

Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional

33

Dezembro 2022

10th Anniversary Special Issue



10th ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL ISSUE

Governo Federal

Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento

Ministra Simone Nassar Tebet

ipea Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada

Fundação pública vinculada ao Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento, o Ipea fornece suporte técnico e institucional às ações governamentais – possibilitando a formulação de inúmeras políticas públicas e programas de desenvolvimento brasileiros – e disponibiliza, para a sociedade, pesquisas e estudos realizados por seus técnicos.

Presidenta (substituta)

Luciana Mendes Santos Servo

Diretor de Desenvolvimento Institucional (substituto)

Sérgio Vinícius Marques do Val Côrtes

**Diretor de Estudos e Políticas do Estado,
das Instituições e da Democracia (substituto)**

Bernardo Abreu de Medeiros

**Diretor de Estudos e Políticas
Macroeconômicas (substituto)**

Francisco Eduardo de Luna Almeida Santos

**Diretor de Estudos e Políticas Regionais,
Urbanas e Ambientais (substituto)**

Bolívar Pêgo Filho

**Diretor de Estudos e Políticas Setoriais, de Inovação,
Regulação e Infraestrutura (substituto)**

Edison Benedito da Silva Filho

Diretora de Estudos e Políticas Sociais (substituta)

Ana Luiza Machado de Codes

Diretor de Estudos Internacionais (substituto)

Fernando José da Silva Paiva Ribeiro

Coordenador-Geral de Imprensa e Comunicação Social

João Cláudio Garcia Rodrigues Lima

Ouvidoria: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/ouvidoria>

URL: <http://www.ipea.gov.br>

Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional

Organizadores

Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino

Felix Garcia Lopez

Natália Massaco Koga

Comitê Editorial

Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino (editor-chefe)

Natália Massaco Koga

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa

Roberto Pires Messenberg

Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar

Felix Garcia Lopez

© Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – ipea 2023

Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional / Instituto de Pesquisa
Econômica Aplicada. – n.1 (2011) - Brasília : Ipea,
2011-

Semestral.

ISSN 2237-6208

1. Política. 2. Estado. 3. Democracia. 4. Periódicos.
I. Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada.

CDD 320.05

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33>

As publicações do Ipea estão disponíveis para *download* gratuito nos formatos PDF (todas) e EPUB (livros e periódicos). Acesso: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/publicacoes>

As opiniões emitidas nesta publicação são de exclusiva e inteira responsabilidade dos autores, não exprimindo, necessariamente, o ponto de vista do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada ou do Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento.

É permitida a reprodução deste texto e dos dados nele contidos, desde que citada a fonte. Reproduções para fins comerciais são proibidas.

A obra retratada na capa deste trigésimo terceiro Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional é a tela *Noite de São João*, de Candido Portinari (1903-1962), datada de 1957. Além da inegável beleza e expressividade de suas obras, Portinari tem importância conceitual para um instituto de pesquisas como o Ipea. O "pintor do novo mundo", como já foi chamado, retratou momentos-chave da história do Brasil, os ciclos econômicos e, sobretudo, o povo brasileiro, em suas condições de vida e trabalho: questões cujo estudo faz parte da própria missão do Ipea. A Diest agradece ao Projeto Portinari pela honra de usar obras do artista em sua produção.

Direito de reprodução gentilmente cedido por João Candido Portinari.

Sumário

PRESENTATION: 10TH ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL ISSUE.....	5
Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Natália Massaco Koga	
POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES.....	25
Luís Felipe Zilli	
AFTERWORD – POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES.....	35
Luís Felipe Zilli	
POSFÁCIO – LETALIDADE E VITIMIZAÇÃO POLICIAL: CARACTERÍSTICAS GERAIS DO FENÔMENO EM TRÊS ESTADOS BRASILEIROS.....	39
Luís Felipe Zilli	
PREVENTING VIOLENT SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING AND AFTER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: GUARANTEEING INCOME, FOCUSING ON MENTAL HEALTH, AND COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY.....	43
Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes	
MANAGEMENT CAPACITY: INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN BRAZIL.....	57
Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa	
MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT DRUG POLICY FORMULATION.....	67
Débora Medeiros Luís Fernando Tófoli	
THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL.....	77
Almir de Oliveira Junior	
AFTERWORD – THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL.....	83
Almir de Oliveira Junior	
POSFÁCIO – A IMPORTÂNCIA DAS ATIVIDADES DE INVESTIGAÇÃO E INTELIGÊNCIA POLICIAL PARA O SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA CRIMINAL E SEU APERFEIÇOAMENTO NO BRASIL.....	85
Almir de Oliveira Junior	
FROM #VIDASNASFAVELASIMPORTAM TO #NÓSPORNÓS: PERIPHERAL YOUTH AT THE CENTER OF THE DEBATE ON DRUG POLICY.....	87
Ana Clara Telles Luna Arouca Raul Santiago	
THE DEBATE ON THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE IN THE COUNTRY: MAIN ARGUMENTS.....	93
Paulo Kliass	

PUBLIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM	99
Almir de Oliveira Junior Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima	
AFTERWORD – PUBLIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM.....	105
Almir de Oliveira Junior Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima	
POSFÁCIO – SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA E RACISMO INSTITUCIONAL.....	107
Almir de Oliveira Junior Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima	
RECENT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION	109
Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa João Cláudio Pompeu	
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK	117
Helder Ferreira Elaine Marcial Joana Alencar	
AFTERWORD – PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK	125
Helder Ferreira Elaine Marcial Joana Alencar	
POSFÁCIO – RESULTADOS PRELIMINARES DO PROJETO A SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA NO BRASIL: UMA VISÃO PROSPECTIVA.....	133
Helder Ferreira Elaine Marcial Joana Alencar	

PRESENTATION: 10TH ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL ISSUE¹

Daniel Pitanguera de Avelino²

Felix Garcia Lopez³

Natália Massaco Koga⁴

This edition of the *Bulletin of Political-Institutional Analysis (Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional – Bapi)* celebrates its tenth anniversary as one of the major avenues for publishing the research results from the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy (Diest).

In an attempt to regularly publish the results of Diest's multi-thematic research, the journal's articles have transitioned through various topics that foster conversation on the structures and institutions of the Brazilian State's performance under democratic rule.

Bapi was originally intended to bring together, in each issue, some of the key results of the multi-thematic research conducted within Diest, but it has gradually evolved into a dossier type publication. Its regular publications began organizing around a central theme, all relevant to the country's political-institutional agenda. Its issues have covered a range of topics, from public governance to class inequality, from changes in the structure of the state to representation through digital means, from the use of scientific evidence in the public policy cycle to obstacles for increasing racial diversity within public bureaucracy. Since its inception in 2011, Bapi has released 32 editions (21 thematic editions), providing 295 articles to the public debate (boxes 1-32).

In celebration of its first decade, this edition contains the 10 most searched for publications according to the Bapi articles repository at Ipea.⁵ The articles are published in English to attract a broader audience and let them access the relevance of the bulletin's publications. A few of the articles contain addendums to the original versions, when the authors deemed it relevant.

The first work, authored by Luís Felipe Zilli, deals with the phenomenon of violence involving police officers. In the study, originally published in December 2018, the author analyzes data from previous years on deaths resulting from police interventions and police officers killed in three Brazilian states – Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and Goiás. As indicated in the addendum, certain trends that were already evident in the original study were accentuated in the following years.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art1>

2. Specialist in public policies and governmental management at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea). Chief Editor of Bapi. *E-mail*: <daniel.avelino@ipea.gov.br>.

3. Planning and research technician at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea). *E-mail*: <felix.lopez@ipea.gov.br>.

4. Specialist in public policies and governmental management at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea). Member of the Editorial Board of Bapi. *E-mail*: <natalia.koga@ipea.gov.br>.

5. This counting considered the data from Repositório do Conhecimento do Ipea. Available at: <<https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/>>. Accessed on: Nov. 9, 2011. Access from each article was measured from the sum of number of downloads and number of pageviews.

The second text, authored by Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes, deals with the possibilities of preventing violent conflicts within the context of the covid-19 pandemic. This analysis, originally published in April 2020, addresses the risk factors associated with the health measures adopted to contain the spread of the coronavirus, which when combined can increase the chances of violent social conflicts. Based on this research, mitigation measures and strategies for the return to face-to-face events are proposed.

The third text, prepared by Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa, introduces the theme of management capacity for policy implementation. The article, first published in June 2016, examines the inter-organizational coordination adopted by social programs in Brazilian federal government agencies. Based on data from previous years, the author discusses alternatives for inter-organizational coordination to strengthen implementation capacity.

The fourth study, produced by Débora Medeiros and Luís Fernando Tófoli, analyzes myths and facts that permeate the debate on drug policies. In the December 2018 essay, the authors seek scientific proof to assess the beliefs that comprise the prohibitionist paradigm, the ideology of the war on drugs, and other conventional wisdom. Based on this evidence, the authors demonstrate the negative impacts of these ideas and the need to review prohibitionist policies.

The fifth text, by Almir de Oliveira Junior, revives the importance of police investigation and intelligence activities. In this study, released in August 2012, the author discusses the challenges faced by Brazilian police organizations because of high crime rates. In this context, data collected can be processed through police intelligence activities so that agents can better perform their work.

The sixth contribution, by Ana Clara Telles, Luna Arouca, and Raul Santiago, deals with the role played by peripheral youth in the debate on drugs. In this study, published in December 2018, the authors discuss the reality in Brazil and how youth from *favelas* and urban peripheries end up being more negatively affected by anti-drug policies. Centered on the narrative of the creation of the Movimentos project, the authors highlight new and noticeable principles that could potentially transform this scenario that is significantly shaped by racism and inequality.

The seventh text, by Paulo Kliass, continues the debate on state-owned companies in Brazil. In this study, originally published in December 2018, the author describes the main arguments historically adopted in Brazil against the long tradition of establishing state-owned companies. Among the arguments the following stand out, motivations of ideological nature, the belief in private efficiency, and pragmatic measures to solve fiscal problems.

Almir de Oliveira Junior and Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima's text, the eighth in the edition, discusses institutional racism within the context of public security. In this work, published in October 2013, the authors argue that Brazil's black population is more exposed to violent crimes and still suffers from discriminatory conduct by police authorities. The authors demonstrate how institutional racism operates from biases and stereotypes to further aggravate the situation of insecurity among this large segment of the population.


The ninth text, composed by Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa and João Cláudio Pompeu, describes the recent trajectory of the organization of the Brazilian federal government. Published in December 2017, the study analyzes the formation and discontinuation of ministries and special secretariats from 1994 to 2015, detailing not only with the number of these agencies, but also with their internal transformations and horizontal differentiation. Based on these observations, it is possible to advance hypotheses on the expansion, fragmentation, and flexibility of these ministerial organizations.

The tenth and final work, by Helder Ferreira, Elaine Marcial and Joana Alencar, presents the preliminary results of the “Public security in Brazil: a prospective vision” project. In this study, published in June 2015, the authors introduce the future scenarios project developed through workshops held during the previous year, which involved researchers, managers, and specialists in Brazilian public security. The addendum prepared by the authors reveals how much the public security landscape has changed in Brazil since then.

These texts represent the research published by Bapi throughout its ten years of existence. Although directed to specific facts and events, these articles advance contemporary debates and concepts related to Brazil. This is the synthesis of the contribution that the journal intends to present to society. It is worth remembering that this contribution was only possible thanks to the valuable efforts of the authors, as well as the network of voluntary reviewers and Ipea’s editorial team. We hope, upon looking back proudly on these past ten years, that we will be able to aptly prepare for the years to come.

BOX 1

Theme and editorial board for 2011 edition

Number 1	November 2011
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maria Martha de Menezes Costa Cassiolato
	

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5545/1/BAPI_n01_Diest_2011-nov.pdf>.

BOX 2

Theme and editorial board for 2012 edition


Number 2	August 2012
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maria Luiza de Castro Muniz Maria Martha de Menezes Costa Cassiolato
	

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5590/3/BAPI_n2.pdf>.

BOX 3

Theme and editorial board for March 2013 edition


Number 3	March 2013
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Alexandre de Avila Gomide Fabio de Sá e Silva Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maria Martha de Menezes Costa Cassiolato
	

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5603/1/BAPI_n03_2013-mar.pdf>.

BOX 4

Theme and editorial board for October 2013 edition

Number 4	October 2013
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Maria Martha de Menezes Costa Cassiolato Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Coordinators:	Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Roberto Pires Messenberg

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5602/1/BAPI_n04_2013-out.pdf>.

BOX 5

Theme and editorial board for May 2014 edition

Number 5	May 2014
Editorial board:	Alexandre de Ávila Gomide Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Constantino Cronemberger Mendes Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Coordinators:	Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Roberto Pires Messenberg

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5601/1/BAPI_n05_Diest_2014-maio.pdf>.

BOX 6

Theme and editorial board for November 2014 edition


Number 6	November 2014
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Constantino Cronemberger Mendes Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Coordinators:	Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Roberto Pires Messenberg

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5591/1/BAPI_n06_2014-jun-nov.pdf>.

BOX 7

Theme and editorial board for January-June 2015 edition


Number 7	January-June 2015
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Constantino Cronemberger Mendes Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos Rute Imanishi Rodrigues Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Coordinators:	Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Roberto Pires Messenberg

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5593/1/BAPI_n07_2015-jan-jun.pdf>.

BOX 8

Theme and editorial board for July-December 2015 edition


Number 8	July-December 2015
Editorial board:	Antonio Lassance de Albuquerque Junior Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Roberto Pires Messenberg Rute Imanishi Rodrigues Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Coordinators:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/6767/1/BAPI_n8.pdf>.

BOX 9

Theme and editorial board for January-June 2016 edition


Number 9	January-June 2016
Editorial board:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Gabriel Godofredo Fiúza de Bragança Ricardo Ginicolo Bacelette Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Coordinator:	Acir dos Santos Almeida

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/7086/1/BAPI_n9.pdf>.

BOX 10

Theme and editorial board for July-December 2016 edition


Number 10	July-December 2016
Editorial board:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Gabriel Godofredo Fiúza de Bragança Ricardo Ginicolo Bacelette Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Coordinator:	Acir dos Santos Almeida

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/7606/1/BAPI_n10.pdf>.

BOX 11

Theme and editorial board for January-June 2017 edition


Number 11	January-June 2017
National Public Security Policy	
Editorial board:	Almir de Oliveira Junior Fabio de Sá e Silva
	
Guest editors:	Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8065/1/BAPI_n11.pdf>.

BOX 12

Theme and editorial board for July-December 2017 edition

Number 12	July-December 2017
Federal public administration	
Editorial board:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Roberto Pires Messenberg Ronaldo Coutinho Garcia Flávia de Holanda Schmidt Squeff
	
Guest editors:	José Celso Cardoso Junior Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8091/1/BAPI_n12.pdf>.

BOX 13

Theme and editorial board for October 2017 edition


Number 13	October 2017
Policy implementation and inequalities	
Editorial board:	Flávia de Holanda Schmidt Squeff Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Marco Antônio Carvalho Natalino Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos
	
Guest editor:	Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8090/1/BAPI_n13.pdf>.

BOX 14

Theme and editorial board for January-June 2018 edition


Number 14	January-June 2018
Social participation	
Editorial board:	Leandro Freitas Couto Paulo de Tarso Linhares Paulo Kliass Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Guest editors:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8543/1/BAPI_n14.pdf>.

BOX 15

Theme and editorial board for July-December 2018 edition

Number 15	July-December 2018
State-owned companies	
Editorial board:	Alexandre de Avila Gomide Bruno Queiroz Cunha Claudio Roberto Amitrano Fernanda de Negri Paulo de Tarso Linhares Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Guest editors:	Flávia de Holanda Schmidt Squeff Mauro Santos Silva Paulo Kliass

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8619/1/BAPI_15.pdf>.

BOX 16

Theme and editorial board for November 2018 edition


Number 16	November 2018
Institutions and development	
Editorial board:	Alexandre de Avila Gomide Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho Janine Mello dos Santos José Celso Pereira Cardoso Junior Marco Antônio Carvalho Natalino Maria Bernadete Sarmiento Gutierrez Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna
	
Guest editors:	Claudio Roberto Amitrano Luís Carlos Garcia Magalhães Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro Mauro Santos Silva

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8720/1/BAPI_16.pdf>.

BOX 17

Theme and editorial board for December 2018 edition


Number 17	December 2018
Empirical studies in law	
Editorial board:	Bernardo Abreu de Medeiros Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Maurício Saboya Pinheiro
	
Guest editors:	Fábio de Sá e Silva Alexandre dos Santos Cunha

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8841/1/Bapi_17.pdf>.

BOX 18

Theme and editorial board for December 2018 edition


Number 18	December 2018
Drug policy	
Editorial board:	Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Janine Mello dos Santos Marco Antônio Carvalho Natalino Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Guest editor:	Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8846/1/Bapi_18.pdf>.

BOX 19

Theme and editorial board for December 2018 edition

Number 19	December 2018
Public governance	
Editorial board:	Alexandre de Avila Gomide Acir dos Santos Almeida Claudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos Janine Mello dos Santos Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar João Cláudio Basso Pompeu Luís Carlos Garcia Magalhães Maurício Saboya Pinheiro Mauro Santos Silva Roberto Pires Messenberg Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa
	
Guest editors:	Pedro Luiz Costa Cavalcante Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8891/1/Bapi_19%20completo.pdf>.

BOX 20

Theme and editorial board for June 2019 edition

Number 20	June 2019
Civil society organizations in Brazil	
Editorial board:	Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira Acir dos Santos Almeida Erivelton Pires Guedes Maurício Saboya Pinheiro Salvador Teixeira Werneck Vianna Luana Simões Pinheiro Leandro Freitas Couto Aguinaldo Nogueira Maciente Igor Ferraz da Fonseca João Cláudio Basso Pompeu Mauro Santos Silva Graziela Ferrero Zucoloto Bruno Queiroz Cunha André Sampaio Zuvanov Priscila Koeller Rodrigues Vieira
	
Guest editor:	Janine Mello dos Santos

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/9404/1/Bapi_20_completo.pdf>.

BOX 21

Theme and editorial board for October 2019 edition

Number 21	October 2019
Electoral financing and lobbying	
Editorial board:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Helder Rogério Sant'Ana Ferreira Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Janine Mello dos Santos Rute Imanishi Rodrigues
	
Guest editor:	Acir dos Santos Almeida

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/9851/1/Bapi_21%20-%20completo.pdf>.

BOX 22

Theme and editorial board for April 2020 edition

Number 22	April 2020
The covid-19 crisis: pandemic impacts and policy recommendations	
Editorial board:	Alexandre dos Santos Cunha Claudio Roberto Amitrano Leandro Freitas Couto Luís Carlos Garcia Magalhães Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Flávia de Holanda Schmidt Squeff Janine Mello dos Santos

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10080/1/BAP1%2022%20_Covid.pdf>.

BOX 23

Theme and editorial board for June 2020 edition

Number 23	June 2020
Social classes, state and inequalities	
Editorial board:	Acir dos Santos Almeida Felix Garcia Lopez Igor Ferraz da Fonseca Helder Rogério Sant'Ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Felix Garcia Lopez Marco Antônio Carvalho Natalino

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10164/1/bapi_23_completo.pdf>.

BOX 24

Theme and editorial board for November 2020 edition

Number 24	November 2020
Uses of evidence in federal public policies	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitanguiera de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro Natália Massaco Koga Pedro Lucas de Moura Palotti Janine Mello dos Santos

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10343/1/Bapi_24_completo.pdf>.

BOX 25

Theme and editorial board for February 2021 edition

Number 25	February 2021
Regular issue with a thematic dossier on digital democracy	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitanguiera de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	João Cláudio Basso Pompeu Igor Ferraz da Fonseca

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10494/1/BAPI_25_2021.pdf>.

BOX 26

Theme and editorial board for March 2021 edition


Number 26	March 2021
Pandemic and public policies: the racial-ethnic issue at the center of the debate	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Tatiana Dias da Silva Antonio Teixeira Lima Junior Angelica Kely de Abreu

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10505/1/BAPI_26_2021.pdf>.

BOX 27

Theme and editorial board for March 2021 edition


Number 27	March 2021
Governmental planning: Pluriannual Plans in crisis	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa Leandro Freitas Couto

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10573/1/bapi_27.pdf>.

BOX 28

Theme and editorial board for April 2021 edition

Number 28	April 2021
Governmental planning: Pluriannual Plan 2016-2019	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Leandro Freitas Couto Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10584/1/bapi_28.pdf>.

BOX 29

Theme and editorial board for June 2021 edition


Number 29	June 2021
Special issue: ten years of Diest	
Editorial board:	Igor Ferraz da Fonseca (chief editor) Acir dos Santos Almeida Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino Felix Garcia Lopez Helder Rogério Sant'Ana Ferreira Natália Massaco Koga
	
Guest editors:	Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires Felix Garcia Lopez Bernardo Abreu de Medeiros

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10629/1/bapi_29.pdf>.

BOX 30

Theme and editorial board for November 2021 edition

Number 30	November 2021
An agenda in (re)construction: the states in Brazilian federalism	
Editorial board:	Daniel Pitanguera de Avelino (chief editor) Natália Massaco Koga Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa Roberto Pires Messenberg Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Felix Garcia Lopez
	
Guest editors:	Sandra Gomes Pedro Lucas de Moura Palotti Elaine Cristina Lício André Luis Nogueira da Silva Catarina Ianni Segatto

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/10923/1/bapi_30.pdf>.

BOX 31

Theme and editorial board for December 2021 edition

Number 31	December 2021
Implementation of affirmative action for black men and women in public service: challenges and perspectives	
Editorial board:	Daniel Pitanguera de Avelino (chief editor) Natália Massaco Koga Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa Roberto Pires Messenberg Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar Felix Garcia Lopez
	
Guest editors:	Tatiana Dias da Silva Luseni Maria Cordeiro de Aquino Adriana Avelar

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/11039/1/bapi_31.pdf>.

BOX 32

Theme and editorial board for June 2022 edition

Number 32

June 2022

National conferences in times of pandemic

Editorial board:

Daniel Pitanguera de Avelino (chief editor)


Natália Massaco Koga

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa

Roberto Pires Messenberg

Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar

Felix Garcia Lopez



Guest editors:

Daniel Pitanguera de Avelino

Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: This edition is available at: <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/11566/9/BAPI_32_web.pdf>.

POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES^{1,2}

Luís Felipe Zilli³

1 INTRODUCTION

According to a survey conducted by the Brazilian Public Security Forum (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública – FBSP), 21,910 people died due to police interventions in Brazil between 2009 and 2016 (FBSP, 2017). During the same period, 2,996 police officers were also killed (both on and off duty). Such numbers not only rank the Brazilian police among the most lethal force organizations worldwide but also confirms their staff among those who die the most due to the performance of their duty and/or police identification (Misse et al., 2013; Nunes, 2018). Today, police killings and victimization are part of two major public security issues in Brazil, not only because of the large number of human lives lost they entail but also because they project deleterious effects on the processes of consolidation of institutions and democracy in the country (Chevigny, 1991; 1995; Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993; Monjardet, 2002; Adorno, 1998; Neme, 2000).

Aiming to contribute to the debate, this article presents a diagnosis of the police killings and victimization phenomena for three Brazilian states: Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and Goiás. Here, we seek not only to scale the problem of deaths resulting from police interventions and violent deaths of police officers in those states but also to know, more in-depth, the circumstances and institutional and criminal contexts that characterize such episodes. For this purpose, the work rests on a database comprising 659 incident records registered between 2009 and 2015 by the police forces of those three states and related to the violent deaths of police officers or deaths resulting from police interventions.⁴ Moreover, FBSP's statistical data were also used.⁵

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art2>

2. English translation of the article originally published in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 17, December 2018. Available at: http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8873/1/bapi_17_cap_10.pdf.

3. Ph.D in sociology from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – UFMG); and researcher at the João Pinheiro Foundation (Fundação João Pinheiro – FJP). At FJP, he is a member of the Center for Studies in Public Security (Núcleo de Estudos em Segurança Pública – Nesp).

4. The data analyzed in this article were collected when conducting the research Diagnosis of the Conditions and Consequences of Policing, developed between 2014 and 2015. The study was funded with the resources of Public Call for proposals of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada – Ipea)/National Development Research Program (Subprograma de Pesquisa para o Desenvolvimento Nacional – PNPD) No. 43/2014 and part of the program Pensando O Direito, the result of an association between the Secretariat of Legislative Affairs of the Ministry of Justice (Secretaria de Assuntos Legislativos do Ministério da Justiça – SAL/MJ) and Ipea.


5. Since 2008, the publications edited by FBSP have worked with the concept and methodology of “quality groups” to classify the data levels of accuracy and reliability provided to the institution by the state Secretariats of Public Security. For this classification, the state are allocated into four quality groups: group 1 (highest quality); group 2 (intermediate quality); group 3 (lowest quality); and group 4 (no condition to assess data quality). For this article, both Minas Gerais and Pernambuco are classified as group 1 and Goiás as group 2.

2 POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: MEASUREMENT CRITERIA AND SCALE OF THE PROBLEM

According to data from the 11th Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security (FBSP, 2017), 4,222 people were killed in Brazil due to police interventions in 2016. During the same year, the number of police officers murdered (both on duty and off duty) reached 453, indicating a ratio of over nine people killed for every police officer murdered for incidents usually classified by the forces as “confrontations” between police officers and suspects, or even “executions” of police officers. Those numbers place the Brazilian police among the most lethal security forces in the world, with an average of approximately eleven deaths per day, but also among those with the highest mortality rates of their agents due to violence, with an average of over one police officer murdered per day.

To get a better view of the scale of this problem in Brazil, one can just compare the national numbers with the ones from other countries that also face severe public security issues. In 2016, while Brazil had a rate of approximately two deaths resulting from police interventions for every 100 thousand inhabitants, South Africa’s rate was just above one death. In Mexico, it was not even 0.3. Even in the United States, a country with approximately 900 thousand active police officers (in Brazil, there are just over 500 thousand), this rate reached 0.13 death for every 100 thousand inhabitants (Zimring, 2017; Nunes, 2018). Figure 1 shows the evolution of cases of police killings and victimization in Brazil between 2009 and 2016.

FIGURE 1
Police killings and victimization in Brazil – number of deaths (2009-2016)



Source: FBSP (2017).
Author’s elaboration.

On the one hand, the public perception that police forces systematically overstep their legal prerogatives to the use of force fosters low levels of trust in the work done by police forces and casts doubt on their own legitimacy as institutions of social control. On the other hand, the observation that Brazilian police officers are subjected to very high rates of victimization also contributes to consolidating, among civil society, organizations, and police officers, a “war culture,” meaning a continuous call for extrajudicial types of conflict resolution and whose most vivid demonstration are the high fatality rates of police actions observed in the country (Skolnick, 1966; Souza and Minayo, 2005).

Aside from measuring the fatality issue and police victimization, studies that aim to understand such phenomena better also face conceptual matters. Empirically, “police lethality” is usually associated with all deaths resulting from police officers’ interventions, only motivated by the exercise of the prerogatives and guidelines that support the police mandate. In the opposite direction, all cases in which there was a violent death of a police officer, as the only result of their concrete or potential exercise of the prerogatives and guidelines supporting the police function and mandate, are classified as occurrences of “police victimization” (including cases in which officers were murdered only because they have been identified as police officers). That is why, traditionally, most studies on the subject include incidents involving both police officers on their regular duty schedule and officers who were off duty or not active (Cano, 1997; Loche, 2010).

Although such definitions seem obvious and intuitive, it is crucial to define them because they help to separate – at least conceptually – the “police lethality” issue from other types of deaths caused by police officers, such as, e.g., crimes connected to activities of “extermination groups,” even if, in practice, there is, in some cases, a relative confluence between the phenomena and the lack of transparency of the classification limits (Misse et al., 2013).

Besides the conceptual issues, the study of police lethality and victimization also faces parametric problems. Authors such as Skolnick and Fyfe (1993), Cano (1997), Bittner (2003), and Nunes (2018), among others, observe that there is no consensus criterion to determine whether the use of force by police organizations in certain situations was necessary, reasonable or appropriate, mainly because lethal force is, to a greater or lesser extent, a resource of social control and maintenance of order used by police organizations worldwide (Geller and Scott, 1992; Chevigny, 1991; 1995; Oliveira, 2012).

There are three criteria often used by specialized studies and also by government agencies to measure the use of lethal force by police: i) the ratio between civilians injured and civilians killed in incidents involving firearms; ii) the ratio between civilians and police officers killed; and iii) the proportion of civilians killed by the police compared with the total of voluntary manslaughters (Cano, 1997; Loche, 2010; Nunes, 2018).

The first criterion rests on data from all incidents, including the use of firearms by police officers. Ideally, police actions in which firearms have been shot would typically result in more civilians injured than killed. When the death toll is higher than the number of people injured, we can infer that the police are making disproportionate use and abuse of power.

The second criterion is based on the assumption that there must be a relatively reasonable ratio between the number of civilians and police killed, above which would be considered a misuse of power by police organizations. Although this indicator could be a good measure of police lethality and victimization, specialized literature has not reached a consensus regarding what should be the boundary line setting the limit of the indiscriminate use of lethal force. Chevigny (1995), for example, assumes the ratio of ten civilians killed for each police officer. Cano (1997), in turn, argues that the ratio of four civilians killed for each police officer would be the reasonable maximum limit.

Both studies proposed their parameters of “tolerable values” based on the observation of the average value that the ratio of civilians/police killed reaches in a group of countries. Nevertheless,

the authors consider the arbitrariness that characterizes the limits considered for this indicator, defined more empirically than conceptually.

The third and last criterion is grounded on the idea that deaths caused by the police cannot represent a significant percentage of the total voluntary manslaughter registered in a given district. Still, the literature has also not reached a consensus regarding what should be the boundary line setting the limit of the abuse of power by the police. In Mexico, for instance, deaths resulting from police interventions represent about 2.4% of the total murders registered in the country (Vivanco, 2015); in the United States, they are approximately 3.6% of the total homicides (Loche, 2010). In turn, in Brazilian states such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, this percentage reaches 9.7% and 8.9%, respectively (Nunes and Rodrigues, 2014).


The significant disparity in data and the methodologies used to measure police lethality and victimization make it difficult to establish clearly defined parameters for classifying these phenomena. So much so that several studies have chosen to simultaneously use more than one measurement criterion to understand the problem of police violence. Even so, a substantial part of these classifications and proposed parameters are still more empirically guided by the average of incident patterns verified in several countries than by technical/conceptual references (Nunes, 2018).

3 POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION IN MINAS GERAIS, PERNAMBUCO AND GOIÁS

3.1 Minas Gerais

Over the last few years, police lethality indicators have significantly increased in Minas Gerais. Between 2009 and 2015, for example, there was a gross growth rate of 110% in the number of victims of police lethality in the state, jumping from fifty deaths resulting from police intervention in 2009 to 105 in 2015. The number of police officers executed or killed in confrontations showed relative stability over the same period, ranging from seven murders in 2009 to eleven dead officers in 2015. Over the studied period, the police killed 524 citizens, and 51 police officers were killed (a ratio of 10.2 civilian deaths for each police officer killed). Figure 2 illustrates these patterns.

FIGURE 2
Police killings and victimization in Minas Gerais – number of deaths (2009-2015)



Source: FBSP (2017).
Author's elaboration.

If we analyze the incident records in more detail, a “typical profile” of the state’s lethal events and police victimization can be built. Geographically speaking, only 30% of the deaths resulting from police interventions registered in Minas Gerais occurred in *favelas* – a different pattern from other studies of this type, especially those carried out in the city of Rio de Janeiro. Almost 80% of those deaths occurred in public spaces, involving, in 77% of cases, police officers who were “on duty.” Nearly 60% of police deaths involved officers working in area units (rather than special units).

In 55% of the records, the officers claimed that the confrontations would have occurred during regular patrolling or while handling incidents. In 32.8% of the cases, lethal force was used during the approach of suspects; in another 44.6% of the incidents, to intervene in crimes in progress, with an average of nine shots fired by police officers and two shots fired by opponents in those incidents. Officers reported the apprehension of firearms in 88% of the incidents and arrests in 48%.

One thing that draws attention to the deaths resulting from police interventions recorded in Minas Gerais is where victims were shot: 32% of the dead were shot in the head and back. This pattern is in blatant disagreement with what is dictated by the different use-of-force regulations adopted by local police forces, suggesting recurrent abuses or misuse of lethal force by police officers.⁶


Another aspect worth noting is that, in the state, there is a disproportion between the number of police officers and citizens killed. As previously indicated, between 2009 and 2015, Minas Gerais recorded an average ratio of 10.3 “non-police” killed for each officer killed. This ratio surpasses metrics commonly used by several studies to indicate the abusive or disproportionate use of force by police organizations (Bittner, 2003; Nunes, 2018).

3.2 Pernambuco

Over the last few years, the indicators of police lethality in Pernambuco have also been showing an increasing trend. Between 2009 and 2015, there was a gross growth of over 27% of victims of police lethality in the state, jumping from 40 deaths resulting from police intervention in 2009 to 51 in 2015. Throughout this period, 244 deaths were registered due to police interventions, and 170 police officers were killed: an average ratio of 1.43 citizens killed for each police in Pernambuco during those seven years. Figure 3 presents those numbers.

6. In Minas Gerais, the document that technically regulates the police approaches to using firearms is the Doctrine Notebook No. 1, edited by the Military Police of Minas Gerais (Polícia Militar de Minas Gerais – PMMG). It states, “In cases where the military police officer fires his firearm at a person, it is important to consider the different circumstances that may interfere with the accuracy of the shot, as described in the ‘variables partially controlled by the military police officer.’ Therefore – and to ensure that this shot is effective (achieves its objective of immediately stopping the attack) – military police officers will point their weapon at the central part of the aggressor’s body (thoracic area). Whenever circumstances allow and as long as it does not present a safety risk to others or themselves, military police officers may shoot in other areas of the body (mainly legs) to reduce injuries to a minimum (however, there is still the risk of causing severe injuries or death)” (Minas Gerais, 2013, p. 92-93).

FIGURE 3
Police killings and victimization in Pernambuco – number of deaths (2009-2015)



Source: FBSP (2017).
Author’s elaboration.


As for Minas Gerais, after analyzing the incident records in Pernambuco, we can also build a “typical profile” of police lethality and victimization in the state. Geographically speaking, 70% of the deaths resulting from police interventions registered in Pernambuco happened outside the *favelas*. Almost 80% of those deaths occurred in public spaces, involving, in 77% of cases, police officers who were “on duty.” In 55% of the records, the officers claimed that the confrontations would have happened during regular patrolling or attending occurrences. In most cases (57%), lethal force was used during the approach of suspects or to intervene in crimes in progress (with an average of two shots fired by both police officers and opponents). It is worth highlighting that over a third of the “non-police” victims were shot in the head and back. Police officers reported the apprehension of firearms in 78% of the cases and arrests in 66%.

One thing that draws attention in Pernambuco – and outlines how complex it is to measure the phenomena of lethality and police victimization – is the relative proportionality between the number of police and “non-police” killed in the state: as previously observed, between 2009 and 2015, there were 1.65 “non-police” killed for each security officer killed. At first, such ratio would place the state within lethality standards recognized as “acceptable” by some international studies. However, it should be highlighted that this proportionality results from more from the extremely high number of officers killed than from an alleged low number of lethal police interventions. For this reason, there is a need to use more than one parameter to measure the problems of police lethality and victimization, as previously observed (Loche, 2010).

3.3 Goiás

Besides its very high levels, police lethality in Goiás showed a substantial increase between 2009 and 2015, jumping from 70 deaths resulting from police intervention in the first year to 141 in the last year under the study scope – a gross growth of over 100%. Throughout this period, there were 566 deaths resulting from police interventions in the state and 38 cases of police officers murdered – a ratio of almost 15 citizens killed for each police officer victimized. Figure 4 shows the evolution of those numbers.

FIGURE 4
Police killings and victimization in Goiás – number of deaths (2009-2015)



Source: FBSP (2017).
Author's elaboration.

Unlike the procedure adopted by the same institutions in Minas Gerais and Pernambuco, the Secretariat of Public Security (Secretaria de Segurança Pública – SSP) of Goiás did not provide copies of the police reports for this research. The authority limited itself to providing a table with the general number of the incidents registered between 2009 and 2015, containing basic annual information on those events. Still, the data allow us to identify some patterns that characterize the phenomena of lethality and police victimization in Goiás. The records indicate, for example, that 85% of police officers killed and 55% injured in the state between 2009 and 2015 were victimized while “off duty.” On the other hand, almost 80% of those killed and 60% injured due to police interventions in this period were victims of officers on a regular work schedule. The typical profile of police lethality and victimization indicates that in Goiás, police officers kill on duty and die off duty.

Another vital aspect to be highlighted in Goiás is the ratio of almost 15 citizens killed for every police officer killed between 2009 and 2015. Although, as previously discussed that the specialized literature has not reached a consensus regarding the limits of a “tolerable” police lethality rate, the proportion of citizens/police officers killed verified in the state far surpasses the metrics observed in countries in which police forces make abusive or disproportionate use of force (Cano, 2014).

4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The data collected point to a scenario of high lethality rates and police victimization for the three states analyzed. In Minas Gerais and Goiás, for instance, the disproportion between the number of citizens and police officers killed in events classified as “confrontations” surpass the limits usually considered by the literature, denoting the abusive and disproportionate use of force by police forces. In Pernambuco, on the other hand, the rate of police officers murdered between 2009 and 2015 was 52% higher than the national rate, reflecting the violence and insecurity that affects public security professionals in that state. When comparing the data with international indicators, their severity becomes even more evident. Table 1 summarizes police lethality and victimization in the country, and the three states analyzed.

TABLE 1
Brazil, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, and Goiás: police killings and victimization (2009-2015)

	Killed citizens/police officers ratio	Deaths due to police intervention per 100 thousand inhabitants	Total of homicides represented by the deaths due to police intervention (%)	Police officers killed per 1,000 officers
Brazil	7.2	1.27	4.50	0.65
Minas Gerais	10.3	0.37	1.73	0.13
Pernambuco	1.4	0.38	0.99	0.99
Goiás	14.9	1.29	3.18	0.34

Source: SSP of Minas Gerais; Secretaria de Defesa Social (SDS) of Pernambuco; SSP of Goiás; FBSP (2017).
 Author's elaboration.

For the states studied, it was also observed that deaths resulting from police interventions involve agents on regular duty in incidents that reach them suddenly (via notifications by passers-by or the police headquarters). In general, homicides are committed by police officers based in area units, outside *favelas*, and involved in lethal confrontations in the “retail” of everyday incidents.

On the other side of the phenomenon, police officers die during their off hours or performing other paid activities other than those typical of policing. They die when trying to intervene in crimes in progress – almost always improvised and without due operational support – while doing odd jobs as private security guards, fighting or reacting to attempted robberies. In common is that they carry guns even during their off hours. Frequently, those guns are used against the police themselves or lead to the victimization of the officers as soon as their aggressors detect them.

All those issues end up connected with elements already discussed by other studies of the same type: insufficient and lack of continuous training for police officers to exercise the types of use of force properly; the need to increase external control of police activity; the discussion of the police function, which imposes to officers carrying of firearms and the obligation to intervene in crimes (even during their off hours); as well as the need to qualify information and records on police lethality and victimization, so that such phenomena are better known.

In Brazil, the historical neglect of those issues seems to be related not only to an “extermination culture” in force among specific sectors of police organizations and public security professionals but also to a set of beliefs and values embraced by a substantial part of civil society that supports and, frequently, encourages police violence practices.

REFERENCES

- ADORNO, S. Consolidação democrática e políticas de segurança pública no Brasil: rupturas e continuidades. In: ZAVERUCHA, J. (Org.). **Democracia e instituições políticas brasileiras no final do século XX**. Recife: Editora Bagaço, 1998.
- BITTNER, E. **Aspectos do trabalho policial**. São Paulo: Editora Edusp, 2003.
- CANO, I. **Letalidade da ação policial no Rio de Janeiro**. Rio de Janeiro: Iser, 1997.

_____. Viés racial no uso da força letal pela polícia no Brasil. **MPMG Jurídico**, Minas Gerais, v. 1, p. 17-25, 2014.

CHEVIGNY, P. **Police deadly force as social control**: Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina. São Paulo: NEV/USP, 1991. (Série Dossiê NEV, n. 2).

_____. **Edge of the knife**: police violence in the Americas. New York: New York Press, 1995.

FBSP – FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. **Anuário brasileiro de segurança pública 2017**. São Paulo: FBSP, 2017.

GELLER, W.; SCOTT, J. **Deadly force**: what we know – a practitioner’s desk reference on police-involved shootings. Washington: Police, 1992.

LOCHE, A. A letalidade da ação policial: parâmetros para análise. **Tomo**, n. 17, p. 39-56, 2010.

MINAS GERAIS. Polícia Militar de Minas Gerais. **Intervenção policial**: processo de comunicação e uso de força. Belo Horizonte: Academia de Polícia Militar, 2013. (Caderno Doutrinário, n. 1).

MISSE, M. et al. **Quando a polícia mata**: homicídio por “autos de resistência” no Rio de Janeiro (2001-2011). Rio de Janeiro: Booklink, 2013.

MONJARDET, D. O que faz a polícia: sociologia da força pública. São Paulo: Edusp, 2002.

NEME, C. **A instituição policial na ordem democrática**: o caso da Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo. 2000. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2000.

NUNES, S. B. **Trabalho sujo ou missão de vida?** Persistência, reprodução e legitimidade da letalidade na ação da PMESP. 2018. Tese (Doutorado) – Fundação Getulio Vargas, São Paulo, 2018.

NUNES, S. B.; RODRIGUES, B. Letalidade policial: uma resiliente prática institucional. *In*: FBSP – FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA (Org.). **Anuário brasileiro de segurança pública 2014**. São Paulo: FBSP, 2014.

OLIVEIRA, E. N. de. Políticas públicas e estratégias de controle da ação letal das instituições policiais no estado de São Paulo. **Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública**, v. 6, n. 1, p. 28-47, 2012.

SKOLNICK, J. H. **Justice without trial**: law enforcement in democratic society. New York: MacMillan, 1966.

SKOLNICK, J. H.; FYFE, J. **Above the law**: police and the excessive use of force. New York: Free Press, 1993.

SOUZA, E. R.; MINAYO, M. C. S. Policial, risco como profissão: morbimortalidade vinculada ao trabalho. **Ciência e Saúde Coletiva**, v. 10, n. 4, p. 917-928, 2005.

VIVANCO, J. M. México: a un año de la masacre. **Human Rights Watch Report for Americas**, 14 Jul. 2015. Retrieved July 20, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/enK3w3>>.

ZIMRING, F. E. **When police kill**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017.

AFTERWORD – POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES¹

Luís Felipe Zilli²

Originally published in 2018, this article already warned, at that time, about the process of strong recrudescence of police violence in Brazil. Based on the analysis of data from three states of the federation (Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Goiás), the text pointed out not only the expressive growth in the number of people killed by the police in the country, but also the deterioration of all the indicators by which traditionally is measured the reasonableness of the use of force by public security agents (ratio between killed and wounded during police actions; ratio between citizens and police officers killed in confrontations; number of citizens killed by the police for each group of 100,000 inhabitants; percentage of deaths caused by the police over the total number of homicides in the country etc.).

According to data from the Brazilian Public Security Forum (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública – FBSP),³ during the four years before the publication of the text, Brazilian police forces had been responsible for the death of 15,763 people in the country, an average of just over 3,900 victims per year. In the following four years, between 2018 and 2021, this number jumped to 25,138 deaths as a result of police actions, an average of 6,200 fatalities per year (a gross increase of almost 60% in police lethality between the two periods). In sociodemographic terms, the profile of victims of state violence has remained unchanged throughout all these years: young, black, with low education and income, residents of poor neighborhoods on the urban periphery.

On the other hand, the country has experienced a significant reduction in its indicators of police victimization in recent years. The same data from the FBSP show that, between 2014 and 2017, 1,536 public security agents were killed in the country, an annual average of 384 fatalities during the period. In the following four years, this figure dropped to 927, an average of 232 police officers killed per year (a gross reduction of almost 40% in the lethal victimization of police officers).

The movement of detachment from the trend lines of lethality and police victimization needs to be highlighted because, in itself, it already undermines the notion, strongly spread by common sense, that the increase in police violence in Brazil would be a result of the recrudescence of the so-called “war on crime” or, more specifically, the “war on drugs”. If the use of lethal force by the police were proportional to the levels of violence suffered by State agents (as determined by all police procedure manuals), lethality and police victimization would reasonably follow the same trend: the increase in deaths caused by the police would be proportionately accompanied by the growth in deaths of the police agents themselves. It is therefore necessary to seek other possible explanations for the phenomenon, or even to understand what its main vectors have been.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art3>


2. Ph.D. in sociology from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – UFMG); and researcher at the João Pinheiro Foundation (Fundação João Pinheiro – FJP). At FJP, he is a member of the Center for Studies in Public Security (Núcleo de Estudos em Segurança Pública – Nesp).

3. Available at: <https://forumseguranca.org.br/>.

A regionalized analysis of the most recent data on police lethality and victimization in Brazil helps to shed light on the issue. This is because the increase in police violence did not occur homogeneously across the national territory. Three regions of the country led this movement in a very evident way: Midwest, North and Northeast. Between 2018 and 2021, Brazil had an average annual rate of 2.97 deaths resulting from police interventions for each group of 100,000 inhabitants. In the same period, three regions of the country had higher average annual rates than the national one: Northeast, Midwest and North with, respectively, 3.04, 4.2 and 4.62 deaths for each group of 100,000 inhabitants. In addition, all these regions showed a growth trend in their police fatality rates over the period, contrary to the national trend, which was of stability with a slight reduction between 2020 and 2021.

The Southeast region, on the other hand, historically responsible for the largest contingent of deaths caused by police forces in the country, showed a tendency to reduce its lethality indicators during the period, leaving a rate of 3.18 deaths for each group of 100,000 inhabitants in 2019, to 2.32 in 2021 (therefore standing below the national average during the period). The following figure shows these movements.

FIGURE 1
Police lethality rates in Brazil, by region (2018-2021)



Source: FBSP, 2022. Available at: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/>>.
Author's elaboration.

In addition to the regional heterogeneities of police lethality patterns, in many ways resulting from the institutional and procedural differences that exist between the public security forces of Brazilian states, another dimension well reflects the complexity of intervening in the problem of police violence in Brazil: the context of fierce political and regulatory disputes that has been

established in the country around investigations and judicial processing of cases of deaths resulting from police interventions. According to a survey carried out by the FJP,⁴ there are currently at least 28 regulations in the country (7 federal and 21 state-level) that deal with the issue of police lethality in its most diverse areas. These are laws, decrees, recommendations, normative instructions and manuals, published since 2010 by various public bodies and agencies (federal and state-level) to try to regulate and establish minimum protocols for action for Public Security and Justice bodies in cases of police lethality.

Currently, the functional and federative autonomy of police forces in the states hampers the existence of minimally standardized institutional procedures or arrangements for Public Security organizations to act in cases of lethality. In practice, there is currently no standardization of nomenclatures or registration methods to be adopted in the country when deaths resulting from police intervention occur; there are no investigation or action protocols for external control bodies; there is not even a definition on which police organization (civilian or military) should conduct investigations of the cases. In each state, the profusion of regulations reflects the context of fierce political, institutional and corporate disputes around the issue of police lethality, clearly damaging the consolidation of mechanisms of transparency and public control of the use of force by organizations of force.

This movement frames a national context of strong incursion by the Military Police (Polícia Militar – PM) in the field of investigation and judicial processing of police lethality: from an administrative perspective, the PMs articulate in their states to create mechanisms that grant them the prerogative to conduct investigations of the deaths caused by their own agents. In the political sphere, these military corporations strengthen their lobby in the national parliament to try to modify the Brazilian criminal and criminal procedural laws and, with that, to make sure that the homicides committed by their agents on duty (or even off-duty, but due to the police service) are judicially considered “military crimes” and, therefore, are no longer judged by the courts of the jury of the common justice and start being prosecuted by military courts of the states or the Union.⁵ Such aspects show the complexity of the theme and the great difficulty that exists today in Brazil to face the problem of police violence.

4. FJP – Fundação João Pinheiro. *Letalidade e vitimização policial em Minas Gerais: arcabouços normativos e fluxos de processamento investigativo*. [s.l.]: [s.d.], fev. 2020. (Relatório de Pesquisa).

5. In its article 9, paragraph 1, the Military Penal Code (Código Penal Militar – CPM) determines that intentional crimes against life, when committed by military personnel against civilians, fall within the competence of the jury court (and, therefore, must be judged by the common justice).

POSFÁCIO — LETALIDADE E VITIMIZAÇÃO POLICIAL: CARACTERÍSTICAS GERAIS DO FENÔMENO EM TRÊS ESTADOS BRASILEIROS¹

Luís Felipe Zilli²

1 INTRODUÇÃO

Originalmente publicado em 2018, este artigo já alertava, à época, para o processo de forte recrudescimento da violência policial no Brasil. A partir da análise dos dados de três estados da Federação (Minas Gerais, Pernambuco e Goiás), o texto apontava não apenas o expressivo crescimento do número de pessoas mortas pelas polícias no país mas também a deterioração de todos os indicadores pelos quais tradicionalmente se mensura a razoabilidade do uso da força por parte dos agentes de segurança pública (razão entre mortos e feridos durante ações policiais; razão entre cidadãos e policiais mortos em confrontos; número de cidadãos mortos pela polícia para cada grupo de 100 mil habitantes; percentual que as mortes provocadas pela polícia representam dentro do total dos homicídios no país etc.).

Segundo dados do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública (FBSP),³ nos quatro anos anteriores à publicação do texto, as forças policiais brasileiras haviam sido responsáveis pela morte de 15.763 pessoas no país, uma média de pouco mais de 3,9 mil vítimas por ano. Nos quatro anos seguintes, entre 2018 e 2021, este número saltou para 25.138 mortos em decorrência de ações policiais, uma média de 6,2 mil vítimas fatais ao ano, um crescimento bruto de quase 60% da letalidade policial no período. Em termos sociodemográficos, o perfil das vítimas da violência estatal se manteve inalterado ao longo de todos esses anos: jovens, negros, com baixa escolaridade e renda, moradores de bairros pobres de periferias urbanas.

Em sentido contrário, o país tem vivenciado nos últimos anos uma redução expressiva de seus indicadores de vitimização policial. Os mesmos dados do FBSP demonstram que, entre 2014 e 2017, 1.536 agentes de segurança pública foram mortos no país, uma média anual de 384 vítimas fatais durante o período. Nos quatro anos seguintes, este montante caiu para 927, média de 232 policiais mortos por ano, uma redução bruta de quase 40% da vitimização letal de policiais.

O movimento de descolamento das linhas de tendência da letalidade e da vitimização policial precisa ser destacado porque, por si só, já joga por terra a noção, fortemente difundida pelo senso comum, de que o aumento da violência policial no Brasil seria decorrência do recrudescimento da chamada “guerra contra o crime” ou, mais especificamente, da “guerra às drogas”. Se o emprego de força letal por parte das polícias fosse proporcional aos níveis de violência sofrida pelos agentes do Estado – como determinam todos os manuais de procedimentos policiais –, letalidade e vitimização policial seguiriam razoavelmente a mesma tendência: o aumento de mortes provocadas pela polícia seria proporcionalmente acompanhado pelo crescimento das mortes dos próprios policiais.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art4>

2. Doutor em sociologia pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG); e pesquisador no Núcleo de Estudos em Segurança Pública da Fundação João Pinheiro (Nesp/FJP).

3. Disponível em: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/>>.

É preciso, portanto, buscar outras possíveis explicações para o fenômeno ou mesmo compreender quais têm sido seus principais vetores.


Uma análise regionalizada dos dados mais recentes de letalidade e vitimização policial no Brasil ajuda a jogar luz sobre a questão. Isso porque o aumento da violência policial não ocorreu de modo homogêneo pelo território nacional. Entre 2018 e 2021, o Brasil apresentou uma taxa anual média de 2,97 mortes decorrentes de intervenções policiais para cada grupo de 100 mil habitantes. No mesmo período, três regiões do país apresentaram taxas anuais médias maiores do que a nacional: Nordeste, Centro-Oeste e Norte com, respectivamente, 3,04, 4,2 e 4,62 mortes para cada grupo de 100 mil habitantes. Além disso, todas essas regiões apresentaram tendência de crescimento de suas taxas de letalidade policial ao longo do período, contrariando a tendência nacional, que foi de estabilidade com ligeira redução entre 2020 e 2021.

A região Sudeste, em contrapartida, historicamente responsável pelo maior contingente de mortes provocadas pelas forças policiais no país, apresentou tendência de redução de seus indicadores de letalidade durante o período, saindo de uma taxa de 3,18 mortes para cada grupo de 100 mil habitantes em 2019 para 2,32 em 2021, ficando, portanto, abaixo da própria média nacional durante o período. O gráfico 1 apresenta estes movimentos.

GRÁFICO 1

Brasil: taxas de letalidade policial (2018-2021)

(Para cada grupo de 100 mil habitantes)



Fonte: FBSP. Disponível em: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/>>.
Elaboração do autor.

Para além das heterogeneidades regionais dos padrões de letalidade policial, em muitos sentidos decorrentes das próprias diferenças institucionais e procedimentais existentes entre as forças de segurança pública dos estados brasileiros, outra dimensão reflete bem a complexidade de se intervir no problema da violência policial no Brasil: o contexto de acirradas disputas políticas e normativas que se estabeleceu no país em torno das investigações e do processamento judicial dos casos de mortes decorrentes de intervenções policiais. Segundo levantamento realizado pela Fundação João Pinheiro, existem hoje no país pelo menos 28 normativas (sete federais e 21 estaduais) que tratam da temática da letalidade policial em seus mais diversos âmbitos.⁴ São leis, decretos, recomendações, instruções normativas e manuais, publicados desde 2010 por diversas instâncias e órgãos públicos (federal e estaduais) para tentar regulamentar e estabelecer protocolos mínimos de atuação para os órgãos de segurança pública e justiça em casos de letalidade policial.

Atualmente, a autonomia funcional e federativa das forças policiais nos estados interdita a existência de procedimentos ou arranjos institucionais minimamente padronizados para que as organizações de segurança pública atuem nos casos de letalidade. Na prática, não existe hoje no país padronização das nomenclaturas ou dos modos de registro a serem adotados quando ocorrem mortes decorrentes de intervenção policial, não há protocolos de investigação ou de atuação dos órgãos de controle externo e sequer há definição sobre qual organização policial (civil ou militar) deveria conduzir as investigações dos casos. Em cada estado, a profusão de normativas reflete o contexto de acirradas disputas políticas, institucionais e corporativas em torno do tema da letalidade policial, com claros prejuízos para a consolidação de mecanismos de transparência e de controle público do uso da força por parte das organizações de força.

Tal movimento emoldura um contexto nacional de forte avanço das polícias militares (PMs) sobre o campo da investigação e do processamento judicial da letalidade policial: sob a perspectiva administrativa, as PMs se articulam em seus estados para criarem mecanismos que lhes garantam a prerrogativa de conduzir as investigações das mortes provocadas por seus próprios agentes. Na esfera política, as corporações militares fortalecem seu *lobby* no parlamento nacional para tentar modificar a legislação penal e processual penal brasileira e, com isso, garantir que os homicídios praticados por seus agentes em serviço – ou mesmo de folga, mas em razão do serviço policial – sejam judicialmente considerados crimes militares e, portanto, deixem de ser julgados pelos tribunais do júri da justiça comum e passem a ser processados por tribunais militares dos estados ou da União.⁵ Esses aspectos evidenciam a complexidade do tema e a grande dificuldade existente hoje no Brasil para o enfrentamento do problema da violência policial.

4. Zilli, L. F. et al. Letalidade e vitimização policial em Minas Gerais: arcabouços normativos e fluxos de processamento investigativo. *Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública*, São Paulo: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, v. 14, n. 2, p. 46-63, 2020.

5. Em seu art. 9º, § 1º, o Código Penal Militar (CPM) determina que crimes dolosos contra a vida, quando cometidos por militares contra civis, são de competência do Tribunal do Júri e, portanto, devem ser julgados pela justiça comum.

PREVENTING VIOLENT SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING AND AFTER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: GUARANTEEING INCOME, FOCUSING ON MENTAL HEALTH, AND COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY^{1,2,3}

Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes⁴

1 INTRODUCTION

The covid-19 pandemic introduced or aggravated a set of stressors for the population. Some of these stressors were due to the pandemic itself while others were due to policies aimed at tackling the pandemic.

For example, among the policies aimed at tackling the pandemic, various social distancing measures were adopted. Adoption of these measures was decentralized, varying across different states and municipalities: governments cancelled public events; closed – partially or fully – non-essential businesses; closed schools; imposed controls on people’s mobility; and restricted the entry of foreign citizens. Similar measures were adopted in countries with high transmission rates (e.g., China, Italy, France, and Spain) and in those with relatively low rates (Bolivia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary) (Hale et al. 2020).

This article explores some of the stressors associated with the pandemic, emphasizing that they increase the chances of violent social conflicts in the absence of state action to tackle the stressors.⁵ The article also proposes policies aimed at mitigating the effects of these stressors and a potential ‘exit strategy’.

2 EPIDEMICS, STRESSORS, AND VIOLENT SOCIAL CONFLICT

The covid-19 pandemic triggered at least five stressors, related either to the pandemic itself or to measures aimed at tackling it: i) fear of being infected, of someone close being infected, or of not receiving medical care if needed; ii) a decrease in income, implying less consumption or greater indebtedness; iii) the effects from social distancing measures; iv) conflicting or inaccurate information about the pandemic and the state’s response to it; and v) a lack of an exit strategy. Although these factors affect the whole society, stress levels are higher for some groups, especially those at higher risk of contracting the disease or in a situation of poverty (or who might enter into poverty due to the pandemic).

These factors increase the odds of violent social conflicts, observed during previous epidemics or natural disasters. Conflicts could occur in the form of protests, riots, looting, vandalism, and abuse of people working to contain the pandemic.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art5>

2. This article was originally published as *Technical Report* No. 27. Available at: <<https://bit.ly/3VsilGm>>. Also, a Portuguese version of this article was originally published in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 22, April 2020. Available at: <<https://bit.ly/3H1Whht>>.

3. The author thanks João Pedro Oliveira dos Santos for collecting part of the information for this article, as well as comments and suggestions from Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira, Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho, Flávia de Holanda Schmidt, Janine Mello dos Santos, and Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares.

4. Planning and research technician at the Department of International Studies of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Dinte/Ipea).

5. Social conflicts manifested virtually or from home would not, of course, impact social distancing measures.

Situations like these occurred during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic (2002-2004), the cholera epidemic in Zimbabwe (2008), and the Ebola epidemic (2013-2015) (Watts, 2003; Onishi, 2014; Ebola..., 2014; Balakrishnan, 2008).

Does the environment created by the covid-19 pandemic favor violent social conflict? Considering what occurred during the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there are, on the one hand, two factors that reduce the chances of violent social conflict in the case of covid-19: i) the mortality rate is much lower than that of Ebola, causing less stress on the population; and ii) to date, covid-19 spread primarily in places with relatively low levels of poverty. On the other hand, the current epidemic has two characteristics that increase the chances of violent social conflict: i) a substantial loss of income for a vast number of people; and ii) social distancing measures for much of the population, aggravated by the fact that many has limited space at home.

In addition, as in previous epidemics, rumors about covid-19 circulate widely, limiting the impact of health policies, causing confusion and, consequently, increasing the risk of violent social conflict. To make things worse, rumors were sometimes disseminated by government authorities (Edwards, 2020; Facher, 2020; Sephton, 2020; Daragahi, 2020).

During the covid-19 pandemic, violent episodes occurred. In Ukraine, people panicked because of a bus carrying people who had arrived from China, leading to clashes with the police (Coronavirus..., 2020b); in the province of Hubei, China, the population rose against the lockdown imposed by the government (Sherwell, 2020); and, in India, there were several reports of abuse by the police (Ayyub, 2020).

Violent episodes happened in prisons in Brazil, Colombia, Iran, Italy, Jordan, and Thailand, causing deaths, injuries, or prison escapes (Coronavirus..., 2020a; 2020c; 2020d; Caetano and Talento, 2020; Two killed..., 2020). Special attention must thus be paid to people in prisons: there is a high risk of transmission; visits were prohibited or limited, increasing levels of stress; access to reliable information is limited; and prisoners may take advantage of the context to escape or riot. These factors increase the chances of violence in prisons, putting prisoners and prisons' staff at risk. To minimize this, government authorities temporarily released less dangerous prisoners and at high risk from covid-19, as well as those whose sentences were close to end. These measures were adopted in, for example, Germany, Canada, the United States, Iran, Northern Ireland, Poland, and Sudan (Baker, 2020; Julian O'Neill, 2020; Suliman, Eckardt and Joselow, 2020).

BOX 1

Physical and mental health of workers of the frontline

Managing a crisis well requires special attention to the physical and mental health of workers from the health sector, public safety, and cleaning. The higher the infection rates of these workers the greater the difficulty of containing the epidemic, treating those infected, and preventing violent social conflict.

It is therefore critical to establish clear protocols to minimize the risk of infection among these workers. In the case of police forces in Brazil, for example, there are no standardized protocols. These protocols vary from state to state, or even from police unit to police unit. Among the already reported impacts, 300 police officers and 150 firefighters in Rio de Janeiro were on sick leave due to suspicion of covid-19 infection, as well as 250 police officers in Rio Grande do Sul (Oliveira, 2020; Mais de..., 2020).

Author's elaboration.

The likelihood of this scenario can be reduced if the stressors are tackled. The stressors and proposals to tackle them are explained in the following sections.

3 FEAR OF BEING INFECTED OR NOT RECEIVING MEDICAL CARE

An epidemic is a stressor because it creates or raises among people a fear of getting infected or having someone close infected. This stressor is observed among both infected and non-infected people, as well as during and after an epidemic. Maunder et al. (2003), in research on the SARS' effects in Canada in 2003, identified feelings of anger, fear, loneliness, and boredom among infected people. Zheng, Jimba and Wakai (2005), in a study on the SARS' effects among students in Japan (who had not been infected), observed feelings of fear and worriedness, as well as depression.

In addition to the fear of being infected, a related stressor is the fear of not having medical care available, or that someone close (family, friends, etc.) may not receive medical care in case they need.

This stressor affects everyone, but its strength varies according to one's social class and place of residence, most acutely affecting poor people and those living in areas with a limited number of health workers and hospital beds.

Social distancing measures have been adopted in most countries to reduce the transmission of the virus, in this way reducing part of the stress associated with the pandemic. These measures, however, introduced other stressors.

4 INCOME LOSS

The pandemic and restrictions on people's mobility decreased the quantity of products and services offered and demanded, prompting a reduction in income levels and an increase in unemployment. Although such change occurred in different sectors of society, some groups were proportionately more affected than others. Adapting to the Brazilian case a division proposed by Milanovic (2020b), workers can be divided into at least five groups: i) workers in the healthcare sector or in sectors that provide inputs (directly or indirectly) to healthcare, whose services had a high growth in demand; ii) workers in *online* services, whose work had an increase in demand; iii) workers who are not in the health sector, but have essential jobs (public safety, cleaning, water, electricity, food production and distribution, etc.), whose demand remained stable or decreased relatively little; iv) workers who could work remotely (lawyers, accountants, programmers, bank employees, bureaucrats, etc.), whose demand remained stable or decreased relatively little; and v) workers in sectors whose demand decreased substantially, in many cases reaching zero, such as workers of manufacturing units, retailers, street vendors, and culture and entertainment professionals.

Impacts in terms of decreased income falls disproportionately on workers from the last group, especially those in the informal sector – approximately 40% of workers in Brazil. For them, income dropped to zero instantly, increasing debt levels or compromising basic needs, including food, rent, medicines, and electricity. In a survey conducted by Instituto Locomotiva/Data Favela with *favela* residents in the first week following the introduction of social distancing measures, 70% of respondents reported a decrease in income, 72% said they had no savings, and 86% said they would need to compromise food consumption if the situation continued for a month (Agência Brasil, 2020).

Since the pandemic started, publications from various sources have drawn attention to the importance of protecting these groups, especially the need to guarantee their income and preserve jobs through: social policies; fiscal stimuli; tax exemptions for micro-, small- and medium-sized companies; and debt relief for poor countries. These recommendations came from the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) (Georgieva, 2020), the World Bank,⁶ the International Labour Organization (ILO),⁷ and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).⁸ They also came from academics of different theoretical orientations, such as Mankiw (2020), Milanovic (2020a), Sachs (2020), and O'Neill (2020).

For informal workers, a minimum income must be guaranteed. There are two options: a focused policy or a universal policy. A policy adopted only for those who need the benefit (focused) would be 'fair', as it would not allocate scarce resources to people less affected by the pandemic. However, this policy could unfairly exclude many people from accessing this benefit, especially because there was little time to process applications for the benefit. Although a cash transfer policy for all citizens (universal) may seem 'unfair' because it benefits those who do not need it, it is possible to compensate this unfairness through a slight increase in taxes for individuals with higher incomes (Mankiw, 2020).

It is also necessary to reduce incentives for the dismissal of formal workers and guarantee part of their income. In addition to preserving jobs, these measures reduce the odds of companies' bankruptcy and costs associated to rehiring workers. The central idea here is to make companies 'hibernate' during the peak of the pandemic (Saez and Zucman, 2020). A possible pathway is to do this directly, with the government subsidizing workers' wages up to a limit. In Brazil, if reductions in salary or suspension of employment contracts were authorized, the government would have to compensate losses. Since the fall in income levels will be relatively high for many workers, there could be a temporary increase in the jobseekers' allowance (*seguro-desemprego*). This would reduce negative impacts for formal workers and create incentives for dismissed workers to stay home instead of going out to search for another job.

Another possible pathway is through more indirect channels. For instance, the Central Bank of Brazil created a program to support small- and medium-sized companies so they could pay their employees, conditioned on companies' commitment to transfer money directly to employees – up to a limit of two minimum wages per month and for two months. Other alternatives are tax exemptions; loans for purposes other than paying employees; credit guarantee for companies affected by covid-19; and government support for restructuring debts with public or private banks.

These policies should, of course, benefit especially low-income people. Otherwise, they might further their vulnerability and engender feelings of injustice. Social psychology literature demonstrates how perceptions of injustice produce negative feelings, increasing the likelihood of protests, emotional exhaustion, and moral and physical disgust (Lind, 2019; Frenkel, Li and Restubog, 2012; Hillebrandt and Barclay, 2017; Vermunt et al., 1996; Skarlicki et al., 2013), whose combined effect increases the chances of violent social conflict.

6. Available at: <<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2020/03/27/world-bank-group-president-david-malpass-remarks-to-the-international-monetary-and-financial-committee>>.

7. Available at: <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/impacts-and-responses/WCMS_739048/lang--en/index.htm>.

8. Available at: <<https://www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/Interim-Economic-Assessment-2-March-2020.pdf>>.

5 SIDE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL DISTANCING MEASURES

Restricting people's mobility may cause high levels of stress and impact people's physical and mental health. The literature is conclusive that reducing social interactions and restricting mobility increases stress. Pressman et al. (2005) found a high correlation between social isolation and physical and mental health degradation, including negative impacts on sleep and increased cortisol levels. Baumeister and Leary (1995) demonstrated that the need for social interaction and a feeling of belonging rise in periods of crisis. In other words, strict social distancing measures aggravate a situation already prone to cause mental health problems. In a study on the effects of lockdowns during the SARS outbreak in Canada, Sim and Chua (2004) identified that 29% of people had post-traumatic stress disorder and 31% depression.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the United States point out that lockdowns have several consequences, including: anxiety, fear, irritability, changes in appetite, sleep disorders, and increased consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs.⁹ Some of the recommendations made by the CDC and UK National Health Service (NHS) are: keeping online connections with friends and family, exercising, eating healthy, adopting or keeping a hobby, and practicing relaxation techniques.¹⁰ CDC¹¹ also recommends that people should share helpful information from trusted agencies, thereby helping others to reduce their stress levels. Finally, the stress experienced by adults is commonly reflected in children, increasing the importance of a focus on mental health in times of crisis (Lazarus, Jimerson and Brock, 2002; 2003a; 2003b).

However, those living in small spaces with a high number of people or few resources struggle to adopt several of these recommendations. Middle- and upper-class individuals can stay entertained during a lockdown period in a way that poor people cannot: poor people have less access to devices, apps, or broadband internet connection; and less space at home to relax, do fun activities, and exercise. In a context of lockdown, this situation is likely to cause a proportionately higher deterioration of mental health conditions among poor people, reducing their incentives to practice social distancing. To minimize this problem, it is crucial to ensure not only a basic income for them but also the supply of electricity so that people can keep in touch with friends and family, as well as do other online activities.

Moreover, recommendations aimed at maintaining a good mental health should be disseminated widely on radio and television channels, social media, or other means, including messages for specific audiences (the elderly, people with a history of mental health problems, in situation of poverty, etc.). It is also possible to help local governments to implement support groups for people in situation of vulnerability. Organizations with expertise in mental health could receive emergency resources to perform this function.

9. Available at: <<https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/selfcare.asp>>.

10. Available at: <<https://www.nhs.uk/every-mind-matters/coronavirus/mental-wellbeing-while-staying-at-home/>>.

11. Available at: <<https://bit.ly/3UvXocq>>.

BOX 2

Lockdowns and domestic violence

There is probably a relationship between lockdowns and episodes of domestic violence against women and children. Although there is little information in literature about the relationship between these two phenomena, at least three factors create a fertile ground for this to happen: i) the various stressors caused by the epidemic (mentioned above); ii) the greater number of hours spent with potential abusers; and iii) the difficulty of accessing state agencies and NGOs providing support. Cases of domestic violence seem to have increased in several countries, including Brazil, China, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain and the United States (Vitale, 2020; Graham-Harrison et al., 2020; Dorn, 2020; Santos, 2020).

In order to deal with this problem, governments should maintain easily accessible channels through which people can ask for help. Chats or similar services can be useful in cases where the victim cannot speak due to proximity of the abuser. This issue should also be part of governments' communication about the pandemic, as occurred in Italy (Vitale, 2020). Recommendations of this type were also made by Dubravka Simonovic, United Nations special rapporteur on violence against women and girls (Relatora..., 2020).

Author's elaboration.

6 CONFUSION CAUSED BY CONFLICTING OR INACCURATE INFORMATION

Inaccurate or conflicting information about the pandemic and about how the government is tackling the pandemic causes confusion, increases stress, and reduces the impact of policies. These problems are caused by 1) rumors, and 2) contradictory messages from government agencies. Concerning the first point, the problem was called 'infodemic' by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO). 'Infodemic' is a situation in which rumors spread rapidly (just like a virus), creating a cacophony of conflicting information. It is thus necessary to 'immunize' the population from this 'infodemic' so they can distinguish fake from real news. Regarding the second point, contradictory information from governmental agencies decreases people's trust in public agencies, increases stress, and increases the chances that people will believe in rumors.

In addition, there is a fine line between not creating panic and hiding the severity of the epidemic from the public. As highlighted in Sandman (2009), hiding information decreases trust in authorities and increase the chances of panic episodes. Shortly before the swine flu spread to the United States, for example, the CDC opted not to suppress 'alarming' information and not to belittle people's fear (Sandman, 2009).

Government policies must be conveyed with clarity, coherence, agility, and transparency. This is valid not only for governments but also for other institutions (e.g., companies, schools, churches), which may be an essential source of reliable information for their members (Lasky, 2007). Different audiences in Brazil should be targeted differently: specific communication for children, parents, and the elderly, for instance, are better than one-size-fits-all messages and forms of communication.

7 THINKING ABOUT AN EXIT STRATEGY

We must begin to develop an exit strategy from strict social distancing measures. In a situation where people knew the duration of these measures, they would be better able to make plans concerning how they use the available resources (e.g., savings). However, this was not the case in this pandemic.

Even if setting specific deadlines to end social distancing measures is not possible, exit strategies should be formulated and communicated to people to reduce the chances of an uncontrolled and chaotic exit, largely carried out by people themselves and without due consideration for health impacts. An action plan should, therefore, begin to be formulated, observing initially what other countries are doing and what the literature recommends.

As soon as epidemiological data are available, these plans could indicate which groups or areas would return first. As a reference, Ichino et al. (2020) suggest that young workers (20 to 49 years old) and not at high risk from covid-19 could gradually return to work voluntarily. For that, the health system should not be overstretched and these workers should not have contact with people at high risk from covid-19. When selecting people and areas that would return to work, objective criteria are essential: for example, how important a sector is in terms of wealth and jobs created. In addition, a sample of workers should be tested frequently for covid-19.

Another strategy is to identify geographical areas where the number of cases is low – which requires testing, of course. These areas could progressively return to a relative normality. Such approach could use the idea of commuting *zones*, that is, the geographical areas where there is great mobility within but little mobility to/from the outside (Monras, 2020; Tolbert and Sizer, 1996).

Regardless of the format adopted, testing is essential. Without data, it is hard to estimate when it is safe to lift social distancing measures. Also, it is challenging to convince people that returning to work and using public transport is safe. The trust that must be recovered is not that of the 2008-2009 financial crisis – in which it was necessary to know if a counterpart was insolvent – but rather the trust that leads people to overcome the fear that a co-worker, seller, or customer is infected (Dewatripont et al., 2020).

Data from covid-19 tests and demographic information can be used to monitor the dynamics of the pandemic, a measure widely adopted in China, Singapore, and South Korea (Hao, 2020). In the latter, an app is used to monitor (by GPS) individuals who should not leave a designated geographical area and report twice a day about their health condition. If they leave the delimited area, the app sends a message to them and to a social worker (Kim, 2020). However, using this app is not mandatory. Although there is a trade-off between privacy and public health, the urgency to contain the epidemic and resume economic activities reduces – in the short-term – the relevance of privacy issues.

8 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary, the pandemic and measures to tackle it produced or aggravated a set of stressors for the population, especially for the poorest and those most at risk of getting infected. Consequently, measures must be adopted or maintained to protect the most vulnerable and reduce the chances of violent social conflict. These measures might also decrease the chances of non-violent events such as protests and motorcades. While under normal circumstances these events could be legitimate, during the pandemic they reduce the positive effects from social distancing measures.

I propose the following recommendations, some of which have already been adopted by the government, but that, in any case, should be maintained and could be improved.

8.1 Recommendations

- Guaranteeing a minimum income for workers in the informal economy. This must be done urgently and universally.
- Reducing incentives for the dismissal of formal workers and creating incentives for guaranteeing part of their income. There could be a temporary increase in jobseekers' allowance, which was done in the United States, for example, minimizing negative impacts of the pandemic on lower-income people and creating incentives for people to stay home.

- Adopting policies that do not sacrifice the income of low-income people, which would produce feelings of injustice and thus increase the chances of violent social conflict.
- Adopting policies that make private companies and jobs ‘hibernate’.
- Guaranteeing electricity and water supply.
- Expanding activities aimed at improving people’s mental health.
- Conveying information with clarity, coherence, agility, and transparency, considering that different audiences need tailor-made messages.
- Fighting against the spread of rumors. Government agencies can do this directly or by encouraging the press and the population to pay attention to the *sources* of information, and forward to others only information from reliable sources.
- Promoting protocols and training for all professionals working on the ‘frontline’, especially the police, firefighters, and health and cleaning workers.
- Elaborating an exit strategy, considering scenarios in which certain economic activities or groups of people would return to work first.

REFERENCES

AGÊNCIA BRASIL. Coronavírus: 70% dos moradores de favelas tiveram redução da renda. **UOL**, 24 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://bit.ly/3VKYNNn>>.

AYYUB, R. Social distancing is a privilege. **Foreign Policy**, 28 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/28/social-distancing-is-a-privilege/>>.

BAKER, L. Lock ‘em up or let ‘em out? Coronavirus prompts wave of prisoner releases. **Reuters**, 25 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://bit.ly/3Us8Gyu>>.

BALAKRISHNAN, A. Zimbabwe declares state of emergency over cholera epidemic. **The Guardian**, 4 Dec. 2008. Retrieved from: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/dec/04/zimbabwe-health>>.

BAUMEISTER, R.; LEARY, M. The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. **Psychological Bulletin**, v. 117, n. 3, 1995.

BBC MONITORING. China coronavirus: misinformation spreads online about origin and scale. **BBC News**, 30 Jan. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-51271037>>.

BELLEMARE, M. Rising food prices, food price volatility, and social unrest. **American Journal of Agricultural Economics**, v. 97, n. 1, p. 1-21, 2015.

BERAZNEVA, J.; LEE, D. Explaining the African food riots of 2007-2008: an empirical analysis. **Food Policy**, v. 39, p. 28-39, 2013.

BOSIO, E.; DJANKOV, S.; RAMALHO, R. Immediate action needed: four ideas to alleviate economic slowdowns. **World Bank**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/immediate-action-needed-four-ideas-alleviate-economic-slowdowns>>.

- BRASIL. Ministério da Saúde. **Saúde sem fake news**. Brasília: Ministério da Saúde, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.saude.gov.br/fakenews>>.
- BURTON, D. et al. The ‘third inning’: next steps for Congress in addressing the coronavirus. **Backgrounder**, n. 3477, 17 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/BG3477_1.pdf>.
- BUTLER, C. How to fight the economic fallout from the coronavirus. **Chatham House**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/how-fight-economic-fallout-coronavirus>>.
- CAETANO, G.; TALENTO, A. Presos fogem em SP; agravamento de crise do coronavírus leva revolta e agitação às prisões. **O Globo**, 16 mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/presos-fogem-em-sp-agravamento-de-crise-do-coronavirus-leva-revolta-agitacao-as-prisoas-24309025>>.
- CASSIDY, J. Is it too late to prevent mass unemployment owing to the coronavirus. **The New Yorker**, 2 Apr. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/is-it-too-late-to-prevent-mass-unemployment-owing-to-the-coronavirus>>.
- COHN, S.; KUTALEK, R. Historical parallels, Ebola virus disease and cholera: understanding community distrust and social violence with epidemics. **PLoS Currents**, n. 8, 2016.
- CONSEIL SCIENTIFIQUE. **Avis du Conseil Scientifique**. [s.l.]: Conseil Scientifique, 2020. Retrieved from: <bit.ly/3gyvCOG>.
- CORONAVIRUS rumour sparks prison riot in Thailand’s Buriram. **Al Jazeera**, 29 Mar. 2020a. Retrieved from: <<https://bit.ly/3gVfE1e>>.
- CORONAVIRUS: Ukraine protesters attack buses carrying China evacuees. **BBC News**, Feb. 2020b. Retrieved from: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51581805>>.
- CORONAVIRUS: at least 23 killed in Colombia prison unrest. **BBC News**, 23 Mar. 2020c. Retrieved from: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-51999594>>.
- CORONAVIRUS, carceri in rivolta: 12 vittime. Nuovi disordini in alcuni penitenziari. A foggia 19 evasi ancora in fuga. Previsto lo ‘sfollamento’ di San Vittore. Indagini di più procure sulla ‘regia’ delle rivolte. **Il Fatto Quotidiano**, 2020d. Retrieved from: <<https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2020/03/10/coronavirus-carceri-in-rivolta-altri-3-detenuiti-morti-a-rieti-nuove-proteste-a-siracusa-e-caserta-a-foggia-evasione-di-massa-23-ricercati-la-procura-di-milano-apre-inchiesta-sulla-sommossa-a-san/5730183/>>.
- DARAGAH, B. Coronavirus: Iran’s leader suggests US cooked up ‘special version’ of virus to target country. **The Independent**, 22 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-coronavirus-us-target-country-special-version-covid19-a9417206.html>>.
- DEWATRIPONT, M. et al. Rapidly identifying workers who are immune to Covid-19 and virus-free is a priority for restarting the economy. **CEPR**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://voxeu.org/article/rapidly-identifying-workers-who-are-immune-covid-19-and-virus-free-priority-restarting-economy>>.
- DORN, S. Domestic violence victims facing higher risks amid coronavirus quarantine. **New York Post**, 28 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://nypost.com/2020/03/28/domestic-violence-victims-facing-higher-risks-amid-coronavirus-quarantine/>>.

DOUGLAS, P. et al. Preparing for pandemic influenza and its aftermath: mental health issues considered. **International Journal of Emergency Mental Health**, v. 11, n. 3, 2009.

EBOLA: Guineans riot in Nzerekore over disinfectant. **BBC News**, 29 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28984259>>.

EDMONDSON, A. Don't hide bad news in times of crisis. **Harvard Business Review**, 6 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://hbr.org/2020/03/dont-hide-bad-news-in-times-of-crisis>>.

EDWARDS, D. Without evidence, Tom Cotton suggests that the coronavirus is Chinese biological warfare. **Salon**, 17 Feb. 2020.

EMMERSON, C.; STOCKTON, I. The economic response to coronavirus will substantially increase government borrowing. **Institute for Fiscal Studies**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14771>>.

FACHER, L. Trump taps pence to lead U.S. coronavirus response. **Stat**, 26 Feb. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/26/trump-taps-pence-to-lead-coronavirus-response/>>.

FALLOUT from Covid-19: global recession, zero interest rates and emergency policy actions. **J.P. Morgan**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/research/fallout-from-covid19>>.

FORD, S. Fake news on coronavirus could make disease outbreak worse. **Nursing Times**, 17 Feb. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.nursingtimes.net/news/research-and-innovation/fake-news-on-coronavirus-could-make-disease-outbreak-worse-17-02-2020/>>.

FRENKEL, S.; LI, M.; RESTUBOG, S. Management, organizational justice and emotional exhaustion among Chinese migrant workers: evidence from two manufacturing firms. **British Journal of Industrial Relations**, v. 50, n. 1, p. 121-147, 2012.

GEORGIEVA, K. Policy action for a healthy global economy. **IMF Blog**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://blogs.imf.org/2020/03/16/policy-action-for-a-healthy-global-economy/>>.

GIBSON, J.; IVANCEVICH, J.; KONOPASKE, R. **Organizations**: behavior, structure, processes. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2011.

GRAHAM-HARRISON, E. et al. Lockdowns around the world bring rise in domestic violence. **The Guardian**, 28 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/mar/28/lockdowns-world-rise-domestic-violence>>.

GRASSO, M.; GIUGNI, M. Protest participation and economic crisis: the conditioning role of political opportunities. **European Journal of Political Research**, v. 55, n. 4, p. 663-680, 2016.

GREGORY, J. The coronavirus 'infodemic' is real. We rated the websites responsible for it. **Stat**, 28 Feb. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.statnews.com/2020/02/28/websites-spreading-coronavirus-misinformation-infodemic/>>.

HALE, T. et al. Variation in government responses to covid-19, version 2.0. **Blavatnik School of Government**, 2020. Retrieved from: <www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker>.

HAO, K. Coronavirus is forcing a trade-off between privacy and public health. **MIT Technology Review**, 24 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/615396/coronavirus-is-forcing-a-trade-off-between-privacy-and-public-health/>>.

HILLEBRANDT, A.; BARCLAY, L. Observing others' anger and guilt can make you feel unfairly treated: the interpersonal effects of emotions on justice-related reactions. **Social Justice Research**, v. 30, n. 3, p. 238-269, 2017.

ICHINO, A. et al. Transition steps to stop covid-19 without killing the world economy. **VOX: CEPR Policy Portal**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://voxeu.org/article/transition-steps-stop-covid-19-without-killing-world-economy>>.

JIM O'NEILL. Coronavirus: all citizens need an income support. **Chatham House**, 16 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/coronavirus-all-citizens-need-income-support>>.

JULIAN O'NEILL. Coronavirus: prisoners to be temporarily freed in response to pandemic. **BBC News**, 30 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-52090399>>.

KESSLER, R. et al. Mental illness and suicidality after hurricane Katrina. **Bulletin of the World Health Organization**, v. 84, p. 930-939, 2006.

KIM, M. South Korea is watching quarantined citizens with a smartphone app. **MIT Technology Review**, Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/615329/coronavirus-south-korea-smartphone-app-quarantine/>>.

KNOPMAN, D. et al. The economic wallop of covid-19: Q&A with Rand. **Rand**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/03/the-economic-wallop-of-covid-19-qa-with-rand-experts.html>>.

LASKY, M. Integrating pandemic flu response planning with business continuity planning at Johns Hopkins University applied physics laboratory. **Journal of Business Continuity and Emergency Planning**, v. 2, n. 1, p. 58-69, 2007.

LAZARUS, P.; JIMERSON, S; BROCK, S. Natural disasters. In: _____. **Best practices in school crisis prevention and intervention**. Bethesda: National Association of School Psychologists, 2002. p. 435-450.

_____. **Helping children after a natural disaster**: information for parents and teachers. Bethesda: National Association of School Psychologists, 2003a.

_____. **Responding to natural disasters**: helping children and families. Bethesda: National Association of School Psychologists, 2003b.

LIND, A. **Social psychology and justice**. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2019.

MAIS DE 250 policiais militares são afastados por suspeita de coronavírus no RS. **G1 RS**, 23 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://bit.ly/3EXcqSX>>.

MANKIW, G. A proposal for social insurance during the pandemic. **Greg Mankiw's Blog**, 23 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2020/03/a-proposal-for-social-insurance-during.html>>.

MAUNDER, R. et al. The immediate psychological and occupational impact of the 2003 SARS outbreak in a teaching hospital. **Cmaj**, v. 168, n. 10, p. 1245-1251, 2003.

MILANOVIC, B. The real pandemic danger is social collapse. **Foreign Affairs**, 19 Mar. 2020a. Retrieved from: <<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-03-19/real-pandemic-danger-social-collapse>>.

_____. Four types of labor and the epidemic. **Globalinequality**, 21 Mar. 2020b. Retrieved from: <<http://glineq.blogspot.com/2020/03/four-types-of-labor-and-epidemic.html>>.

MONRAS, J. Some thoughts on Covid-19 from a labour mobility perspective: from ‘red-zoning’ to ‘green-zoning’. **VOX**: CEPR Policy Portal, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://voxeu.org/article/some-thoughts-covid-19-labour-mobility-perspective>>.

NEL, P.; RIGHARTS, M. Natural disasters and the risk of violent civil conflict. **International Studies Quarterly**, v. 52, n. 1, p. 159-185, 2008.

OLIVEIRA, C. Coronavírus: PM do Rio recruta dentistas após baixa de médicos afastados com sintomas de covid-19. **The Intercept Brasil**, 27 mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://theintercept.com/2020/03/27/coronavirus-medicos-enfermeiros-quarentena-dentistas-policia/>>.

ONISHI, N. Clashes erupt as Liberia sets an ebola quarantine. **The New York Times**, 20 Aug. 2014. Retrieved from: <<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-liberia-quarantine.html>>.

PICHETA, R.; QIBLAWI, T. Jordan eases lockdown after total curfew leads to chaos. **CNN**, 26 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/25/middleeast/jordan-lockdown-coronavirus-intl/index.html>>.

PRESSMAN, S. et al. Loneliness, social network size, and immune response to influenza vaccination in college freshmen. **Health Psychology**, v. 24, n. 3, 2005.

RELATORA da ONU: Estados devem combater violência doméstica na quarentena por covid-19. **UNIC Rio**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://unicrio.org.br/relatora-da-onu-estados-devem-combater-violencia-domestica-na-quarentena-por-covid-19/>>.

SACHS, J. Our best hope for fighting coronavirus. **CNN**, 22 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/22/opinions/coronavirus-lockdown-fight-jeffrey-sachs-opinion/index.html>>.

SAEZ, E.; ZUCMAN, G. Keeping businesses alive: the government will pay. **Economics for Inclusive Prosperity**, 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://econfp.org/policy-brief/keeping-businesses-alive-the-government-will-pay/#>>.

SANDMAN, P. Pandemics: good hygiene is not enough. **Nature**, v. 459, n. 7245, p. 322-323, 2009.

SANTOS, J. Covid-19. Isolamento domiciliário faz disparar queixas por violência doméstica. **RTP Notícias**, 28 mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/covid-19-isolamento-domiciliario-faz-disparar-queixas-por-violencia-domestica_n1216270>.

SEPHTON, C. Coronavirus: Belarus president refuses to cancel anything – and says vodka and saunas will ward off covid-19. **Sky News**, Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-belarus-president-refuses-to-cancel-anything-and-says-vodka-and-saunas-will-ward-off-coronavirus-11965396>>.

SHERWELL, P. Coronavirus in China: clashes after Hubei lockdown lifted. **The Sunday Times**, 29 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coronavirus-in-china-clashes-after-hubei-lockdown-lifted-nv60pc56f>>.

- SIM, K.; CHUA, H. C. The psychological impact of SARS: a matter of heart and mind. **Cmaj**, v. 170, n. 5, p. 811-812, 2004.
- SKARLICKI, D. et al. Does injustice affect your sense of taste and smell? The mediating role of moral disgust. **Journal of Experimental Social Psychology**, v. 49, n. 5, p. 852-859, 2013.
- SLETTEBAK, R. Climate change, natural disasters, and post-disaster unrest in India. **India Review**, v. 12, n. 4, p. 260-279, 2013.
- SUEDFELD, P. Social isolation: a case for interdisciplinary research. **Canadian Psychologist/Psychologie Canadienne**, v. 15, n. 1, 1974.
- SULIMAN, A.; ECKARDT, A.; JOSELOW, G. Coronavirus prompts prisoner releases around the world. **NBC News**, 26 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/coronavirus-prompts-prisoner-releases-around-world-n1169426>>.
- TOLBERT, C.; SIZER, M. US commuting zones and labor market areas: a 1990 update. **ERS Staff Paper**, n. 9614, 1996.
- TWO KILLED in prison riot in Jordan after visit ban. **Deutsche Welle**, 16 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.dw.com/en/two-killed-in-prison-riot-in-jordan-after-visit-ban/av-52788472>>.
- VERMUNT, R. et al. The effects of unfair procedure on negative affect and protest. **Social Justice Research**, v. 9, n. 2, p. 109-119, 1996.
- VINOCUR, N. Criminals are exploiting coronavirus outbreak, warns Europol. **Politico**, 27 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.politico.eu/article/criminals-are-exploiting-the-coronavirus-outbreak-warns-europol-chief/>>.
- VITALE, G. Coronavirus, campagna del governo contro la violenza domestica: 'fermiamo l'emergenza nell'emergenza'. **La Repubblica**, 24 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2020/03/24/news/coronavirus_violenza_domestica_bonetti-252152524/>.
- WARRELL, H.; FILDES, N. Cyber criminals exploit coronavirus disruption. **Financial Times**, 15 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.ft.com/content/cbe2b35a-66d2-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75>>.
- WATTS, J. SARS sparks Chinese riots. **The Guardian**, 6 May 2003. Retrieved from: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/06/sars.china>>.
- WHEATON, S. Coronavirus: no end in sight. **Politico**, 25 Mar. 2020. Retrieved from: <<https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-endgame/>>.
- YALOM, I. **The theory and practice of group psychotherapy**. New York: Basic Books Az, 1995.
- ZHENG, G.; JIMBA, M.; WAKAI, S. Exploratory study on psychosocial impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak on Chinese students living in Japan. **Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health**, v. 17, n. 2, p. 124-129, 2005.

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY: INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN BRAZIL^{1,2}

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa³

1 INTRODUCTION

As a phase of the public policy cycle, implementation transforms general intentions into actions and results. This challenge is enhanced by the increasing complexity of implementing public policies, mainly due to the points of contact between different themes under the scope of these policies. In this regard, we can observe that a particular public policy objective interferes in several jurisdictions or is interfered with by them (O'Toole Junior, 1996). Implementing public policies can involve actors from different levels of Government and organizations with other interests, *expertise*, and institutional forms, constituting interorganizational arrangements for achieving specific government actions, and their structure and way of interacting influence their performance.

Besides several organizations that make up the federal government's structure, the arrangements above for implementing public policies may include state agencies and private and third-sector organizations. Including such organizations in these arrangements is a trend to obtain the best of each sector's competencies and promote complementary actions to solve public issues, maximizing society's well-being.

This logic is anchored in the premise that the state has a higher capacity to collect resources necessary to solve public issues, and the private and third sectors have a better ability to produce and deliver goods and services (Salomon, 2002).

Those interorganizational relations are defined by the participation of state and non-state actors that define the lines of the complex implementation process and demand considerable effort of interorganizational coordination to effectively transform public policies into results.

Once recognized the need for joint actions between the public and the private sectors, as well as the public and third sectors, for the better solving of public issues – concept brought by texts dealing with state reform in Brazil, such as Pereira and Spink (1998) –, the discussion turns to include, therefore, the most appropriate means to promote this joint action and optimize the synergy intended by it. That is, the focus of the discussion becomes what type of management suits this collective action, whether it would be a traditional management model based on authority and control or management based on cooperation (Palumbo, 1998; Hill, 2009; Salomon, 2002).

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art6>

2. Originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional*, No. 9, June 2016. Available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/7107/1/BAPI_n9_capacidade.pdf>.

3. Public policies and government management specialist, currently working at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea).

In recent years, the topic of public policy networks has been widely addressed based on the concept of governance, grounded in the same contexts adopted in the analysis of interorganizational coordination, although they represent – governance and coordination – different ideas.

Governance refers to regulating relationships through mechanisms that include governmental authority and sanction. Still, it goes beyond them since interorganizational coordination relates to promoting cooperation (Daft, 1999). For Kooiman (2003), the need for coordination comes from the division of labor, functional differentiation, and specialization processes that occur in the separation of decision-making from implementation.

Coordination can, therefore, be seen as a dimension of governance, but it only represents part of the concept of governance. It is helpful in a complex social context as a process of integrating separate but interdependent actors who, in some way, need to adapt to each other despite their possible antagonism (Kooiman, 2003).

Therefore, the central question Klijn (2005) raises is: how to organize the implementation of public policies and provision of public services within the fragmented setup of the organizations involved? Moreover, taking into account a state tending not to carry out public policy by itself but only acting as an integration system in which public policies and the provision of public services are produced and delivered by other contracted organizations – for profit or not. The coordination of the action of those different parties is at the center of this integration process.

The study on interorganizational coordination in implementing federal public programs developed herein was organized into five sections – including this introduction. Section 2 presents the analytical framework design. In section 3, we address the methodological aspects of the analysis and discuss the data from recent experience in Brazil regarding the public policy implementation process in the social field. Section 4 presents an in-depth analysis with a specific discussion on interorganizational coordination mechanisms in this implementation process. Section 5 includes the final considerations as an outcome of this analysis.

2 PROSPECTS FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION ANALYSIS IN PUBLIC PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Discussing the possibilities and limits of interorganizational coordination requires first establishing its purpose. For Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), it is caused by the interdependence control requirements: the need to have access to resources, control results, and avoid dependence on the environment, mainly external.

We observe that there are several ways to approach the interorganizational coordination analysis, classified as follows:

- structural perspective: focus on formalization, complexity (geographical dispersion, number of actors involved), direction, and timeframe of relationships;
- process perspective: focus on defining stages of the interorganizational coordination process and managing sequential, parallel, and reciprocal interdependencies;
- performance perspective: focus on evaluating results measured through performance indicators to produce a certain standard of results;

- consistency perspective: focus on the distribution of competencies and the resulting overlaps, gaps, and divergences in government action; and
- political perspective: focuses on the distribution of power and types and participation volumes.

From the structural perspective, the variables of interest analyzed are related to the formalization, centrality, and timeframe of the relationships between implementers (stable or dynamic) and those indicating the vertical or horizontal dimensions of those relationships. On the other hand, the process perspective focuses on managing interdependencies between implementers forming interorganizational arrangements. Such interdependencies can be sequential, parallel, and reciprocal. The performance perspective focuses on the mechanisms used to monitor and optimize implementation performance in search of homogeneous results. From the perspective of the consistency of state action, the attention goes to the coordination for minimizing failures, such as gaps, inconsistencies, or overlaps in public policy actions. For last, from a political perspective, the focus is on relationships between implementers in terms of opportunities for participation and distribution of power in the interorganizational arrangement of public policy implementation.

Based on the perspectives mentioned above, the analysis of organizational coordination aims to enable a broader view of the process and point out unique aspects of interorganizational coordination related to implementation outcomes.

3 INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN BRAZIL'S FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SOCIAL FIELD IN RECENT YEARS

We conducted qualitative research to highlight the main aspects of coordinating interorganizational relationships in federal public programs implementation. It applied a comparative method based on Boolean algebra and logical equations that allow us to identify the conditions or setup of conditions leading to a specific result, in this case, the success or failure of public programs implementation. The reason for adopting this method was its ability of the so-called qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), to deal with the causal complexity of the social sciences (Ragin, 1987; Rihoux and De Meur, 2008).

In this regard, the quality of success or failure attributed to the implementation outcome was mediated based on the physical percentage of implementation achieved by the program at the end of the period of the Multi-Year Plan (Plano Plurianual – PPA). Mainly, reaching a value equal to or greater than 80% of the physical implementation goal was considered successful.

To enable the comparison process of the coordination experiences studied, we developed an analytical framework based on the five analysis perspectives, including mechanisms and contexts of interorganizational coordination, which refer to coordination in hierarchical, market, solidarity association, or political contexts.

It is worth explaining that coordination is based on authority for the first context – the hierarchical one. For the market context, coordination takes place based on exchange. On the other hand, for solidarity associations, coordination occurs through a common interest. Last but not least, in the political context, coordination occurs through the accommodation of interests, not always in common and sometimes even conflicting.

It is essential to highlight how crucial the political context is to discuss the interactions between the actors involved in the public program's implementation, as observed by Câmara (2002) and as outlined by the research data.

We focused on identifying interorganizational coordination in sixteen cases of federal public programs' implementation in the social field, selected among priority programs of the 2004-2007 PPA, reportedly to be in better conditions for implementation in terms of resource availability and decision-making. Conditions, which, in theory, highlight the effects of coordination and management capacity on the implementation outcome.

Data characterizing the coordination and implementation of each of the selected programs were collected through questionnaires and interviews with program managers, action coordinators, and implementers at the regional and local levels. The different implementation cases were then described based on the five previously mentioned analysis perspectives and compared among them to identify the conditions or setup of common conditions in success and failure cases of the federal public program's implementation.

Looking at the Brazilian experience (as of the organization of the 2004-2007 PPA), the analysis of variables related to interorganizational coordination showed that those which emerge as differentiators for the implementation success are the indicators related to the relationships in the decision-making process, that is, those of the political perspective. This observation points to the relevance of this perspective and the need to give it more attention, as we will further discuss and explain.

This relevance is possibly an outcome of something that has not yet ripened in implementing public policies. This situation is different from what has already occurred from the structural perspective because – as will be seen next – the structural aspects related to complexity, for instance, are not significant in explaining success since they occur in a typical pattern in all cases analyzed. However, this does not mean saying those are factors that can be neglected, even if they are not part of aspects of differentiation for the success or failure of implementation.

In explaining the success of the implementation resulting from the analysis including all variables, the results equation points out as the conditions for success the relationships with program managers of the “exchange of information and joint decisions” type or relationships with program coordinators of “subordination relationship and information exchange relationships” type, or, even, the presence of some discretion in the decision-making process.

The result of the comparative analysis makes it clear that the type of participation suggested by the variables indicating the relationships and the distribution or sharing of power implied by the variables related to the decision-making process are critical factors in public programs' implementation.

Consistently, the lack of participation and power sharing appears in the explanation of failure. The failure cases explain that the absence of relationships with other implementers is the differentiating factor, as seen in its different cause combinations. Were observed the following conditions in those combinations: relationships of subordination and lack of connection with program managers, lack of discretion in resource distribution, lack of coordination mechanisms of decision-making and negotiation and coordination units and functions, as well as the lack of influence of interest groups.

We observed that the impact of interest groups is not a factor in success. Still, this absence associated with the lack of relationships with other implementers is in the failure explanation.

In cases where the influence of interest groups has been reported, its presence is related to the indication of beneficiaries or the allocation of financial resources. This apparent contradiction – the lack of influence from interest groups in explaining failure, but, on the other hand, its presence not included in the basis of success – can be explained by the causal complexity observed. That is, the outcome is explained by a full set of conditions, not the presence or absence of an isolated condition. According to data provided by the research, the absence of interest groups only is factor of failure when it appears combined with lack of relationship with other implementers.

The low participation is pointed out in explaining the implementation failure, primarily due to a lack of relationships and coordination mechanisms that enable such participation. Additionally, a lack of discretion in the decision-making process due to the low involvement of other implementers in the interorganizational coordination process of implementation is present in the explanation of failure.

One interesting thing is that, despite the mentioned indication of low interaction between the federal level and the other implementers, especially at the municipal level, the research indicates as relevant the aspects of participation in explaining the success of the implementation.

The research data does not support a consistent explanation for this apparent contradiction between the evidence of low interaction and the fact that participation is a factor that contributes to a successful implementation. Finding a reason for that would be a task for future studies. Still, it may be related to what Frey (2000) pointed out as a movement of democratic expansion towards building a more consistent social participation, i.e., the participation already mentioned is not yet consolidated but is moving in that direction. We can already notice its relevance in research data.

Interorganizational coordination in public social programs' implementation in Brazil has a pattern with hierarchical contours as a consequence of institutions setting the government's mode of operation. That is, under the constitutional, directive, or operational decisions ranging from determining public interest's supremacy and defining the formal structure of state action plans coordination to the modes of operation of those actions. In other words, it is a management model based on authority.

From a structural point of view, interorganizational coordination is characterized by the complexity of typical formalized relations. However, it was observed that this complexity is not a determinant of successful implementation. Coordination, in this regard, is stable and has a vertical structure. However, some evidence of horizontality and dynamism can be verified, and instability in arrangements for policy implementation provides autonomy to state or local governments for resource allocation in projects.

Regarding the process perspective, the interorganizational coordination for federal public programs' implementation is characterized – to a high degree – by the management of interdependencies, parallel and sequential, coordinated by plans and standardization, coherently set in a strongly hierarchical and formalized context. Moreover, reciprocal interdependency – commonly found in contexts of solidarity associations – remains more visibly explored, which, at the same time, according to the international literature, can offer synergy gains and would probably require much more in terms of interorganizational coordination.

Probably, the situation is connected to implementation patterns that have been reproduced over time when establishing public policies as systems (policies related to the same issues and shared structures, such as work, health, and education). These patterns are subject to gradual changes over time due to external pressure concerning the implementation content and performance.

On the other hand, from the performance perspective, what stands out in the analysis is that some guidelines affirm their focus on performance, establishing indicators and goals to be achieved. However, interorganizational coordination towards performance remains incipient due to still fragile monitoring, which assumes more ex-ante and ex-post control features than coordination that provides concurrent performance adjustments through effective monitoring. The reason for it possibly lies in the fact that, in Brazil, the adoption of results-oriented state action planning is a relatively recent experience, and much of its practical application needs to be consolidated in the state action *praxis*.

Interorganizational coordination is visible in the consistency perspective of this kind of state action. It seems to operate much more at the institutional level since the research suggests that the evidence of gaps, inconsistencies, and overlaps related to federal public programs are flaws whose origins are in institutional arrangements. Here, the participation of the actors involved in the implementation, or even civil society organizations' involvement in pointing out those coordination flaws, guides this coordination effort. At this point, the political context in implementing interorganizational coordination stands out since, through participation and the need to arrange interests, such flaws become more evident so they can be effectively corrected through negotiations and later institutional adjustments.

After discussing the findings from those interorganizational coordination perspectives of analysis, we present analyses related to the interorganizational coordination mechanisms observed in the studied program data and their connections with the results of the already addressed views.

4 INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Regarding the coordination mechanisms that explain the successful implementation, the comparative analysis indicated that decision and negotiation mechanisms, regular advice or planning, and information systems are vital elements to success – although none are crucial or sufficient separately. That is, none is the only one responsible for success nor part of all successful combinations.

At the same time, the comparative analysis to explain failure – considering the same variables – does not present any possible logical minimization. It means that based on the research data, it is impossible to determine what conditions are related to the coordination mechanisms that are differentiators for implementation failure. We cannot state, even by analogy, that the situation opposite from the one found in the explanation for success considering such variables is a valid explanation for failure. That is why depending on the conditions related to the needs and sufficiency found during the analysis, one can say which are relevant rather than determinants of a successful implementation.

Another interesting fact is that we observed incentive mechanisms in the implementation process in only one of the studied cases. This situation may be connected to the verification that implementers' performance control is not consolidated and that using incentive systems is an alternative to increase performance.

The application of coordination mechanisms has diverse settings having communication mechanisms and information systems as a common core.

Among the potential coordination possibilities mentioned, the research outcomes suggest that the political perspective has greater power to explain the success and failure of the implementation processes studied since its associated variables are presented as differentiators in both cases. Thus, the discussion about types of participation is relevant – clearly outlining that this concept is not only restricted to social engagement outside the government since implementers participate in decision-making and actions for programs' implementation.

Furthermore, the research data suggest the relevance of developing relationships' quality for public policies' implementation. In this regard, we proposed further studies to analyze the promotion of shared common values and references – as pointed out by Jobert (2004) – beyond establishing formal participation institutions, determining actions, or simply acquiring products and services.

The results of the study allow us to deduce that more relevant than the discussion on the need or not for hierarchy in interorganizational arrangements for public policies' implementation is the debate on how to balance the requirements related to the distribution of discretion, participation, and arrangement of interests of the actors involved in the implementation process – also in contexts of hierarchy. Thereby, we recommend including this debate in the agenda for future studies.

For last, regarding interorganizational coordination mechanisms, the instrumentality of management is limited to a few since many of the possible mechanisms in interorganizational coordination for public programs' implementation are underused or not even used. Out of the eight mechanisms studied, in most cases, only communication and information systems are combined. On the other hand, the incentive system mechanism is the least used, with only one occurrence among the cases studied.

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The analyses reported herein reveal a pattern of hierarchical coordination and point out weaknesses that indicate the importance of looking beyond formulation and planning, bringing to the country's research agenda the debate on implementation management.

There is significant autonomy in policies shaped as financing structures and focused targeting in those as consolidated systems – e.g., policies related to education, health, social work, employment, and income. It would be a valid exercise for research efforts to exam management alternatives and interorganizational coordination in public programs' implementation, considering an implementation process characterized by these extremes in the distribution of competencies. Primarily by thinking of intermediate settings, including, for instance, the use of coordination mechanisms that promote not only communication and interactions from top to bottom but also the other way around and horizontally.

The inevitable questioning regarding autonomy in the distribution of competencies is related to the dichotomy between targeting and autonomy in the specific Brazilian context. Settling control over the involved actors' performance implies partially absorbing their autonomy once their performance is defined and controlled in a shared way. On the other hand, the feasibility of greater autonomy has other consequences. The most relevant is the fragility of performance-oriented coordination.

The point of interest in this dichotomy is the search for a balance between the public policies' federal targeting and the maintenance of the states' autonomy. On the one hand, a more focused targeting, typical of public policies organized in the systems – such as those in health, education, and work – is related to greater control of the implementation process. On the other hand, autonomy grants greater “responsiveness” on the actors' side and greater process legitimacy.

Also related to implementation performance, given the limitation of interorganizational coordination under this perspective, we consider relevant the debate on the relationship between interorganizational coordination and the effectiveness of planned implementation performances. This debate is recommended aiming at shedding light on possible targeting and contributions of interorganizational coordination in transforming plans into results; that is, it means looking beyond planning and formulation to understand the role management plays in government actions' performance.

REFERENCES

- CÂMARA, L. M. Breves notas sobre o modus operandi do modelo de relacionamento entre instâncias de governo institucionalizado pelo Decreto-Lei nº 200/67 em face dos novos desafios do federalismo cooperativo. **Revista de Administração Pública**, v. 36, n. 5, p. 797-809, set./out. 2002.
- DAFT, R. L. **Administração**. Rio de Janeiro: LTC, 1999.
- FREY, K. Políticas públicas: um debate conceitual e reflexões referentes à prática da análise de políticas públicas no Brasil. **Planejamento e políticas públicas**, n. 21, p. 211-259, jun. 2000.
- HILL, M. **The public policy process**. 5th ed. London: Pearson Longman, 2009.
- JOBERT, B. **Estado, sociedade, políticas públicas**. Santiago: LOM, 2004. (Série Universitária).
- KLIJN, E.-H. Networks and interorganizational management: challenging, steering, evaluation and the role of public actors in public management. In: FERLIE, E.; LYNN JUNIOR, L. E.; POLLITT, C. (Ed.). **The Oxford handbook of public management**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 257-281.
- KOOIMAN, J. **Governing as governance**. London: Sage Publications, 2003.
- O'TOOLE JUNIOR, L. J. Rational choice and the public management of interorganizational networks. In: KETTL, D. F.; MILWARD, H. B. (Ed.). **Public management**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. p. 241-263.
- PALUMBO, D. J. **Public police in America: government in action**. 2nd ed. Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998.
- PEREIRA, L. C. B.; SPINK, P. K. (Org.). **Reforma do Estado e administração pública gerencial**. 2. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 1998.
- PFEFFER, J.; SALANCIK, G. R. **The external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

RAGIN, C. C. **The comparative method**. Berkley: University of California Press, 1987.

RIHOUX, B.; DE MEUR, G. Crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (CsQCA). In: RIHOUX, B.; RAGIN, C. C. (Ed.). **Configurational comparative methods: qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques**. Thousand Oaks; London: Sage, 2008. p. 33-68.

SALOMON, L. M. **The tools of government: a guide to the new governance**. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT DRUG POLICY FORMULATION^{1,2}

Débora Medeiros³
Luís Fernando Tófoli⁴

1 INTRODUCTION

The use of psychoactive substances is a historical-cultural phenomenon with medical, political, religious, and economic implications (Minayo and Deslandes, 1998). From the historical point of view, it is known that the relationship of humanity with psychoactive substances – for which we will also use the generic denomination drugs – is an old and lasting phenomenon: except for the populations inhabiting Arctic regions, utterly devoid of vegetation, there is not a single human group that has not been related to psychoactive substances (Escohotado, 1998). The motivations for such long-standing relationships were many: the search for pleasure, the relief of worries and tension, the mood control, and the expansion of consciousness, with alteration of their normal states (Filev, 2015).

It is noteworthy, however, that although the systematic use of psychoactive drugs has been a practice observed since ancient times, it was only during the 20th century that the use of some of those substances was consolidated as a field of attention, debate, and social and state concern (Fiore, 2008). From this moment on – raised to the level of a *social issue* – the drug issue began to be delimited by three main discourses: medicalization, criminalization, and moralization (op. cit.).

Therefore, the moralistic pressure on drugs – which dates back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries – not only preceded the laws on psychoactive drugs but served as a substrate for it (Rodrigues, 2008). Likewise, the incrimination of illegal drugs is socially legitimized by protecting the legal interest of public health (Taffarello, 2009).

Throughout the 20th century, a specific state action regarding the drug issue has become hegemonic: prohibitionism. A model that incorporates several aspects of moral panic about psychoactive substances. One of its important international milestones occurred in 1961, in the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, approved by the United Nations (UN) and sponsored by the United States (Fiore, 2012).

The genesis and spread of prohibitionism resulted from social, political, and economic factors. The political radicalization of the North American Puritanism, the fear of social elites about urban disorder, the geopolitical conflicts of the 20th century, and the interest of the medical and pharmaceutical industry for the monopoly of drug production contributed to the construction of its hegemony. Among all psychoactive substances, the main targets of contemporary prohibitionism were those derived from *cannabis* (marijuana), coca (cocaine/*crack*), and poppy (opium and heroin) (Fiore, 2012).

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art7>

2. Originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional*, No. 18, Dec. 2018. Available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8880/1/bapi_18_cap_6.pdf>.

3. Psychiatrist; master of medicine student in public health; and advisor at the Board on Drug Policy of the state of São Paulo.

4. Psychiatrist; professor at the Department of Medical Psychology and Psychiatry of the Faculty of Medical Sciences of the State University of Campinas (Universidade Estadual de Campinas – Unicamp); co-founder of the Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Studies on Psychoactive (Laboratório de Estudos Interdisciplinares sobre Psicoativos – Leipsi) of Unicamp; and Ph.D. in medicine (psychiatry) from the University of São Paulo (Universidade de São Paulo – USP).

Knowing the discourses that permeate the approach to the drug issue and considering that prohibitionism, by establishing arbitrary limits for the use of legal and illegal drugs, modulated the contemporary understanding of psychoactive substances and even the scientific production related to them (Fiore, 2012), this work aims to analyze some myths and facts that permeate the drug policy formulation.

In the next section, we will seek to evaluate, in the light of scientific evidence, the assumptions and conceptions of the prohibitionist paradigm (Fiore, 2012) and the war on drugs ideology (Faria, 2017), in addition to other common-sense beliefs about illegal psychoactive substances, jointly referred to herein as myths about the drug policy formulation.

To facilitate the reader's understanding, we will divide those myths into the following three categories: those related to the nature of illegal psychoactive substances or associated with the risk of using drugs; those associated with the desired results with their prohibition; and those associated with the feared consequences of their decriminalization.

2 MYTHS RELATED TO THE NATURE OF THE ILLEGAL PSYCHOACTIVE SUBSTANCES AND THEIR RISK OF USE

Concerning the drug issue, decades of approximation between the discourse of medicalization and criminalization have resulted in a widespread conception that the use of any of the prohibited drugs would be physically and mentally harmful – which could occur in the short or medium term and could even lead to death due to general deterioration of health or accidental intoxication (overdose) (Fiore, 2012).

According to Fiore (2012), is widespread the idea that illegal drugs, in general, would easily cause addiction, since the first pleasurable consumption would lead to repeated use, substitution for more potent substances, loss of self-control, and even violence, given the difficulty of users to afford other doses.

To evaluate the validity of these conceptions in the light of scientific evidence, we consider relevant data available about the risk of toxicity associated with the acute use of legal and illegal substances, the potential of both types of substances to cause addiction, as well as the perception of the risk of use for users and society according to experts.

To compare psychoactive substances according to their acute lethal toxicity, Gable (2004) established the security ratio for a list of legal and illegal substances based on a broad review of literature data, comparing their lethal acute dose with the most commonly used for non-medical purposes.

The data obtained by the author allow us to understand that the potential of a substance to cause a fatal acute intoxication is not directly related to its legal status. Therefore, regarding this aspect, marijuana and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) demonstrated a safety ratio around 100 times higher than alcohol, while cocaine presented a 50% higher safety ratio (Gable, 2004). The major exception to this rule was the intravenous (injectable) use of heroin which, according to the same parameters, was shown to be only 20% less safe than alcohol (op. cit.) – a legal drug used by half of the adults and around a quarter of Brazilian adolescents (Laranjeira, 2014).

It should also be noted that this higher risk associated with the acute use of legal substances, compared to several illegal ones, was not an isolated finding. Other authors, using different methodologies have also classified alcohol as the substance associated with the highest risk on a

population scale (this being commonly underestimated) and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) as being within safe limits, both in an individual and population assessment (Lachenmeier and Rehm, 2015).

Similar to the toxicity risks associated with acute drug use, the hegemonic conceptions related to the potential of illegal drugs for causing addiction and the risks that their use may entail to users or third parties are also inconsistent, given the evidence.

Among all those who come into contact with these substances – in 2015, approximately 250 million people used some drug worldwide – around 12% developed a pattern of risky use, developing dependence and needing clinical treatment (UNODC, 2017).

Likewise, European experts from several areas related to the drugs issue, when assessing the ability of these to cause harm to users or third parties, have shown that the legal *status of* a psychoactive substance does not directly correlate with its ability to cause harm. Again, alcohol was the most harmful among the 20 substances analyzed (Nutt, King and Phillips, 2010; Van Amsterdam et al., 2015).

Along with a misperception of the risk associated with the use of legal and illegal psychoactive substances, prohibitionism spread, through the classification and control of drugs, the idea that illegal drugs had virtually no therapeutic potential.

Therefore, only some psychoactive substances, such as opioids, benzodiazepine tranquilizers, and amphetamines, are allowed to be used in medical treatments for conditions such as pain and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), while methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and psychedelics are prohibited and are not available for therapeutic use, or, as in the case of *cannabis*, are not yet regulated worldwide (Nutt, King and Nichols, 2013).

This condition does not correspond to the scientific evidence regarding the potential therapeutic use of prohibited substances. The *cannabis* derivatives present evidence of efficacy in treating spasticity associated with multiple sclerosis (Zajicek et al., 2012) and Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)-associated painful neuropathy (Abrams et al., 2007).

There is also the possibility of using *cannabis* as a symptomatic treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Passie et al., 2012) and one of its cannabinoids, cannabidiol (CBD), as an adjuvant in the treatment of patients with severe and refractory epilepsy, beginning in childhood (Stockings et al., 2018).

Regarding MDMA, its use has already been approved by the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) as an innovative therapy (breakthrough therapy) for the experimental treatment of patients with PTSD, having been demonstrated to have sustained symptomatic relief of the symptoms in patients non-responsive to traditional therapies (Mithoefer et al., 2013).

In the same way, LSD diethylamide, in a single dose, has beneficial effects in treating disorders associated with alcohol use, validated in a meta-analysis (Krebs and Johansen, 2012). There is also a demonstration of the potential benefits of using LSD as an adjunct to psychotherapy in patients with life-threatening diseases (Gasser et al., 2014).

For last, it is worth outlining that the form of drug regulation associated with the hegemony of prohibitionism has constituted a significant obstacle to the scientific research of prohibited substances (Nutt, 2015).

3 MYTHS RELATED TO THE RESULTS INTENDED BY THE DRUG PROHIBITION

In the war on drugs ideology and prohibitionist paradigm, there are conceptions related to the expected results of prohibition policies for certain drugs.

Faria (2017) highlights the ideal perspective that illegal drugs and their use can and should be eradicated, as well as encouraging forms of incarceration – criminal or sanitary – as a solution to the drug issue. There is an understanding that the state's ideal action to fight drugs is to criminalize their circulation and use (Fiore, 2012). There is also the idea that drug prohibition would protect the legal interest of public health (Taffarello, 2009).

Nothing could be further from reality. Despite the commitment adopted by the UN in 1998 that member countries adhere to strategies to eradicate or significantly reduce the illegal cultivation of coca, *cannabis*, and poppy (the same applies to synthetic psychoactive substances) by 2008 (White, 2012), illegal psychoactive substances are still used, driving a highly profitable trade and stable demand (Souza, 2015).

Similarly, mass incarceration (Moore and Elkavich, 2008; Brasil, 2017) and violence associated with drug prohibition (Werb et al., 2011) did not improve access to health and did not reduce health risks.

There is an increased prevalence of substance use disorders in the prison population, as demonstrated by international (Fazel, Bains and Doll, 2006) and national (Canazaro and Argimon, 2010) data. The Brazilian prison population still has a risk 28 times higher than the general population of contracting tuberculosis and a rate of intentional violent deaths more than six times higher than observed throughout the country, in 2013 (Brasil, 2014).

Outside of prisons, prohibitionist drug policies are also associated with violence. A prominent international example is the case of Mexico, where the decision of the former president, Felipe Calderón, in 2006, to use military force in civilian areas to fight trafficking led to an epidemic of violence that also spread through Central America (OAS, 2013).

In Mexico, the increase in deaths by homicide, especially among young people, prevented the increase in life expectancy among men in the country and, in some states, seemed to be the main responsible for the decrease in life expectancy among men aged 15 to 75 years (González-Pérez, Vega-López and Cabrera-Piraval, 2012). Also, in Latin America, Mejía and Restrepo estimated that around 25% of the homicide rate in Colombia is explained by the booming cocaine market and the war on drugs in the country (Mejía and Restrepo, 2013).

Likewise, the declaration of war on drugs by the president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, elected in 2016, was associated with an escalation of violence, incarceration, and preventable deaths (McCall, 2017), with more than 7 thousand deaths related to the implementation of this policy in a few months of government (HRW, 2017).

It is also worth demonstrating that drug prohibition policies are not applied equitably to the entire population but have a strong racial bias.

In the United States, the war on drugs is related to the erosion of legislation that restricts police action and an increase in police brutality directed at the minority of African Americans without a corresponding reduction in the use and trade of drugs on the streets (Cooper, 2015). Still, drug-related

crimes account for approximately half the federal prison population in this country, and black persons are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white ones (Sentencing Project, 2014).

Similarly, between 2009 and 2016, more than 20 thousand people were killed in Brazil as a result of police actions, primarily men, young and black people (FBSP, 2017). In our country, the crime that most singularly contributes to mass incarceration (and its consequent health risks) is drug trafficking, responsible for depriving 26% of the male and 62% of the female prison population of their liberty (Brasil, 2017).

Here, as in the United States, there is also an overrepresentation of black people in the prison population (64% versus 53% of black persons in the general population), who are also mostly young (55%) and have a lower level of education (80% have not completed high school) (Brasil, 2017).

We demonstrate, this way, that the prevailing ideas about the expected results of the application of prohibitionist drug policies – protection of public health, elimination of illegal substances, and equitable application of public policies – are not justified with accumulated scientific evidence.

4 MYTHS RELATED TO THE FLEXIBILIZATION OF PROHIBITIONIST DRUG POLICIES

Despite the accumulated scientific evidence strongly pointing to the ineffectiveness and social and public health damage of prohibitionist drug policies, they continue to be implemented, and institutions are highly resistant to change them.

One of the factors contributing to this scenario is the fear associated with easing these policies, especially the idea that the easing of drug policies would lead to an indiscriminate increase in use. This conception, however, is not verified when the experiences of changes in legislation related to one or more illegal substances are analyzed.

When evaluating changes related to the pattern of use of marijuana after its decriminalization⁵ in Australia, Bretteville-Jensen and Williams (2011) observed that this flexibility seems to reduce the age people start to use it, keeping unchanged the proportion of the population that will begin using the drug. The same authors replicated this observation, that is, that the impact of decriminalization is concentrated in youth, but showed that this impact is restricted to the first five years following the implementation of the policy and is not observed after this period (Williams and Bretteville-Jensen, 2014).

Similarly, when evaluating data from drug policies in Europe, the United States, and Australia, experts have reported that no systematic relationship can be established between drug policies and the prevalence of the use of marijuana (Maag, 2003). The same study also concludes that the social costs related to restrictive legislation and the negative consequences of decriminalization of use can be solved by decriminalization (op. cit.).

There is also data available on the Portuguese experience of decriminalizing the use of all drugs. Authors who analyzed the results of this policy showed that, contrary to what was expected, there was no significant increase in use, and there was still a reduction in the problematic use and in the drug-related harm, as well as a reduction in the criminal justice burden (Hughes and Stevens, 2010).

5. It is important to note that the concept of decriminalization refers to taking the use or possession of drugs out of the legal sphere while still maintaining trafficking as criminal conduct.

It is also interesting to note that the interpretation of the evidence generated by the Portuguese experience (which is positive, despite its nuances) has been made selectively by both pro and critics of decriminalization (Hughes and Stevens, 2012).

5 CONCLUSION

Drug policies were, throughout the 20th century, hegemonized by the prohibitionist paradigm that, being endowed with a strong character of moral panic about psychoactive drugs, promoted the dissemination of many myths related to these substances, the benefits of their prohibition and the harms of relaxation of legislation on the subject.

Over the last decades, the perpetuation of these misconceptions, or vague ideas, has produced negative impacts on public health and security, especially felt by the most vulnerable populations, such as problematic drug users and female and black populations.

In the scientific literature, accumulated evidence indicates the need to change prohibitionist policies on drugs and points out ways to carry out such changes.

Therefore, the decriminalization of drug possession for personal use and small sales, the reduction of police violence and discrimination, in the context of policing, the harm reduction approach, and the scientific evaluation of regulated markets are proposed paths for drug policy formulation based on the evidence available to date (Csete et al., 2016).

For last, we reiterate the need for a rigorous evaluation of the evidence produced from the experiences of easing drug policies since the selective use of evidence does not favor the construction of scientifically based and myth-free approaches.

BOX 1

Myths about drug policy formulation

- The use of illegal drugs is always problematic or leads to addiction.
- Illegal drugs are more toxic and have a higher chances of leading to death by overdose.
- Illegal substances were banned for causing greater harm to the user or society.
- Illegal drugs have no therapeutic use potential.
- Is it possible to eradicate illegal drugs and completely ban their use.
- The state should criminalize and punish the use and trade of drugs to solve the social issue of drugs.
- The criminalization of drug use and trade equally affects the entire population.
- Loosening drug policies would lead to indiscriminate increases in use.

Authors' elaboration.

BOX 2

Scientific evidence accumulated about the drug issue

- A minority – around 12% – of drug users evolve into a pattern of addiction and will require treatment.
- There are legal substances, such as alcohol, which are much less safe than many illegal drugs, in relation to the risk of causing death by overdose.
- There is no correlation between the assessed ability of a drug to cause harm and its legal *status*.
- Several prohibited substances have shown potential for therapeutic use according to scientific studies.
- Demand for drugs remains stable despite criminalization policies.
- The decriminalization of the use and of the small crimes related to the drug trade is justified by the accumulated scientific evidence.
- The criminalization of drug use disproportionately affects the poorest population, the black population and the female population.
- There was no significant increase in drug use in countries that relaxed their drug policies.

Authors' elaboration.

REFERENCES

- ABRAMS, D. I. et al. Cannabis in painful HIV-associated sensory neuropathy: a randomized placebo-controlled trial. **Neurology**, v. 68, n. 7, p. 515-521, 2007.
- BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça. Departamento Penitenciário Nacional. **Levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias**: Infopen. Brasília: MJ, 2014.
- _____. **Levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias**: Infopen – atualização junho de 2016. Brasília: MJ, 2017.
- BRETTEVILLE-JENSEN, A. L.; WILLIAMS, J. **Decriminalization and initiation into cannabis use**. Melbourn: University of Melbourn, 2011. (Working Paper, n. 1130).
- CANAZARO, D.; ARGIMON, I. I. L. de. Características, sintomas depressivos e fatores associados em mulheres encarceradas no estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. **Cadernos de Saúde Pública**, v. 26, p. 1323-1333, 2010.
- COOPER, H. L. F. War on drugs policing and police brutality. **Substance Use and Misuse**, v. 50, n. 8-9, p. 1188-1194, 2015.
- CSETE, J. et al. Public health and international drug policy: report of the Johns Hopkins. **Lancet**, London, v. 387, n. 10026, p. 1427, 2016.
- ESCOHOTADO, A. **Historia general de las drogas**. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998.
- FARIA, E. C. C. de. **Redução de danos em um contexto de “guerra às drogas”**: a formação sob a perspectiva de quem atua no SUS. 2017. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2017.
- FAZEL, S.; BAINS, P.; DOLL, H. Substance abuse and dependence in prisoners: a systematic review. **Addiction**, v. 101, n. 2, p. 181-191, 2006.
- FBSP – FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. **Anuário brasileiro de segurança pública**. São Paulo: FBSP, 2017.

FILEV, R. Como você se comporta? Dilemas sobre as dependências de substâncias. In: BOKANY, V. (Org.). **Drogas no Brasil: entre a saúde e a justiça – proximidades e opiniões**. São Paulo: FPA, 2015. p. 103-118.

FIORE, M. Prazer e risco: uma discussão a respeito dos saberes médicos sobre o uso de “drogas”. In: LABATE, B. C. et al. (Org.). **Drogas e cultura: novas perspectivas**. Salvador: EDUFBA, 2008. p. 141-154.

_____. O lugar do Estado na questão das drogas: o paradigma proibicionista e as alternativas. **Novos Estudos Cebrap**, n. 92, p. 9-21, 2012.

GABLE, R. S. Comparison of acute lethal toxicity of commonly abused psychoactive substances. **Addiction**, v. 99, n. 6, p. 686-696, 2004.

GASSER, P. et al. Safety and efficacy of lysergic acid diethylamide-assisted psychotherapy for anxiety associated with life-threatening diseases. **The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease**, v. 202, n. 7, p. 513, 2014.

GONZÁLEZ-PÉREZ, G. J.; VEGA-LÓPEZ, M. G.; CABRERA-PIVARAL, C. E. Impact of homicide on male life expectancy in Mexico. **Revista Panamericana de Salud Pública**, v. 32, n. 5, p. 335-342, 2012.

HRW – HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH. **“License to kill”**: Philippine police killings in Duterte’s “war on drugs”. New York: HRW, 2017.

HUGHES, C. E.; STEVENS, A. What can we learn from the Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs? **The British Journal of Criminology**, v. 50, n. 6, p. 999-1022, 2010.

_____. A resounding success or a disastrous failure: re-examining the interpretation of evidence on the Portuguese decriminalisation of illicit drugs. **Drug and Alcohol Review**, v. 31, n. 1, p. 101-113, 2012.

KREBS, T. S.; JOHANSEN, P-Ø. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) for alcoholism: meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials. **Journal of Psychopharmacology**, v. 26, n. 7, p. 994-1002, 2012.

LACHENMEIER, D. W.; REHM, J. Comparative risk assessment of alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and other illicit drugs using the margin of exposure approach. **Scientific Reports**, v. 5, p. 8126, 2015.

LARANJEIRA, R. **II Levantamento Nacional de Álcool e Drogas (Lenad) 2012**. São Paulo: Unifesp, 2014.

MAAG, V. Decriminalization of cannabis use in Switzerland from an international perspective: European, American and Australian experiences. **International Journal of Drug Policy**, v. 14, n. 3, p. 279-281, 2003.

MCCALL, C. Philippines president continues his brutal war on drugs. **The Lancet**, v. 389, n. 10064, p. 21-22, 2017.

MEJÍA, D.; RESTREPO, P. **The economics of the war on illegal drug production and trafficking**. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, 2013. (Documento Cede, n. 2013-54).

MINAYO, M. C. S.; DESLANDES, S. F. A complexidade das relações entre drogas, álcool e violência. **Caderno de Saúde Pública**, v. 14, n. 1, p. 35-42, 1998.

- MITHOEFER, M. C. et al. Durability of improvement in post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and absence of harmful effects or drug dependency after 3,4 -methylenedioxyamphetamine-assisted psychotherapy: a prospective long-term follow-up study. **Journal of Psychopharmacology**, v. 27, n. 1, p. 28-39, 2013.
- MOORE, L. D.; ELKAVICH, A. Who's using and who's doing time: incarceration, the war on drugs, and public health. **American Journal of Public Health**, v. 98, n. 1, p. 176-180, 2008.
- NUTT, D. Illegal drugs laws: clearing a 50-year-old obstacle to research. **PLoS Biology**, v. 13, n. 1, p. e1002047, 2015.
- NUTT, D.; KING, L.; NICHOLS, D. Effects of schedule I drug laws on neuroscience research and treatment innovation. **Nature Reviews Neuroscience**, v. 14, n. 8, p. 577, 2013.
- NUTT, D.; KING, L.; PHILLIPS, L. Drug harms in the UK: a multicriteria decision analysis. **The Lancet**, v. 376, n. 9752, p. 1558-1565, 2010.
- OAS – ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. **The drug problem in the Americas**. Washington: OAS, 2013.
- PASSIE, T. et al. Mitigation of post-traumatic stress symptoms by cannabis resin: a review of the clinical and neurobiological evidence. **Drug Testing and Analysis**, v. 4, n. 7-8, p. 649-659, 2012.
- RODRIGUES, T. Tráfico, guerra, proibição. In: LABATE, B. C. et al. (Org.). **Drogas e cultura: novas perspectivas**. Salvador: UFBA, 2008. p. 91-104.
- SENTENCING PROJECTS. **Trends in U.S. corrections**. Washington: Sentencing Projects, 2014. Retrieved Aug. 10, 2018, from: <<https://www.sentencingproject.org/reports/trends-in-u-s-corrections/>>.
- SOUZA, T. S. de. **A economia das drogas em uma abordagem heterodoxa**. 2015. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas, 2015.
- STOCKINGS, E. et al. Evidence for cannabis and cannabinoids for epilepsy: a systematic review of controlled and observational evidence. **Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry**, v. 89, n. 7, p. 741-753, 2018.
- TAFFARELLO, R. F. **Drogas: falência do proibicionismo e alternativas de política criminal**. 2009. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2009.
- UNODC – UNITED NATION ORGANIZATION FOR DRUGS AND CRIME. **World drug report 2017**. Vienna: UNODC, 2017.
- VAN AMSTERDAM, J. et al. European rating of drug harms. **Journal of Psychopharmacology**, v. 29, n. 6, p. 655-660, 2015.
- WERB, D. et al. Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: a systematic review. **International Journal of Drug Policy**, v. 22, n. 2, p. 87-94, 2011.
- WHITE, T. The drug-free world. **Substance Use and Misuse**, v. 47, n. 13-14, p. 1637-1639, 2012.

WILLIAMS, J.; BRETTEVILLE-JENSEN, A. L. Does liberalizing cannabis laws increase cannabis use? **Journal of Health Economics**, v. 36, p. 20-32, 2014.

ZAJICEK, J. P. et al. Multiple sclerosis and extract of cannabis: results of the Musec trial. **Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry**, v. 83, n. 11, p. 1125-1132, 2012.

COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

GROTENHERMEN, F. The toxicology of cannabis and cannabis prohibition. **Chemistry and Biodiversity**, v. 4, n. 8, p. 1744-1769, 2007.

WHITEFORD, H. A. et al. The global burden of mental, neurological and substance use disorders: an analysis from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. **PloS One**, v. 10, n. 2, p. e0116820, 2015.

THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL^{1,2}

Almir de Oliveira Junior³

More than calling the army to go up and down the “morros,” is the use of intelligence that will define the crime level we will have to endure for the next years.

Guaracy Mingardi

1 INTRODUCTION

The debate related to the actions and performance of the State's institutions in formulating and executing the programs and policies requires a broadened understanding of the professional bureaucracies' operation and its ability to promote, democratically, favorable conditions for the development in its broad definition – what comprises the increasing guarantee of individual rights and the promotion of justice. With this objective in mind, this article raises some fundamental questions regarding the role of police organizations when facing the current challenges posed by the high crime rates and the sense of impunity disseminated in Brazil.

2 STATUS OF PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL

Data from Ipea show that most of the population is terrified of crimes such as murder and armed robbery, that the level of trust in police institutions is low, and that the Armed Forces' participation in public security operations is widely desired (Ipea, 2010; 2012). In this context of the citizen's clear, deep desire for a country where social peace and public security are achieved, one needs to consider the problems of police forces' actions and the possible impacts of the strategic reorientation of their actions cause on crime control.

The distribution of public security entails several correlated and continuing steps promoted by many State organizations, all of them unique, that as a group and working together, define the criminal justice flow, in which the police is a fundamental part (Sapori, 2007). Police organizations represent the most significant “filter” of this system, setting the distance between the crimes detected and investigated (Adorno and Pasinato, 2010).

The Police is the institution responsible for crime investigation and order maintenance, having the means for registration and explanation of facts, and the legitimate use of force.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art8>

2. Special thanks to Priscila Carlos Brandão, from the University of Minas Gerais (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – UFMG), and Luseni Aquino, directorate at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea), for their comments. The author takes full responsibility for any omissions or mistakes. This article was originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 2, Aug. 2012. Available at: <http://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/6765/2/BAPI_n02_p49-54_RD_Importancia-atividades_Diest_2012-ago.pdf>.

3. Planning and research technician at Postgraduate and Training Coordination at Ipea.

This institution works on an essential selection of what will or will not be registered as a crime and what will or will not be sent to be processed by the judiciary (Paes, 2010, p. 112-113).

3 POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE

In this article, we support that the deficiencies in police investigation and intelligence are among the main problems of the criminal justice system. Police investigation refers to technical procedures that shall be carried out so that, after an offense is committed, the facts can be verified and support information can be gathered for criminal action. Therefore, that is a *reactive* action, part of the criminal prosecution, used for determining if there are proofs of the fact, its characteristics as a crime, and possible author.

So that the facts of society can be recognized as a crime and deserve the intervention of agents in charge of the security and justice system's institutions, there needs to be a criminal classification, and the agents adopt a set of procedures for verifying the versions told, and pieces of evidence collected what comprises several documents that contribute to the formalization of the criminal fact to be judged (Paes, 2010, p. 110).

In other words, police investigation consists of work that must be done efficiently and effectively, so the consequences effectively guarantee public security. However, not only those technical aspects are at stake. Considering the State's prerogative to social control and the requirement to institute criminal proceedings when State's institutions are aware that a crime occurred, Brazilian legislation seeks to guarantee the full right to defense to the maximum degree and, this way, protect the citizens from the discretionary judgment of the agents in charge of implementing public security (Pereira, 2010). In those terms, the burden of proof rests on the plaintiff, who shall act with this objective to the extent permitted by the law, within limits also set by the guarantee of the fundamental rights of the suspects. Herewith, there should only be the possibility of the Judiciary enforcing the sentence on the citizens against whom the Police have legally gathered evidence.⁴

In Brazil, it is estimated that errors in investigations make most crime cases unsolved without even sending them to the Public Prosecutor's Office to file a complaint (Adorno and Pasinato, 2010). This shows a historical and structural problem of Brazilian police who, traditionally, do not keep the investigation and intelligence at a leading position among their responsibilities. Besides the general criticism about the "slowness of justice," the significant difference between the number of offenses that generates police service and the ones that become criminal proceedings represents one of the major factors of impunity in the country (Misse, 2010). To provide an example, in February 2012, the press widely disseminated the failure of a task force carried out by the Federal Government, the Judiciary, and the Public Prosecutor's Office to end around 143 thousand police investigations – which were on hold – created as of 2007 by the civil police.⁵ The result: simply a substantial number of investigations were closed due to the lack of evidence, information about the authors, suspects, and witnesses, or very inaccurate information about them.

4. That is, there should be an effort to eradicate – in a democratic rule-of-law State – practices such as torture to extract a confession or to get evidence, the use of wiretapping, and other technological resources that violate the suspect's privacy without the proper authorization of a judge, among others that violate fundamental rights.

5. The headline of the first page of *Folha de S.Paulo* of February 23, 2012 (Fracassa..., 2012).

The deficiencies in investigation operations can be approached from different aspects as the lack of structure or investment in training experts. However, in this text, we aim to underline a specific dimension related to the occupational culture of the Police. Different studies present an alarming Framework regarding the role of criminal investigation techniques education in this culture. Research carried out in Rio de Janeiro, seeking to identify the formal and informal procedures of investigation and transmission of information in specialized units, indicated that the knowledge and learning acquired by police officers mainly occur during their daily activities at work. The conclusion is that the expertise to solve cases of kidnapping, homicide, and organized crime includes few formal specialization activities (Nascimento, 2008).

Indeed, Brazilian police organizations have not achieved an appropriate level of professionalism in two primary responsibilities: the use of physical force and the capacity for investigation. First, due to excessive use of force, especially against the low-income classes (Paixão, 1988). Second, the criminal investigation and analysis end up in the background, surrounded by a vast number of other demands that gained priority in the Police's standard service. Those requests range from administrative activities to service in a high number of cases unrelated to crime reporting that, per se, represent a significant demand in the middle of the Police's defective material and human resources context (Azevedo and Vasconcellos, 2011). Furthermore, the organizational culture – itself – usually developed by the police officers, is reluctant to a higher level of specialization and professionalism to improve the use of investigation techniques, mainly due to the strong sense police officers share that they are educated “in the streets” or “in the field.” According to Nascimento (2011, p. 27), “when questioned about their skills in investigating homicide cases, police officers often say they have not attended any course. They say they learn by getting experience and that some elements they have brought from the precinct they were in before can be used to solve crimes”.

It is about the myth of the “police instinct.” Police officers usually downgrade the training received in their academies, considering the courses distant from their daily practices (Minayo and Souza, 2003). When a crime occurs (e.g., a homicide), the civil police investigators, based on their experience or intuition, consider the possible motivations involved and search for evidence that indicates the suspects. Then, mainly based on the statement, they believe that, once they have the culprits, they can catch them falling into their contradictions once they have this “powerful police instinct.”⁶

The investigation function is too complex and vital to be carried out within common sense limits. One cannot deny that efforts have been made to improve investigation capacity training, which should be valued.⁷ However, we seriously need to consider the possibility of further progress.

6. A detailed description is found in Beato (1992). Moreover, formal technical knowledge is also downgraded among Military Police officers. In the following excerpt from an interview collected by Muniz (1999, p. 153), a sergeant of the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro compares his learning process with that of the criminal, both through informal socialization with the most experienced in the environment: “*Vagabundo* says they take a crime diploma in jail. For the police officer, the diploma comes from the street. The street is the police officer's school. Everything you want to see is there; it is to look. I learned to have a technical look on the street” – the term *vagabundo* is commonly used by Military Police to refer to suspects and criminals, especially those from the low-income classes. The problem is that this allegedly “technical” look is not neutral. In practice, we can see that when the bodies of murdered black and poor young people are found in the favelas and peripheries. Police officers continually refer to the same version on the news in different media outlets in the country (“We already know what happened, the victim was involved in drug trafficking”). However, although police authorities estimate that most shooting victims in Brazil consist of individuals involved in trafficking, research shows this is a simplistic explanation (Adorno and Pasinato, 2010; Misse, 2010).

7. We could mention, among other initiatives, the courses in the field of research offered nationwide by the National Secretariat of Public Security (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública – Senasp) It should also be noted that the spending on information and intelligence increased by 28.5% between 2008 and 2009 and 15.5% between 2009 and 2010 (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2010).

As Barreto Júnior (2009) argues, the careers of chief of Police and detective need to be reconceptualized and understood within a new perspective on investigation management. This can be seen as a rational process of technical imbrication with qualities similar to scientific research.

We should ponder the feasibility of a methodological fusion between the objectives of describing crime for the judicial purposes of punishment and, at the same time, the objectives of an enlightening description, modeling a scientific “reading” of the recurrence and characteristics of criminal behavior within time and space. This last piece of advice would contribute to formulating preventive intervention policies, proactive and connected to the agendas of other government sectors, besides responsible and competent social movements (Barreto Júnior, 2009, p. 45).

Likewise, Pereira (2010) addresses the possibility of an investigation science that would go beyond isolated and individual practice, becoming a broad collective activity aimed at discussing general analysis models. This angle points to another topic that is also fundamental to the Police’s institutional improvement: the production and use of police intelligence.

Despite being connected and, in fact, complementary concepts, we need to see the difference between criminal investigation and police intelligence. As mentioned before, the research consists of a reactive activity, through which one seeks to raise pieces of evidence and proof of a criminal offense and its author, whose destination will be the police investigation and the records of the criminal proceedings – if the Public Prosecutor’s Office proposes to press charges. Intelligence, in turn, is a proactive activity characterized by the constant search for information that, once organized, becomes available to assist the decision-making process. By nature, criminal investigation’s role is to provide elements for prosecuting crimes that have already occurred. On the other hand, intelligence can aid both preventive and controlling actions against crime.

Police intelligence refers to the systematic treatment of information and the production of knowledge by establishing connections between criminal facts or situations of immediate or potential influence on them, establishing patterns and crime trends in a given historical context of an area or region (Ferro, 2006). It can also be seen as a complementary activity to crime investigation, providing elements that allow an understanding of the *modus operandi* of criminal agents in a broader framework using software, georeferencing, and statistical methods.⁸

While criminal investigation itself consists of activity of exclusive competence of the judicial police, the intelligence expertise can and should be developed for also advising the actions of ostensive policing through information analysis, sharing, and controlled dissemination. These practices allow us to understand a set of factors that affect criminal behavior in particular local or regional contexts. This happens through interdisciplinary and qualified criminal analysis based on data from different sources, such as police incidents and information produced during investigations. Even those that do not become part of the investigation or complaint can be stored to support future decision-making processes. The first National Public Security Plan (Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública – PNSP),

8. Just to give you two examples, the Public Security Institute (Instituto de Segurança Pública – ISP) of Rio de Janeiro can be considered an intelligence production collaboration agency in the State of Rio de Janeiro. The ISP produces statistical reports on the state’s Public Security System to analyze the issues that most affect the population and, therefore, evaluate the performance of actions in that state. Regarding the partnership between the Police and the University, we can highlight the Center for Studies in Crime and Public Security (Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública – Crisp) of the UFMG, which has already offered several courses on criminal analysis for police officers, besides other similar experiences nationwide.

from 2000, already provided for implementing a public security intelligence subsystem (Sisp), and its creation was included in Decree No. 3,448 of May 5, 2000, but that has not been consolidated yet.

4 CONCLUSION

Not disregarding other equally relevant and urgent initiatives to strengthen the public security system, we may consider that, in the Brazilian case, investigative and criminal analysis activities should be improved to be more effective in controlling crime rates. As Brandão (2010, p. 17) affirms:

in our country, we have not yet achieved a level of specialization and prominence capable of generating what is already called intelligence-led policing in other countries. It is crucial to building a culture capable of perceiving the answers and immediate operational results that intelligence activity can provide, and that fundamentally depends on the synergy produced between the technological gains made possible by the information and communications technology infrastructure, the robust databases, and information embedded in the operational activity itself (preventive and investigative) and analytical capacity.

Instead of acting on incidents in an isolated and limited way, police intelligence could guide police officers' actions for more detailed, long-term situational diagnoses, allowing better allocation of resources to combat crime and maintain order. Public security authorities cannot work with a narrow perspective on knowledge. The amount of data accumulated by Brazilian police is large but dispersed. There must be interest in recovering and transforming them into helpful guidance for dealing with any type of crime: from the so-called organized crime, such as drug and arms trafficking, to the most common types of crimes, such as theft, break-ins, and vehicle thefts. With intelligence work – which also involves critical capacity on the part of professionals in the area to fill information gaps with analytical judgment – it is possible to supply the police with more efficient strategies to fulfill their role, providing greater security to citizens.

REFERENCES

- ADORNO, S.; PASINATO, W. Violência e impunidade penal: da criminalidade detectada à criminalidade investigada. **Dilemas** – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social, v. 3, p. 51-84, jan./mar. 2010.
- AZEVEDO, R. G.; VASCONCELLOS, F. B. O inquérito policial em questão: situação atual e a percepção dos delegados de polícia sobre as fragilidades do modelo brasileiro de investigação criminal. **Revista Sociedade e Estado**, v. 26, n. 1, jan./abr. 2011.
- BARRETO JÚNIOR, J. T. Polícias civis e políticas de segurança pública no Brasil. **Segurança Pública** – Cadernos Adenauer, ano 9, n. 4, p. 43-50, jan. 2009.
- BEATO, C. C. Suicídio ou homicídio: a definição de um fato. **Análise e Conjuntura**, v. 7, n. 2, p. 92-106, 1992.

BRANDÃO, P. C. A inteligência criminal no Brasil: um diagnóstico. In: LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS, 29 Oct. 2010, Toronto, Canada. **Proceedings...** [s.l.]: [s.n.], 2010.

FERRO, A. L. Inteligência de segurança pública e análise criminal. **Revista Brasileira de Inteligência**, v. 2, n. 2, p. 77-92, abr. 2006.

FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. **Anuário do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública**, ano 4, 2010.

FRACASSA mutirão para solucionar homicídios. **Folha de S.Paulo**, 23 fev. 2012. Retrieved from: <<http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cp23022012.htm>>.

IPEA – INSTITUTO DE PESQUISA ECONÔMICA APLICADA. **Sistema de indicadores de percepção social: segurança pública**. Brasília: Ipea, 2010. Retrieved from: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/SIPS/sips_segurancap_2010.pdf>.

_____. **Sistema de indicadores de percepção social: defesa nacional**. Parte III. Brasília: Ipea, 2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/SIPS/120229_sips_defesanacional_3.pdf>.

MINAYO, M. C. S.; SOUZA, E. R. (Org.). **Missão investigar: entre o ideal e a realidade de ser policial**. Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2003.

MINGARDI, G. Inteligência policial e crime organizado. In: LIMA, R. S.; PAULA, L. (Org.). **Segurança pública e violência**. São Paulo: Contexto, 2008.

MISSE, M. O inquérito policial no Brasil: resultados gerais de uma pesquisa. **Dilemas – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social**, v. 3, p. 35-50, jan./mar. 2010.

MUNIZ, J. **Ser policial é sobretudo uma razão de ser – cultura e cotidiano da Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro**. 1999. Tese (Doutorado) – Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1999.

NASCIMENTO, A. A. A atividade policial nas delegacias especializadas do Rio de Janeiro: considerações práticas. **Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública e Cidadania**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 99-123, jan./jul. 2008.

_____. Especialistas no improviso: breves considerações sobre as atividades policiais nas delegacias especializadas do Rio de Janeiro. **Cadernos de Segurança Pública**, ano 3, n. 2, p. 16-31, jan. 2011.

PAES, V. F. Do inquérito ao processo: análise comparativa das relações entre polícia e Ministério Público no Brasil e na França. **Dilemas – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social**, v. 3, p. 111-141, jan./mar. 2010.

PAIXÃO, A. L. Crime, controle social e a consolidação da democracia: as metáforas da cidadania. In: REIS, F. W.; O'DONNELL, G. (Org.). **A democracia no Brasil – dilemas e perspectivas**. São Paulo: Vértice, 1988.

PEREIRA, E. S. Limites jurídicos da investigação. In: _____. **Teoria da investigação criminal: uma introdução jurídico-científica**. Coimbra: Almedina, 2010.

SAPORI, L. F. Sistema de justiça criminal e a manutenção da ordem pública. In: _____. **Segurança pública no Brasil: desafios e perspectivas**. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2007.

AFTERWORD – THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL¹

Almir de Oliveira Junior²

The article *The Relevance of Police Investigation and Intelligence to the Criminal Justice System and its Improvement in Brazil*, published for the first time in 2012, remains relevant because it discusses a central point for the success of police activity in confronting crime. The use of police intelligence is one key piece for the improvement of public security policies. However, it is crucial to insist on a conceptual distinction: it is a common mistake to misunderstand “investigation” and “intelligence” even among professionals in police organizations. In the cases presented by the media, for instance, a slightly more sophisticated police investigation is often taken as an intelligence operation. It is usual to think that using wiretapping in an investigation represents intelligence work. However, it is not the case. Intelligence is an organization’s specialized activity to collect, gather, and analyze information to guide strategic decisions. In this sense, intelligence helps to plan action strategies for all public security agencies in their decision-making processes, not just the police. Therefore, police intelligence is a subgroup of a slightly broader category called criminal intelligence. Other institutions, such as the Public Ministry, the Municipal Security or Social Defense Department, universities, and agencies of government-related research, can also develop criminal intelligence. It is important to emphasize that, while the investigation has, by nature, the function of providing subsidies for the repression of crimes that have already occurred, on the other hand, criminal intelligence serves to assist both in preventive and repressive actions against crime. It refers to gathering information and producing knowledge by establishing correlations between illegal facts, or situations of immediate or potential influence on them, establishing patterns and crime trends in a given context. Such information refers to the nature of the environment (social, cultural, economic, and legal) that spreads specific criminal activities and the motivations of their agents. In practice, such knowledge allows for a better allocation of personnel and resources based on effective planning of policing actions and the possibility of faster investigation of crimes. It is possible to create systematic processes for gathering and analyzing information on the modalities of criminal activity and trends regarding market niche expansions (Oliveira Junior, 2017).³ In this sense, it is also necessary to monitor the uncertainties that can cause significant changes in the ways criminals act or migrate from their areas of activity, as well as predict the effects of technological changes that can lead to the emergence of new types of crime. Therefore, the intelligence activity’s prospective nature is complementary to the police investigation activity without replacing it. Likewise, it is essential to reinforce investigative work in judicial police organizations with more investment in training and personnel.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art9>

2. Planning and research technician at Postgraduate and Training Coordination at Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea).

3. Oliveira Junior, A. Análise da criminalidade organizada e incremento das atividades de inteligência policial. In: Pereira, E. S.; Werner, G. C.; Valente, M. M. G. (Org.). *Criminalidade organizada: investigação, direito e ciência*. São Paulo: Almedina, 2017. v. 1, p. 105-122.

Costa and Oliveira Junior (2016)⁴ noticed a change from a predominant pattern of traditional investigation, based on the search for witnesses and the production of testimonies and confessions, to another pattern in which arrests in flagrante delicto occupy a prominent place. In the investigation process, the civil police, in principle, identify and interrogate suspects, produce legal evidence, and instruct criminal legal proceedings. However, evidence indicates that in most cases where the suspects are delivered to justice, there was no police investigation work since the arrests occurred in the act, and investigations concluded in non-specialized police stations. It suggests that the police investigation in Brazil has not become more technical or sophisticated in recent years. On the contrary, arrest in flagrante delicto came to play a central role in the criminal investigation. The reasons for this change remain unclear. However, they probably go through the resistance of the civil police to abandon their notary standard of action, with little emphasis on investigation and intelligence activities (Costa and Oliveira Junior, 2016, p. 162).

4. Costa, A. T. M.; Oliveira Junior, A. Novos padrões de investigação policial no Brasil. *Sociedade e Estado*, v. 31, n. 1, p. 147-164, 2016. Available at: <<https://periodicos.unb.br/index.php/sociedade/article/view/6083>>.

POSFÁCIO – A IMPORTÂNCIA DAS ATIVIDADES DE INVESTIGAÇÃO E INTELIGÊNCIA POLICIAL PARA O SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA CRIMINAL E SEU APERFEIÇOAMENTO NO BRASIL¹

Almir de Oliveira Junior²

O artigo *Importância das Atividades de Investigação e Inteligência Policial para o Sistema de Justiça Criminal e seu Aperfeiçoamento no Brasil*, publicado pela primeira vez em 2012, mantém-se relevante por discutir um ponto central para o sucesso da atuação policial no enfrentamento ao crime. O uso da inteligência policial é uma peça fundamental para o aprimoramento das políticas de segurança pública. No entanto, é fundamental insistir em uma distinção conceitual: é um erro comum confundir investigação e inteligência, mesmo entre profissionais de organizações policiais. Nos casos apresentados pela mídia, por exemplo, uma investigação policial um pouco mais sofisticada costuma ser considerada uma operação de inteligência. É comum pensar que usar escutas telefônicas em uma investigação representa um trabalho de inteligência. No entanto, não é o caso. A inteligência é a atividade especializada de uma organização para coletar, reunir e analisar informações visando orientar as decisões estratégicas. Nesse sentido, a inteligência ajuda a planejar estratégias de ação para todos os órgãos de segurança pública em seus processos decisórios, não apenas para a polícia. Portanto, a inteligência policial é um subgrupo de uma categoria um pouco mais ampla chamada inteligência criminal. Outras instituições, como o Ministério Público, a Secretaria Municipal de Segurança ou Defesa Social, universidades e órgãos de pesquisa relacionados ao governo, também podem desenvolver inteligência criminal. É importante ressaltar que, enquanto a investigação tem, por natureza, a função de fornecer subsídios para a repressão de crimes já ocorridos, a inteligência criminal serve para auxiliar nas ações tanto preventivas quanto repressivas contra a criminalidade. Refere-se à coleta de informações e à produção de conhecimento por meio do estabelecimento de correlações entre fatos ilícitos, ou situações de influência imediata ou potencial sobre eles, estabelecendo padrões e tendências de criminalidade em determinado contexto. Tais informações se referem à natureza do ambiente (social, cultural, econômico e jurídico) que dissemina atividades criminosas específicas e as motivações de seus agentes. Na prática, esse conhecimento permite uma melhor alocação de pessoal e recursos com base no planejamento eficaz das ações de policiamento e na possibilidade de apuração mais rápida dos crimes. É possível criar processos sistemáticos de coleta e análise de informações sobre as modalidades de atuação criminosa e tendências de expansão de nichos de mercado (Oliveira Junior, 2017).³ Nesse sentido, também é necessário monitorar as incertezas que podem causar mudanças significativas na forma como os criminosos agem ou migram de suas áreas de atuação, bem como prever os efeitos das mudanças tecnológicas que podem levar ao surgimento de novos tipos de crime. Portanto, a natureza prospectiva da atividade de inteligência é complementar à atividade de investigação policial, mas sem substituí-la. Da mesma forma, é fundamental reforçar o trabalho investigativo nas organizações de polícia judiciária com mais investimento em treinamento e pessoal. Costa e Oliveira Junior (2016) perceberam uma mudança de um padrão predominante de

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art10>

2. Técnico de planejamento e pesquisa e coordenador de pós-graduação e capacitação do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea). E-mail: <almir.junior@ipea.gov.br>.

3. Oliveira Junior, A. de. Análise da criminalidade organizada e incremento das atividades de inteligência policial. In: Pereira, E. S.; Werner, G. C.; Valente, M. M. G. (Coord.). *Criminalidade Organizada: investigação, direito e ciência*. São Paulo: Almedina, 2017.

investigação tradicional, baseado na busca de testemunhas e produção de depoimentos e confissões, para outro em que as prisões em flagrante ocupam lugar de destaque.⁴ No processo de investigação, a polícia civil, em princípio, identifica e interroga suspeitos, produz provas legais e instrui processos judiciais criminais. No entanto, as evidências indicam que na maioria dos casos em que os suspeitos são entregues à justiça não houve trabalho de investigação policial, uma vez que as prisões ocorreram em flagrante, sendo as investigações concluídas em delegacias não especializadas. Isso sugere que a investigação policial no Brasil não se tornou mais técnica ou sofisticada nos últimos anos. Ao contrário, a prisão em flagrante passou a ter papel central na investigação criminal. As razões para essa mudança permanecem obscuras. No entanto, provavelmente passam pela resistência da polícia civil em abandonar seu padrão de atuação notarial, com pouca ênfase nas atividades de investigação e inteligência (Costa e Oliveira Junior, 2016, p.162).

4. Costa, A. T. M.; Oliveira Junior, A. de. Novos padrões de investigação policial no Brasil. *Sociedade e Estado*, v. 31, p. 147-164, Brasília: UnB, 2016.

FROM #VIDASNASFAVELASIMPORTAM TO #NÓSPORNÓS: PERIPHERAL YOUTH AT THE CENTER OF THE DEBATE ON DRUG POLICY^{1,2}

Ana Clara Telles³

Luna Arouca⁴

Raull Santiago⁵

1 INTRODUCTION: AT GUNPOINT

The war on drugs directly affects our daily lives. For us, it means closed schools, changes in the routine, fear of leaving home, and extreme concern for our and our family's well-being. On behalf of this war, the state justifies a series of rights violations against us, young people from the favelas and peripheries. But this war is not ours. We did not declare war on drugs. We did not decide that some drugs would be considered legal and others illegal. But we die because of them.

Movimentos

In Brazil, the policy of war on drug disproportionately affects the peripheral areas of urban centers. It is nothing new that *favelas* are seen by Brazilian society as territories of precariousness and deprivation, chaotic and violent, that need to be controlled and repressed. In recent decades, the “trafficker” imagery, directly associated with the already stigmatized image of the peripheries, has come to represent the country's number one enemy in the popular imagination, further accentuating the repressive character of public policies that reach the *favelas* territories.

The Brazilian state looks at *favelas* and peripheries at gunpoint. Regarding drug policy, the overriding strategy governments adopt is confrontation and war. The tactics to fight the illegal drug market are well known: frequent police raids, with unrestricted use of heavy weaponry and the declared goal of dismantling criminal organizations and seizing illegal substances. Placed on the front lines, residents of the peripheries are exposed to daily violence resulting from “anti-drug” operations and territorial disputes over controlling the illegal market. In this context, their fundamental rights are systematically violated: classes are canceled, workers are afraid to leave their homes, stores and public facilities close their doors. And, the worst: hundreds of lives, most of them of young black men, are lost.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art11>

2. Article originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional*, No. 18, Dec. 18. Available at: <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8886/1/bapi_18_cap_12.pdf>.

3. Specialist in public policy analysis by the Institute of Economics of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ); Ph.D. student at the Institute of International Relations (Instituto de Relações Internacionais – IRI) of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro – PUC-Rio) and M.A. in international relations by the same institution. She was a researcher at the Center for Studies on Security and Citizenship (Cesec) between 2014 and 2018, where she coordinated the project *Movimentos*.

4. Graduated in social work by UFRJ; M.A. in political science by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris; researcher at Cesec in drug policy and preventive detention; and coordinator of *Espaço Normal*, a reference site on drugs of *Redes da Maré*.

5. Social and media activist in the collective *Papo Reto*, an independent communication collective of young residents of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha; and coordinator of the project *Movimentos* of Cesec.

The collective *Movimentos* was created to debate alternatives to the current war on drugs policy from the perspective of those most affected: the youth from *favelas* and peripheries. Based on a hybrid institutional model, the collective was conceived by young activists, communicators, and artists from different *favelas* of the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro (região metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro – RMRJ), with the support of the Cesec of Universidade Cândido Mendes (Ucam). Since its creation, *Movimentos*' objective has been twofold: to bring the debate on drug policy into Brazilian *favelas* and peripheries and to bring the voices, faces, and bodies of *favelas* and peripheries to the center of the discussion already happening in other spaces.

This article aims to outline the set of circumstances behind the creation of *Movimentos*; the collective's experience in building new understandings of drug policy from the perspective of *favelas* and peripheries; and the principles that we believe should guide the search for fair and effective policies in combating racism and inequalities that fuel the war on drugs.

2 WAR ON DRUGS, WAR ON FAVELAS

In recent years, the debate on drug policy in Brazil has undergone important changes, albeit modest. Two movements stand out in the recent history of the anti-prohibitionist position: the articulation between political leaders and world-renowned personas led by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which culminates in the creation of the Global Commission on Drug Policy and the release of the documentary *Quebrando o tabu*, in 2011; and the mobilization of medical marijuana patients and their families in the fight for the regulation of access to proper medication, a process well portrayed in the film *Ilegal*, of 2014.

Undoubtedly, these movements have been crucial in moving the debate forward and giving impetus to drug policy changes. In January 2015, the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária – Anvisa) removed cannabidiol, the active principle in marijuana, from the list of prohibited substances, a crucial obstacle to importing *cannabis*-derived medicines. In August of the same year, the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) began to discuss decriminalizing drug possession for personal use. Especially concerning medical marijuana, important advances have been made since then, starting with granting habeas corpus so that thirteen families may plant and produce the *cannabis* oil for therapeutic purposes and Anvisa's registration permit for the first *cannabis*-based medicine. More recently, Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Fiocruz) announced a research plan to produce *cannabis* for medicinal use.

However, despite this timidly encouraging scenario, regarding the war on drugs and its impacts on the poor and peripheral population, we are witnessing a setback. The latest data released by the *Brazilian Yearbook of Public Security* show that Brazil reached the mark of 60 thousand deaths in 2016. In the country with the highest absolute number of homicides worldwide, the highest rate of violent deaths is concentrated in the 21-year-old age group (Cerqueira et al., 2017). Between 2005 and 2015, the homicide rate among young people aged 15 to 29 increased by 17% – this means that in this same period, 318,000 young people were murdered in the country (op. cit.). Although we cannot estimate how many of those deaths are related to drugs, many are due to violence caused by the militarization of the fight against *drug trafficking*.

Nonetheless, the war on drugs does not affect young people homogeneously: today, black young people are more likely to be murdered than non-black young people in Brazil. Of every hundred

people murdered in the country, 71 are black (Cerqueira et al., 2017). The data shows that, instead of improving, this situation has worsened: over the past decade, the homicide rate among the black population has increased by 18%, while the same rate among people of other races and ethnicities has decreased by 12% (op. cit.). The war on drugs cost falls disproportionately on young black men, the majority of whom are male.

Looking at the number of homicides is just one way of understanding the impact of the *war on drugs* on society. When we consider incarceration rates, the picture of violence and inequality remains the same. Brazil has the third largest prison population in the world, with drug trafficking being the most recurrent cause of arrests. Since the new Drug Law (Law No. 11.343, of 2006), the number of people arrested for trafficking has increased by 339% (D'Agostino, 2015). As in the case of homicides, black people suffer more impact than the rest of the population: although black persons represent just over 53% of Brazilian society, 64% of people arrested in the country are black (Brasil, 2016).

Where has the war on drugs been battled? Although drugs circulate all over the city, only the *favelas* and the peripheries feel the violent impacts of combating the illegal market of these substances. Recent data released by the Public Defender's Office of the State of Rio de Janeiro show that most of the arrests in flagrante delicto for drug trafficking happen on the outskirts of the metropolitan region (Haber, 2018). In Complexo da Maré, a group of favelas located in the North of the city of Rio de Janeiro, 41 police operations were carried out in 2017; on average, one operation every nine days (Redes da Maré, 2017). That same year, armed clashes killed 42 people in Maré and left 57 others injured. In total, there were 45 days without any activities in the regional healthcare units and 35 days of classes suspended.

What happened in Complexo da Maré in 2017 is not the exception, but the rule: similar data were collected by *Coletivo Papo Reto* for the Complexo do Alemão, also in the North region.⁶ On the same trend, statistics systematized by Cesec's Intervention Observatory show that the recent intervention decreed by the federal government in public security in the state of Rio de Janeiro invests primarily in police operations in *favelas* and peripheries, with a record number of deaths.⁷ No wonder, in recent years, the hashtag #vidanasfavelasimportam (#livesinfavelasmatter) has become popular on social media. It aims to give visibility to the violations committed in the daily context of militarization in peripheries for the "fight against drugs".

All this shows that the impacts of the war on drugs fall on society selectively and unequally. Although drugs are illegal for everyone, we choose to arrest and kill young black people and residents of the *favelas* and peripheries. The root of this problem lies in the very same way we build our drug policies: betting on the repression of retail trafficking and on the violence against the poor, black and peripheral population as a way to deal with the use of these substances.

For this reason, we need to debate further the consequences of the war on drugs in peripheries and *favelas*. But, even more importantly, we need to make way for those who suffer the most from the impacts of the war on drugs to take the lead in the debate on changes in drug policies, becoming their protagonists.

6. The collective's institutional website, available at: <<https://goo.gl/eJfq6F>>. Accessed on: Nov. 19, 2018.

7. Available at: <<https://goo.gl/kGfulS>>. Accessed on: Nov. 19, 2018.

3 FROM #VIDASNASFAVELASIMPORTAM TO #NÓSPORNÓS

Movimentos originated from the need to create spaces in which the perspective of the youth from the *favelas* and peripheries about drug policy would be placed in the foreground. With this goal in mind, in May 2016, Cesec brought together ten young people from the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Salvador to participate in a three-day training workshop on drug policy in Rio de Janeiro.

Since then, the group has met periodically to build tools and think activities on drug policy from the perspective of *favelas* and peripheries.

In the first two years of its existence, the collective participated in debates, seminars, and TV and radio programs; taught classes and workshops on the topic in public and private schools, community courses of preparation for university, and social projects; promoted educational and cultural events with collectives and organized groups of *favelas*; and conducted qualitative research with 30 young leaders from different *favelas* in the city of Rio de Janeiro to know what they think about the topic. In addition, the group created a manual called *Movimentos: drogas, juventude e favela* (Movimentos, 2017). Designed and built in collaboration, the publication brings together the main data and information on drug policy in plain language, aiming at helping to introduce this debate in schools, collectives, and social projects inside and outside the *favelas*.

In late 2017, *Movimentos* organized a three-day immersion with young people from *favelas* and peripheries across Brazil to begin building a national peripheral youth agenda on drug policy. Therefore, the 1st *Movimente-se* was born, a meeting of peripheral youth to discuss drug policy, which brought together 25 young people from ten states who work in collectives, institutions, and community initiatives on the topics of human rights, public security, racism, and youth. From this meeting, 21 proposals were systematized in six areas: i) empowerment of peripheral youth; ii) media democratization; iii) public participation; iv) investment in education and culture; v) strengthening harm reduction; and vi) policing supervision.

The proposals formulated by the participants of 1st *Movimente-se* make it clear that when the protagonists of the debate change, the priorities also change. One of the first lessons learned in the first two years of *Movimentos* was that talking about drug policy with and from the perspective of *favelas* and peripheries means addressing broader and more complex issues, which include: the difficult access to quality public services for those who make problematic use of drugs; the absence of public policies for youth in peripheries; the challenges of communicating the need for changes in drug policy in a context of media concentration on the hands of a few and influential outlets; the need to rethink the role of the police in Brazilian society and their performance in *favelas* and peripheries, among many other issues.

In addition, we have also learned that it is impossible to discuss drug policy without discussing racism, criminalization of poverty, and inequality as central and structuring issues, since they are phenomena that go hand in hand with the war on drugs in a reciprocal movement. Although social movements have always been an essential part of the anti-prohibitionist position in recent years, we can verify that several initiatives focused on racial and gender debate within the field of drug policy were created, such as the Black Initiative for a New Drug Policy (Iniciativa Negra por uma Nova Política de Drogas – INNPD) and the National Network of Feminist Antiprohibitionists (Rede Nacional de Feministas Antiproibicionistas – Renfa). The process of creation and consolidation of *Movimentos* is part of a context of broadening the participation of collectives and grassroots

organizations in the debate on drug policy from an intersectional perspective, which understands the discussion on multiple inequalities as crucial for thinking about new drug policies.

For this reason, *Movimentos* believes that for changes in drug policies to bring positive impacts to the lives of residents of favelas and peripheries, it is necessary to go beyond the discussion on decriminalization and regulation. We need to think of alternative models that ensure the inclusion and participation of populations historically marginalized and directly impacted by the war on drugs; that strengthen services and effective public policies in peripheries; that provide opportunities and perspectives for youth in *favelas* and peripheries; and that repair the material, physical and psychological damage of decades of failed policies.

Current examples show us that drug policy reforms alone do not account for a whole conjuncture of inequalities and violence of a social and racial nature related to the war on drugs. In the United States, where nine states have already legalized the marijuana market, the experiences of regulation have not always brought changes into the lives of people most impacted by the war on drugs. This is the case in the State of Washington, where restrictions on people who have already been convicted of drug-related crimes to participate in the legal trade have led to the part of the population directly impacted by prohibition being excluded from the legalization process (Rough, 2017). The market, now legalized, changes hands: from the poor youth, mostly black and Latino, involved in the underground market, to young entrepreneurs, generally white, who have never had to get their hands dirty. No wonder, in California – the latest United States state to approve the regulation of the marijuana market – discussions about reparation policies for the social and racial impacts of prohibition have become central, pulled, above all, by social movements aware of the problems of previous experiences.

These examples make it clear that for drug policy reforms to bring positive effects to *favelas* and peripheries, a conscious and determined effort must be made to build models that directly address inequalities. And we, from *Movimentos*, believe that, for this to happen, we need to put the *favelas* and the peripheries at the center of the debate as protagonists. The peripheral youth is active, engaged, connected, and informed and circulates through different city spaces. Investing in young leaders from *favelas* and peripheries is the best strategy we have at hand to build alternatives to the current drug policy that would actually bring positive impact to those who suffer most from the war on drugs.

It is #nóspornós (#usbyourselves): “nothing about us without our participation.”

4 CONCLUSION: FAVELA IS POWER

The war on drugs directly affects the daily lives of *favelas* and peripheries. On behalf of the “fight against drugs,” governments justify a series of rights violations against their residents and especially against their youth. However, amid a scenario of inequality, racism, and violence, *favelas* and peripheries continue to innovate and survive with a lot of creativity and intelligence. Every day, new tools are created, and new solutions are thought to account for a context of no policies and the intensive presence of a violent state.

The peripheries are the center, not the margin. It is the core that teems with solutions and keeps cities alive and working. Therefore, they have to be at the center of processes that discuss change. Supposing that we want new drug policies that break historical social relations based on

racism, inequality, and violence, we need to make room for *favelas* and peripheries to take the lead in this discussion.

Based on our research conducted with 30 young leaders from favelas in the city of Rio de Janeiro, we systematized six indications that can help guide the debate on drug policy made in and from the peripheries.⁸ They are: i) the logic of war that permeates current drug policies needs to be at the center of the debate; ii) to talk about drug policy, we need to address the racism, inequality, and criminalization of poverty that are at its core; iii) we need to build innovative ways to talk about drugs with *favelas*; iv) the debate on drug policy in *favelas* and peripheries must go beyond decriminalization and legalization; v) religions and other spaces of spirituality should be included in the debate, rather than relegated; and vi) youth can and should be a key player in this process.

This article aimed to show that the youth from *favelas* and peripheries are organized and prepared to occupy this debate. Fortunately, *Movimentos* is one initiative among many created by young people from Brazilian *favelas* and peripheries who flourish day after day with a thirst for transformation.

REFERENCES

- BRASIL. Ministério da Justiça e Segurança Pública. Departamento Penitenciário Nacional. **Levantamento nacional de informações penitenciárias**. Brasília: MJ, 2016. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/7BXMSJ>>.
- CERQUEIRA, D. et al. **Atlas da violência 2017**. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea; FBSP, 2017. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/sNSSXv>>.
- D'AGOSTINO, R. Com lei de drogas, presos por tráfico passam de 31 mil para 138 mil no país. **G1**, 24 jun. 2015. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/mQCGkB>>.
- HABER, C. (Coord.). **Relatório final da pesquisa sobre sentenças judiciais por tráfico de drogas na cidade e região metropolitana do Rio de Janeiro**. Rio de Janeiro: Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2018. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/vE2r5d>>.
- MOVIMENTOS. **Movimentos: drogas, juventude e favela**. [s.l.]: Movimentos, 2017.
- REDES DA MARÉ. **Boletim direito à segurança pública na Maré**. Rio de Janeiro: Redes da Maré, 2017. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/rQwpUX>>.
- ROUGH, L. Can you get a cannabis business license if you're a convicted felon? **Leafly**, June 9, 2017. Retrieved Nov. 19, 2018, from: <<https://goo.gl/9yktT2>>.

8. Research available at: <<https://goo.gl/xsy97E>>. Accessed on: Nov. 19, 2018.

THE DEBATE ON THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE IN THE COUNTRY: MAIN ARGUMENTS^{1,2}

Paulo Kliass³

1 INTRODUCTION

The presence of the State in the economy has always been one of the striking characteristics of capitalism's development in Brazil. It is worth highlighting the existence of the federal government's State-owned enterprises in strategic sectors. However, this type of governmental intervention in economic dynamics has reached a wide field of sectors and has been present in quite diverse moments in the country's history. This article aims to bring back the debate about this governmental option, considering that the arguments for and against State-owned enterprises are essential for understanding this phenomenon.

In addition to this introduction, this article comprises five more sections. Section 2 includes a brief history of the State-owned enterprises' constitution in Brazil and indicates that political issues were not decisive in hindering their emergence over the decades. Section 3 addresses the ideological arguments that started to be used as of the 1990s, when questioning the State's presence in the economy, especially regarding government-owned enterprises. Section 4 presents the arguments associated with private enterprises' higher efficiency compared to the performance of companies under State control. Section 5 sets out the arguments involving pragmatism, taken as the solution to the fiscal crisis. In this case, privatization appears as the only alternative to the lack of public resources. For last, section 6 includes the final considerations.

2 THE PRESENCE OF THE STATE IN THE ECONOMY: LONG HISTORY OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

The structure of the set of Brazilian State-owned enterprises has a close relationship with the genesis and consolidation of the type of capitalism developed in the country. The increased relevance of the State's presence in economic activity occurred mainly through the creation and operation of several State enterprise initiatives.

The financial sector was the first to move. Banco do Brasil was created at the beginning of the 19th century, although its primary rural credit operations only started almost a hundred years later, in 1905. Caixa Econômica Federal was also created in the mid-19th century, but only in 1931 it became a consolidated financial agent focused on credit. The Brazilian Reinsurance Institute (Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil – IRB) was established in 1939.

Over the first half of the 1940s, the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional (CSN), Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), Companhia Nacional de Álcalis (CNA), Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM),

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art12>

2. This article was originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 15, July-Dec. 2018. Available at: https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/8626/1/BAP15_Cap2.pdf.

3. Specialist in public policy and governmental management, working at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea).

Acesita and Companhia Hidrelétrica do São Francisco (Chesf) emerged. Those were the first steps in building a hard core of State-owned enterprises in the different sectors related to energy, infrastructure, and the so-called basic industry.

Between the beginning of the 1950s and 1964, Petrobras; the steel companies Companhia Siderúrgica Paulista (Cosipa) and Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais (Usiminas); Brazilian Economic Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico – BNDE); Banco do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB); Brazilian Telephone Company (Companhia Telefônica Brasileira – CTB, acquired by the government); the holding of electricity companies Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S/A (Eletrobras); the supply field group Companhia Brasileira de Alimentos (Cobal) and Companhia Brasileira de Armazenamento (Cibrazem); and the Rede Ferroviária Federal (unified from independent railways) were created.

Since 1964, despite the change in economic policy direction due to changes in the regime, the process of creating State-owned enterprises did not cease. This was the case of the following enterprises, which all emerged during the 1960s:

- National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional da Habitação – BNH);
- Banco da Amazônia (Basa);
- Brazilian Post and Telegraph Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Correios e Telégrafos – ECT), merged from several federal public agencies;
- Brazilian Telecommunications Company (Empresa Brasileira de Telecomunicações – Embratel); and
- Brazilian Aeronautics Company (Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica – Embraer).

In the following decade were created: i) the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária – Embrapa); ii) the steel industry holding (Siderurgia Brasileira S/A – Siderbras); iii) the telephone companies holding (Telecomunicações Brasileiras S/A – Telebras); iv) the Companhia de Desenvolvimento dos Vales do São Francisco e do Parnaíba (Codevasf); v) Empresas Nucleares Brasileiras S/A (Nuclebrás) and its six subsidiaries in the nuclear energy field; vi) the public computing company Cobra; and vii) the port system holding (Empresa de Portos do Brasil S/A – Portobras).

During the next ten years, the pace of the emergence of State-owned enterprises fell sharply. Therefore, at the federal level, only the Brazilian Company of Urban Trains (Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos – CBTU) was created in 1984, and the National Supply Company (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento – Conab)⁴ in 1990.

We can see that the constitution of such a complex structure of State-owned enterprises at the federal level took place at quite different periods in the country's history. Governments and periods marked by very different political spectra used this strategic resource. This characteristic may demonstrate that opting for this public policy implementation instrument transcended historical and political-ideological barriers over this period. The different controversies can be verified both when the companies were created and when their privatization appeared as an alternative for the governments to adopt.

4. Conab was created from the merger of Production Financing Company (Companhia de Financiamento da Produção – CFP), in 1943, Cobal, in 1963, and Cibrazem, in 1963.

Therefore, political or philosophical issues do not seem to have been crucial in explaining the emergence of such a significant network of enterprises under Brazilian State regulation. From the first stages of capitalism – at the beginning of the twentieth century – until the end of the democratic transition in the 1980s, the country has gone through governmental experiences as different as those from Getúlio Vargas, Juscelino Kubitschek, the military regime, and Sarney.

3 IDEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

As of the 1990s, Brazil also came under the most direct influence of the movement supporting liberal ideas, with international relevance by then. This way, incorporating the Washington Consensus guidelines to orient government policy towards economic issues gains relevance. The foundations of this platform rest on liberalization and deregulation at large. Among them stand out the recommendation to promote the reduction of the State's presence in economic activity and the resulting transfer of State-owned enterprises to private capital.

Therefore, we face here the first set of arguments against State-owned enterprises. Those main aspects of the debate lie in a more ideological sphere, referring to the legacy of the 1980s neoliberal approach. Its paradigmatic example was Margaret Thatcher's government in England, which, in its origin, pointed to the natural damages of a State alternative while underlining the intrinsically positive aspects of the private management of goods and services previously offered by companies belonging to the British government.

Collor's government is a clear expression of the political manifestation of this movement in Brazil by launching a National Privatization Plan (Programa Nacional de Desestatização – PND) in 1990 and being willing to promote the privatization of a wide range of State-owned enterprises early in his term. The period starting with the inauguration of the first president directly elected after the democratic transition in the country blends with the exercise of the ideological hegemony of liberalism. The narrative proposing a minimal State sought to associate the era of the military government with the increasing government presence in the economy. Based on this somewhat appealing correlation, the advocates of this liberal project argued that the democratic transition should incorporate a movement contrary to those from the previous period and, consequently, promote the sale of State-owned enterprises.

4 ARGUMENT FOR THE SUPREMACY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S EFFICIENCY

Another line of argument, albeit slightly connected to the more ideological issue, refers to the alleged supremacy of the private sector's efficiency compared with the State, from an economic point of view. According to that approach, State action compromises gains in the entire system in terms of the economic and social aspects. Considering that public behavior is not subordinated to the market working logic, the results of the presence of State-owned enterprises in a given sector bring over references to artificially determined prices, illegitimately appropriated incomes, and offers outside the standards expected for a market operating with total freedom for its agents.

Consequently, the solution for promoting the improvement of allocative efficiency and the maximization of the results of all sectors involved in the stages of the economic process would be to transfer the ownership of State-owned enterprises to the private sector. According to this approach, consumers of goods and services offered by such companies would benefit since the private logic

would follow the market rules, and prices and fares would tend to reduce. On the other hand, improving the quality of goods and services would be ensured since the company would be exposed to the market competition rules and incorporate such effects into its structure, operating according to private standards.

The difficulties come up when discussing the case of companies operating under a monopoly or oligopoly. In such situations, privatization alone would not bring about the expected effects since the absence of free competition could directly lead to the private appropriation of the benefits previously incorporated by the State. Therefore, the modeling envisaged for the privatization of sectors supplying public goods and services assumed the creation of regulatory agencies. Consequently, sectors such as health, phone, or electricity would be subject to this new institutional arrangement, in order to impose the prevalence of rules consistent with the idealized hypothesis of free competition. Regulatory agencies would prevent exploitation by agents operating alone or through oligopolistic agreements on the supply side.

5 PRAGMATISM ARGUMENT AND THE FISCAL ISSUE

The historical evolution over the last three decades and the series of controversial privatization experiences in several countries have reinforced another line of argument in favor of selling State-owned enterprises to private capital. It is a line that benefits a more pragmatic approach to the debate. Consequently, its advocates seek to escape the political or ideological cleavage between critics and advocates of the privatization solution.

The starting point for the pragmatism line rests on identifying the bottleneck of the State's capacity for action due to the aggravation of the fiscal framework. One cannot deny that countries from almost all continents have faced increasing difficulties balancing their public accounts. The pressure for macroeconomic adjustments led to cutting budget expenditures and searching for new State revenue sources.

With the aggravated fiscal situation, there would no longer be room for the public sector to continue operating the enterprises correctly under its jurisdiction. Therefore, privatization would solve the problem on two sides: i) it would free up resources from the management of the companies and from their future investments; and ii) it would relieve the Treasury's cash through the inflows related to the sale of companies to private capital.

The pragmatic approach has the advantage of avoiding the most substantive controversy regarding the privatization issue. Bringing the debate to the field of the sense of reality in the search for solutions to the emergence of the fiscal crisis, there remains the plea made under the "there is no alternative"⁵ motto. The need to find resources for the State is urgent, and privatization presents itself no longer as a panacea, but only as a real possibility to solve the crisis. A challenging measure to take, but one that neither the government nor society would have arguments to dodge.

5. TINA, the acronym for "there is no alternative". Expression attributed to Margaret Thatcher when she fiercely defended the severe measures of her government as British prime minister in the 1980s.

6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Monitoring the evolution of State-owned enterprises in the Brazilian economy provides an apparently contradictory framework. In quite different periods of the country's history, this State intervention tool was used on a recurring basis. This strategy was adopted not only in Brazil, and by governments from such different political and ideological spectra that could even be qualified as opposite from each other. Despite their different origins, almost all of them resorted to creating State-owned enterprises until the 1990s, to implement their governmental projects.

The picture changed significantly as the hegemony of ideology from the neoliberal wave was consolidated. The phenomenon that incorporated policies of broad liberalization and reduction of the State's role in the economy arrived in Brazil already under pressure exerted by the governments of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States over multilateral organizations. On the other hand, the recommendations provided in the Washington Consensus are explicit about the need for privatizing State-owned enterprises.

The arguments for transferring the assets of State enterprises to private capital also vary according to the context evolution and the evaluation of experiences with the initiative. The first series of points in favor of the measure lies in the ideological field, presenting the aspects considered intrinsically positive for transferring ownership from the State to the private sector.

Another set of arguments favoring privatization rests on the alleged superiority of the private sector's efficiency. According to that interpretation of the economic phenomenon, State intervention presents results always less efficient than that which could be obtained through the private management of an enterprise. Under those conditions, selling public assets to private capital would allow for a better allocation of resources and ensure an offer of goods and/or services of better quality and lower prices.

For last, the rationale embedded in the pragmatic approach keeps the debate about the State's business option restricted to the field of fiscal problems. In this case, the privatization alternative is not discussed due to its possible merits or advantages concerning the private management of State-owned enterprises. Pragmatism reveals how deep the crisis in public accounts is and suggests more structural measures should be adopted to solve it. Therefore, one of the aspects presented would be the sale of State-owned enterprises to private capital, aiming at promoting liquidity inflow into Treasury cash, and avoiding problems of poor allocation of resources in the current flow of enterprises and their future investments.

REFERENCES

- DAIN, S. **Empresa estatal e capitalismo contemporâneo**. Campinas: Unicamp, 1986.
- KLIASS, P. **O processo de criação da Sest: aspectos e momentos da empresa estatal no Brasil**. 1989. Thesis (Master's Degree) – Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 1989.
- MUSACCHIO, A.; LAZZARINI, S. G. **Reinventando o capitalismo de Estado: o Leviatã nos negócios – Brasil e outros países**. São Paulo: Portfolio-Penguin, 2015.
- WERNECK, R. L. F. **Empresas estatais e política macroeconômica**. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1987.

1 INTRODUCTION

As a constitutional duty, the State should provide citizens, regardless of gender, age, social class, or race, with a broad framework of protection against the possibility of becoming victims of violence. This is a right from which no individual could legitimately be excluded – the basis of the social contract itself. However, public security is one of the State action's dimensions in which racial selectivity becomes more evident.

There is great inequality between white and black people regarding security distribution. This inequality becomes evident in the higher victimization rates of the black population. We can take the homicide rate as a reference. If – due to the country's insecurity context – the entire population is already exposed to a strong possibility of violent death, being black corresponds to belonging to a population at risk: for every three murders, two are against black people (Waiselfisz, 2011). Considering the total population of residents in the 226 Brazilian cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants, one estimates that the possibility of a black teenager being a victim of homicide is 3.7 times higher compared to a white teenager.⁵

Suppose those numbers show a greater demand for security on the black population's side. In that case, it should be noted that the agencies in charge of providing this social good act biasedly, damaging this part of the population. According to a study conducted by Adorno, although there is no evidence that black people commit more crimes than white people do, they tend to suffer greater coercion by the criminal justice system, either by more constant surveillance by the Police or by a greater probability of suffering punishment (Adorno, 1996).

In this context, the objective is to address institutional racism within the Police. Even without underestimating the role or relevance of the other institutions included in the criminal justice system, the Police deserve to be under the spotlight for a few reasons. First, because they are the system's primary "filter." By directly assisting the population and engaging in crime investigation, they set the distance between detected and legally processed crimes (Paes, 2010). Second, because

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art13>

2. This article is based on the presentation entitled *Violence, Black Population and the Performance of the Criminal Justice System: the police, made during the Series of Debates of the International Year of Afrodescendent People*. Available at: http://www.ipea.gov.br/igualdaderacial/index.php?option=com_alphacontent&view=alphacontent&Itemid=13>. Another version of the same study was included in the book *Igualdade Racial no Brasil: reflexões no ano internacional dos afrodescendentes*, with the title *Violência Letal no Brasil e a Vitimização da População Negra: qual tem sido o papel das polícias e do Estado?*. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3F4rlsK>>. Also, this article was originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 4, October 2013. Available at: <https://bit.ly/3UvouQY>>.

3. Planning and research technician at Postgraduate and Training Coordination at Ipea.

4. Bachelor's degree in communication studies from Instituto Científico de Ensino Superior e Pesquisa (Icesp); and special student in the graduate program in human rights and citizenship of the Multidisciplinary Center for Advanced Studies of the University of Brasília (Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares da Universidade de Brasília – Ceam/UnB).

5. Available at: <http://prvl.org.br/>>.

the Police are one of the most present and active State apparatuses in the population's daily lives, especially for the poor and black classes – the obvious target of Police surveillance and repression operations (Paixão, 1985).

A lot needs to be done for these institutions to contribute more substantially, in a boarder way, with a conceptualization of development encompassing the guarantee of individual rights and the promotion of equity. Usually, police officers work in a discriminatory manner when looking for their “cliente,” based on stereotypes related to the “suspect’s” skin color as the main element. In democratic societies, this type of orientation becomes one of the most controversial elements of policing.

2 THE CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

Institutional racism can be defined as the collective failure of institutions to provide a professional and appropriate service to people because of their skin color. The concept was first used in 1967 by the activists Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, members of the Black Panthers, to define how racism manifests in the organizational structures of society and institutions (Geledés and CFMEA, 2013, p. 11). It was also used, as of 1993, by institutions to fight racism in England, especially the United Kingdom's Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (Sampaio, 2003). It manifests itself through discriminatory rules, practices, and behaviors active in the work of organizations every day, resulting from prejudice or racist stereotypes (Ipea, 2007). Institutional racism is not expressed in specific actions, explicit or declared acts of discrimination, but acts diffusely within the institutions' and organizations' routines, which operate differently – from a racial point of view – in the distribution of services, benefits, and opportunities to different sectors of the population (Silva et al., 2009).

Hasenbalg (1979) points out that race has been kept a potent symbol of subordinate position in labor's hierarchical division and continues to provide the logic for confining members of subordinate racial groups to the conditions that society's racial code defines as their “suitable places.” According to Santos (2012), institutional racism is veiled by mechanisms and strategies of public institutions, explicit or not, hindering the presence of black people in those spaces or the presence of the State where there is a greater concentration of the black population. Access is restricted not by written and visible norms and rules but by legal obstacles in social relations reproduced in institutional and public spaces and/or State agent training. The action is always aggressive, insofar as it affects human dignity, crystalizing within the organization's routine and generating inequalities and inequities in public policy implementation (Ipea, 2007). According to Ipea (op. cit., p. 216, our translation), “this type of discrimination has extremely relevant effects. It goes beyond interpersonal relationships and sets itself in an organization's routine, including effective public policy implementation, producing inequalities and inequities in a broad, even if diffuse, way”.

In Brazil, the concept of this form of racism started to be used only in the 1990s by black social movements. It was used to formulate and execute federal racial equity programs in 2005, such as the Program to Fight Institutional Racism (Programa de Combate ao Racismo Institucional – PCRI) (Ipea, 2007). The goal of the program was to expand public institution's capacity for identifying and preventing institutional racism through policy formulation, institutional training, and review of standards and procedures. The transversality in programs of this nature would help mobilize managers and professionals from different areas to find solutions to reduce racial inequalities.

3 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND POLICING

There are several ways for the State to act on the racial injustice context, manifested in the unequal rates of violence against the black population. A large public policy apparatus needs to focus on racism, of which lethal violence is one of the most perverse aspects. We also need to promote the reduction of the imbalance involving distribution of public security between black and white populations.

Public security's process of production and distribution comprises activities to control crime and violence by the criminal justice system, formed by institutions linked to the Executive and the Judiciary, acting in coordinated and sequential stages of social control, defining the role of the State in achieving public order. As a State representative on the streets, the police officer must, by law, treat citizens universally, impartially, without distinctions of class, skin color, gender, etc., but this remains a concept. Black people are more likely to be assaulted by police officers than white ones. As the National Victimization Survey shows, 6.5% of the black people who suffered an assault in the previous year had police officers or private security guards (often police officers working during their time off) as aggressors, against 3.7% for white people (IBGE, 2010).

In the daily life of uniform officers, in their constant surveillance operations, suspicion and approach are work instruments for which they seek to set a basis and rationalize. The police officer should have an articulated argument before deciding to stop and search a citizen – an action that somehow constrains the person's freedom. Policing approach is based on the Code of Criminal Procedure (Código de Processo Penal – CPP), which handles this topic in articles 240 and 244, defining that, even without a warrant, the police officer can conduct a home or personal search in case of *reasonable suspicion*. However, reasonable suspicion is very subjective, and the determination of its existence depends on the Police authority's discretion (Teixeira Júnior, 2001).

In practice, the signs identified to approach a suspect are – in general, but not exclusively – strongly associated with citizens' social class and race. For a survey conducted in Recife, when asked about who to approach first in a suspicious situation involving a black man and a white man, military police officers were almost unanimous in saying that black men suffer a differentiated look and, therefore, they are always the first to be approached – or, sometimes, even the only ones (Barros, 2008). In the same study, it was found that the situation regarding drivers that most raised suspicion was a black person driving a luxury car: this is a suspicious situation for 21% of military police officers, while a white person driving a luxury car would raise suspicion for only 2.6% of respondents (Barros, 2008, p. 139).

The concept of institutional racism seems, therefore, reasonably appropriate to the way Police organizations operate. It is not a matter of the Police, per se, that produces the discrimination phenomenon. It reflects the deviant behavior in several other groups, including those of its members (Reiner, 2004).

It is worth highlighting the paradox of the Military Police [Polícia Militar – PM], an institution with a strong presence of black people on their staff, practicing racial discrimination, being perceived as very racist by a significant part of society, and, even so, defensively avoid any questioning, any debate, internal or external, about this issue (Ramos and Musumeci, 2005, p. 215, our translation).

Police should act as public agencies to minimize the iniquity generated by racism and other social imbalances, not reproducing or amplifying them. Research by Ipea shows a precise diagnosis

of the distance between the Police and society; an issue aggravated in the relationship with the non-white population, who trust less the services provided by the Police and, consequently, trust less these institutions (Oliveira Júnior, 2011).

The Police's organizational culture guides a biased view. This lack of impartiality can be observed when bodies of young black and poor people are found in the *favelas* and peripheries. Police officers continually refer to the same version on the news displayed in the different media outlets in the country, usually condensed into the following statement: "We already know what happened: the victim was involved in drug trafficking," without carrying out a more serious investigation. However, although Police authorities estimate that most shooting victims in Brazil consist of individuals involved in trafficking, research shows this is a simplistic explanation (Adorno and Pasinato, 2010; Misse, 2010). It becomes clear that the Police not only exercise greater punitive power over the poor black young people but also "save" energy to ensure the punishment of those who commit violence against them (Adorno, 1996). Those points deserve a broad and in-depth political debate. We need to question the fact that the black population, mainly the young and poor, is defined as the preferred target of repressive and exclusionary policies.

The crystallization of the myth that associates the black youth with criminality multiplies disastrous consequences in daily Police practices. One of the most evident components of the Police's institutional racism is naturalizing the relationship between poverty and crime, incoherently taking skin color as its visible indicator. The most striking result of this attitude is that the homicide rate of young black people in Brazil – to which the Police contribute significantly – is much higher than the death rates of young people in countries at war (Waiselfisz, 2012).

It is as if the young black man synthesized the drama of a society incapable of resolving its contradictions. The image of the young black man condenses the positive and syncretic aspect of Brazilian culture, expressed in *samba* and *malandragem* (street smartness), among other manifestations, which distance us from the European colonizer. At the same time, it embodies a matter of disorder, atrocious from the point of view of an authoritarian State, historically aimed at controlling and taming the "dangerous classes" as if they were a kind of domestic enemy.

4 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Every day, criminal justice decisions, mainly the ones made by the Police, are unjustifiably harsher for black than for white people. The offshoot of legitimate State repression – sometimes, even the means of summary executions – mainly affects young black men. Usually, police officers work in a discriminatory way when looking for their "cliente," based on stereotypes related to the "suspect's" skin color as the main element. In democratic societies, this type of orientation becomes one of the most controversial elements of policing.

A lot needs to be done for these institutions to contribute more substantially, in a boarder way, with a conceptualization of development encompassing the guarantee of individual rights and the promotion of equity. Considering these critical conditions, we need to introduce programs to fight institutional racism in public security, making progress in materializing the proposals in PCRI.

Fighting violence against the black population, especially against young people, requires public policies to reinforce the position of the Brazilian State as a provider of rights, as a guarantor of equal opportunities, and correcting social distortions historically produced by racist ideologies

and practices. Without a doubt, criminal justice actions alone cannot dilute racial inequality if made in disconnection. However, if broadened, they can mitigate it, reducing obstacles to the full development of capacities of a representative contingent of the population.

REFERENCES

- ADORNO, S. Racismo, criminalidade violenta e justiça penal. **Justiça e Cidadania: Estudos Históricos**, n. 18, v. 9, 1996.
- ADORNO, S.; PASINATO, W. Violência e impunidade penal: da criminalidade detectada à criminalidade investigada. **Dilemas – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social**, v. 3, p. 51-84, jan./mar. 2010.
- BARROS, G. S. Filtragem racial: a cor na seleção do suspeito. **Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública**, ano 2, n. 3, p. 134-155, jul./ago. 2008.
- GELEDÉS – INSTITUTO DA MULHER NEGRA; CFMEA – CENTRO FEMINISTA DE ESTUDOS E ASSESSORIA. **Guia de enfrentamento do racismo institucional**. [s.l.]: [s.n.], 2013. Retrieved from: <<http://www.onumulheres.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Guia-de-enfrentamento-ao-racismo-institucional.pdf>>.
- HASENBALG, C. A. **Discriminação e desigualdades raciais no Brasil**. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, p. 83, 1979.
- IBGE – INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA. **Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD): características da vitimização e do acesso à justiça no Brasil**. Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2010.
- INESC – INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS SOCIOECONÔMICOS. **Segurança pública e cidadania: uma análise orçamentária do Pronasci**. Brasília: Inesc, 2010.
- IPEA – INSTITUTO DE PESQUISA ECONÔMICA APLICADA. **Boletim de políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise nº 14**. Brasília: Ipea, 2007.
- MISSE, M. O inquérito policial no Brasil: resultados gerais de uma pesquisa. **Dilemas – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social**, v. 3, p. 35-50, jan./fev./mar. 2010.
- OLIVEIRA JÚNIOR, A. Segurança pública: confiança e percepção social das polícias. In: SCHIAVINATTO, F. (Org.). **Sistema de Indicadores de Percepção Social (SIPS) – segurança pública**. Brasília: Ipea, 2011.
- PAES, V. F. Do inquérito ao processo: análise comparativa das relações entre Polícia e Ministério Público no Brasil e na França. **Dilemas – Revista de Estudos de Conflito e Controle Social**, v. 3, p. 111-141, jan./fev./mar. 2010.
- PAIXÃO, A. L. A distribuição de segurança pública e a organização policial. **Revista da OAB**, n. 22, p. 167-185, 1985.

RAMOS, S.; MUSUMECI, L. **Elemento suspeito**: abordagem policial e discriminação na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005. (Coleção Segurança e Cidadania).

REINER, R. **Desmistificando a polícia**: pesquisa social e prática policial. A política da polícia. São Paulo: Edusp, 2004.

SAMPAIO, E. O. Racismo institucional: desenvolvimento social e políticas públicas de caráter afirmativo no Brasil. **Interações** – Revista Internacional de Desenvolvimento Local, v. 4, n. 6, p. 77-83, 2003.

SANTOS, I. A. **Direitos humanos e as práticas de racismo**: o que faremos com os brancos racistas. 2012. Tese (Doutorado) – Universidade de Brasília, Brasília, 2012.

SILVA, J. et al. A promoção a igualdade racial em 2006 e o Programa de Combate ao Racismo Institucional. In: JACCOUD, L. (Org.). **A construção de uma política de promoção da igualdade racial**: uma análise dos últimos vinte anos. Brasília: Ipea, 2009. p. 147-170.

TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, E. P. **Abordagem policial**: a legalidade da busca pessoal e suas consequências. 2001. Monografia (Especialização) – Academia de Polícia Militar, Fundação João Pinheiro, Belo Horizonte, 2001.

WASELFISZ, J. J. **Mapa da violência 2011**: os jovens do Brasil. Brasília; São Paulo: Ministério da Justiça; Instituto Sangari, 2011.

_____. **Mapa da violência 2012**: crianças e adolescentes do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Cebela; Flacso, 2012.

AFTERWORD – PUBLIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM¹

Almir de Oliveira Junior²

Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima³

The article *Public Security and Institutional Racism* (Oliveira Junior and Lima, 2013), published almost ten years ago, addresses a topic that has stood out over the years and still motivates intense debates in the mainstream media. Institutional racism is not a problem unique to the area, but it has been a crucial issue in the public safety system for a long time. Discriminatory behavior motivated by racial prejudice within the scope of public security causes insecurity for a significant portion of the Brazilian population. Research shows that the racial issue still predominates when some “suspicious elements” (Ramos and Musumeci, 2005) are preferred targets of police approaches. The race-color cut motivates this selectivity and becomes a substantial factor in determining the perception of someone as a dangerous individual or not (Barros, 2008). The profile of victims of police interventions in Brazil has not changed significantly. According to data from the *Brazilian Public Security Yearbook*, in 2021, police actions caused 6,145 deaths, corresponding to 12.9% of all intentional violent deaths (IVDs) in the country. Of this total number of victims, 84.1% were black people (FBSP, 2022). That is, when considering police interventions, blacks are disproportionately affected. Its victimization rate is 4.5 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, while the same rate for the white population is 1.0 per 100,000. These data characterize Brazil with higher police lethality rates globally, with an exacerbated exposure of the black population to this violence cowardly justified as a legitimate use of force. Taking into account the Criminal Justice System, it is also important to mention that most people wrongfully imprisoned are black. A report published in 2021 by the National Council of Defenders and Public Defenders-General (Condege, 2021) indicates that more than 80% of arrests made unjustly for photographic recognition are of black people.

As a constitutional duty, the State must provide citizens with a broad framework of protection against the possibility of becoming victims of violence, regardless of their age, social class, sex, or race. Therefore, to improve public policies in the area of public security, it is necessary to use mechanisms that mitigate the weight of racial bias. In addition, the systematic use of lethal force due to police interventions constitutes a considerable challenge for the police in Brazil. As an example of a recent initiative to address the issue, law enforcement officers’ adoption of body cameras can have a positive effect. Research carried out with the Military Police of São Paulo, with data for the year 2021, suggests an average reduction of 0.81 deaths in police interventions per battalion in which police officers had adopted body cameras. In practice, 18 São Paulo Military Police avoided about 88 deaths in six months by implementing body cameras (Lima et al., 2022).

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art14>

2. Planning and research technician at Postgraduate and Training Coordination of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea).

3. Bachelor’s degree in communication studies from Instituto Científico de Ensino Superior e Pesquisa (Icesp); and special student in the graduate program in human rights and citizenship of the Multidisciplinary Center for Advanced Studies of the University of Brasília (Centro de Estudos Avançados Multidisciplinares da Universidade de Brasília – Ceam/UnB).

REFERENCES

BARROS, G. S. Filtragem racial: a cor na seleção do suspeito. **Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública**, ano 2, n. 3, p. 134-155, jul./ago. 2008.

CONDEGE – CONSELHO NACIONAL DAS DEFENSORAS E DEFENSORES PÚBLICOS-GERAIS. **Relatório sobre reconhecimento fotográfico em sede policial**. Rio de Janeiro: DP-RJ, 2021. (Relatório de Pesquisa). Disponível em: <<http://condege.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Relatorio-CONDEGE-DPERJ-reconhecimento-fotografico.pdf>>.

FBSP – FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. **Anuário brasileiro de segurança pública 2022**. [s.l.]: FBSP, 2022. Retrieved from: <<https://bit.ly/3BdnbPT>>.

LIMA, R. et al. Câmeras na farda reduzem a letalidade policial? **GV Executivo**, v. 21, p. 13-21, 2022.

RAMOS, S.; MUSUMECI, L. **Elemento suspeito**: abordagem policial e discriminação na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005. (Coleção Segurança e Cidadania).

O texto *Segurança Pública e Racismo Institucional* (Oliveira Junior e Araújo Lima, 2013), publicado há quase dez anos, aborda um tema que ainda vem se destacando e motiva intensos debates na grande mídia. O racismo institucional não é um problema exclusivo da área de segurança pública, mas tem sido uma questão crucial no sistema há muito tempo.

O comportamento discriminatório motivado pelo preconceito racial no âmbito da segurança pública causa insegurança para uma parcela significativa da população brasileira. Pesquisas mostram que a questão racial ainda predomina quando alguns “elementos suspeitos” (Ramos e Musumeci, 2004) são alvos preferenciais das abordagens policiais. O corte raça-cor motiva essa seletividade e se torna um fator substancial para a determinação da percepção de alguém como um indivíduo perigoso ou não (Barros, 2008).

O perfil das vítimas de intervenções policiais no Brasil não mudou significativamente. Segundo dados do *Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública*, em 2021, as ações policiais causaram 6.145 mortes, correspondendo a 12,9% de todas as mortes violentas intencionais (MVI) no país (FBSP, 2022). Desse total de vítimas, 84,1% eram negros. Ou seja, ao considerar as intervenções policiais, os negros são afetados desproporcionalmente. A taxa de vitimização desses indivíduos é de 4,5 óbitos por 100 mil habitantes, enquanto para a população branca é de 1,0 por 100 mil. Esses dados mostram o Brasil com um dos maiores índices globais de letalidade policial, com exposição exacerbada da população negra a essa violência que covardemente se justifica pela alegação de uso legítimo da força. Levando em conta o sistema de justiça criminal, também é importante mencionar que a maioria das pessoas presas injustamente é negra. Um relatório publicado em 2021 pelo Conselho Nacional de Defensores e Defensoras Públicas-Gerais (Condege) indica que mais de 80% das prisões feitas injustamente por reconhecimento fotográfico são de pessoas negras (Condege, 2021).

Como dever constitucional, o Estado deve proporcionar aos cidadãos um amplo quadro de proteção contra a possibilidade de serem vítimas de violência, independentemente de sua idade, classe social, sexo ou raça. Assim, para aprimorar as políticas públicas na área de segurança, é necessário utilizar mecanismos que mitiguem o peso do preconceito racial. Além disso, o uso sistemático da força letal devido a intervenções policiais constitui um desafio considerável para a polícia no Brasil. Como exemplo de uma iniciativa recente para resolver o problema, a adoção de câmeras corporais por policiais pode ter um efeito positivo. Pesquisa realizada com a Polícia Militar de São Paulo, com dados para o ano de 2021, sugere uma redução média de 0,81 óbito nas intervenções policiais por batalhão em que os policiais adotaram câmeras corporais. Na prática, dezoito policiais militares paulistas evitaram cerca de 88 mortes em seis meses com a implementação de câmeras corporais (Lima *et al*, 2022).

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art15>

2. Técnico de planejamento e pesquisa e coordenador de pós-graduação e capacitação do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea).
E-mail: <almir.junior@ipea.gov.br>.

3. Bacharela em comunicação pelo Instituto Científico de Ensino Superior e Pesquisa (Icesp); e pós-graduanda em direitos humanos e cidadania no Centro Multidisciplinar de Estudos Avançados da Universidade de Brasília (Ceam/UnB).

REFERÊNCIAS

BARROS, G. S. Filtragem racial: a cor na seleção do suspeito. **Revista Brasileira de Segurança Pública**, n. 3, p. 134-155, jul./ago. 2008.

CONDEGE – CONSELHO NACIONAL DAS DEFENSORAS E DEFENSORES PÚBLICOS-GERAIS. **Relatório sobre reconhecimento fotográfico em sede policial**. Relatório de pesquisa Rio de Janeiro: DP-RJ, 2021. Disponível em: <<http://condege.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Relatorio-CONDEGE-DPERJ-reconhecimento-fotografico.pdf>>.

FBSP – FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. **Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2022**. São Paulo: FBSP, 2022. Disponível em: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/05-anuario-2022-letalidade-policial-cai-mas-mortalidade-de-negros-se-acentua-em-2021.pdf>>.

LIMA, R. S. de *et al.* Câmeras na farda reduzem a letalidade policial? **GV Executivo**, v. 21, n. 2, p. 13-21, 2022. Disponível em: <<https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/gvexecutivo/article/view/85750/80983>>.

OLIVEIRA JUNIOR, A. de; ARAÚJO LIMA, V. C. de. Segurança pública e racismo institucional. **Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional**, n. 4, p. 21-26. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2013.

RAMOS, S.; MUSUMECI, L. **Elemento suspeito**: abordagem policial e discriminação na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Cesec, 2004. (Boletim Segurança e Cidadania, n. 8).

RECENT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION^{1,2}

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa³

João Cláudio Pompeu⁴

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Brazilian government has undergone profound changes. New ministries and special secretariats were created. At the same time, the existing ministries were also changed, having created new secretariats and their corresponding departments.

However, this movement was reversed as of the second semester of 2015. Some ministries and special secretariats were extinguished through the agglutination of assignments in the remaining ministries.

This article sheds light on the organizational universe as a conditioning element of the state's ability to deliver goods and services to society,⁵ by analyzing the history of the Federal Direct Administration's administrative structure in the recent period.

The research analyzed the decrees establishing the procedural structure of ministries and secretariats with the status of a ministry. For this purpose, we built a database that shows the organizational history of the ministries as of 1994 by observing the secretariats and departments created, transformed, or extinct throughout the period in question. We collected data on the procedural structure for 38 ministries and special secretariats,⁶ and regulatory acts that create or extinguish ministries or secretariats.

The organizational changes observed could happen under two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that it responds to government activity's complexification due to societal demands. The second is that it happens due to government negotiations within the coalitional presidentialism. Such hypotheses are not exclusive and may be tested in later stages of the research.

Moreover, we discuss inflections in this history, such as those related to the organizational response to expanding social participation in public administration. It is also discussed the rise of special secretariats with ministries status as a way to introduce or raise specific issues related to society's demands to the government agenda or to obtain more negotiating power to maintain the coalition in Congress.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art16>

2. Originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 12, July-Dec. 2017. Available at: <http://bit.ly/3Ukl8A4>.

3. Specialist in public policy and governmental management; and associate professor at the Department of Public Policy Management at the University of Brasília (UnB).

4. Specialist in public policy and governmental management.

5. "The government's ability to implement its decisions is also an important part of public policy and a key factor, which affects the types of action that the government will take into account" (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2013, p. 8, our translation).

6. It does not include the Central Bank.

2 HISTORY OF THE NUMBER OF MINISTRIES AS OF 1994

Between 1994 and 2015, the number of agencies holding the status of ministry experienced significant growth, going from 26 in the first government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) to 39 at the beginning of the second government of Dilma. It meant an increase of 50% in twenty years⁷ (table 1). It should be noted that during this period, such changes were not guided by a definite organization policy of the Federal Public Administration.⁸

TABLE 1

History of the number of ministries and special secretariats (1994-2016)

Government	Ministry	Extraordinary ministry	Total including extraordinary ministry	Military ministries	Total of ministries including military ministries	Agencies of the Presidency with ministry status	Presidency of the Central Bank of Brazil with minister status	Total overall of structures with ministry status
FHC 1 (1995-1998)	17	4	21	3	24	2	0	26
FHC 2 (1999-2002)	20	1	21	0	21	6	0	27
Lula 1 (2003-2006)	23	0	23	0	23	6	1	30
Lula 2 (2007-2010)	24	0	24	0	24	12	1	37
Dilma 1 (2011-2014)	24	0	24	0	24	14	1	39
Dilma 2 (2015-2016)	24	0	24	0	24	14	1	39
Temer (2016-)	21	0	21	0	21	5	1	27

Authors' elaboration.

It is worth noting that after the FHC's second government, a new trend appears regarding structures with ministry status. Instead of creating new ministries or appointing extraordinary ministers, subsequent governments adopted a new strategy, raising the status of some presidency of the Republic special secretaries to ministries, keeping the exact terminology of "Secretariat".

The new strategy draws less attention to the number of ministries since they are not designated as such. Still, it produces practical results both in raising one or more issues on the government agenda (at least in formal terms) and increasing the negotiating power with more valued positions in the power distribution within the coalition.

Therefore, this new strategy was consolidated during the second Lula's and Dilma's governments. It reached its highest point in 2015, when the Federal Public Administration had 39 agencies in total with ministry status, with, at the same time, a framework of progressive party system fragmentation within a context of coalitional presidentialism.

7. Note that the total number of agencies with the ministry status was reduced at the end of the second Dilma government and the beginning of the Temer government. However, the number of departments was not reduced in the same proportion, indicating the agglutination of structures into the remaining ministries.

8. Generally, the Federal Direct Administration organization is set by its law at the beginning of presidential terms. The Decree-Law No. 200 of 1967 remains in force as a guideline for the Federal Public Administration organization, which is limited to establishing concepts and subordination. According to the records, in 2007, there was an initiative to propose an organic law. The Ministry of Planning established a committee of jurists for this purpose; however, the document produced never was presented to the Legislative.

The strategy above has several implications from the point of view of public apparatus administration and government capacity to coordinate and implement public policies. Given the resources naturally limited by the budget and capacity set, a more significant fragmentation – through the horizontal function differentiation – tends to produce the dispersal of efforts, weakening the capacity for action. Further research shall investigate the resource dispersion in the different structures and their effects on the programmed results. For now, table 1 shows the administrative structure history as of 1994.

3 INTERNAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN MINISTRIES

As of 1994, the ministerial structures underwent several procedural changes. Some modifications were observed as the procedural structures changed by decrees. This survey focuses on changes at higher hierarchical levels (secretariats and departments).⁹ Table 2 shows the number of changes for each ministry within the period analyzed and the average number of changes per year after their creation.¹⁰

TABLE 2
Changes in ministries' organizational structure

Ministry	Start year	End year	Changes	Changes per year
Ministry of Planning	1996	2017	27	1.29
Ministry of Economics	1991	2017	25	0.96
Ministry of Social Security	1992	2011	18	0.95
Secretariat of Strategic Affairs	2008	2013	3	0.60
Institutional Security Office	2002	2013	7	0.64
Ministry of Health	1991	2016	17	0.68
Ministry of Justice	1991	2016	16	0.64
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	2005	2011	3	0.50
Ministry of Development of Industry and Trade	1993	2016	14	0.61
Ministry of Sport	2003	2016	7	0.54
Secretariat-General of the Presidency	2003	2015	6	0.50
Office of the Chief of Staff	1993	2017	13	0.54
Ministry of Education	1990	2017	14	0.52
Ministry of Agriculture	1990	2016	13	0.50
Ministry of Culture	1995	2016	10	0.48
Ministry of Agrarian Development	2000	2010	4	0.40
Ministry of Science and Technology	1995	2011	7	0.44
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1990	2016	12	0.46
Ministry of Defense	1999	2013	6	0.43
Secretariat for Human Rights	2003	2013	4	0.40
Secretariat of Ports	2007	2013	2	0.33
Ministry of Labor	1991	2008	7	0.41
Ministry of Communications	1996	2011	6	0.40
Office of the Comptroller General	2003	2016	5	0.38
Secretariat of Policies for Women	2003	2014	4	0.36

(Continues)

9. It refers to the hierarchy level run by leadership and advising positions (*direção e assessoramento* – DAS) – levels 5 and 6. It does not include changes in general coordination, coordination among others.

10. The start and end periods vary since several ministries were created and extinct over the decades of 1990, 2000, and 2010.

(Continuation)

Ministry	Start year	End year	Changes	Changes per year
Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality	2003	2010	2	0.29
Attorney General's Office	2010	2017	2	0.29
Ministry of Social Development	2004	2016	4	0.33
Ministry of Tourism	2003	2015	4	0.33
Ministry of Integration	2000	2017	6	0.35
Ministry of the Environment	1994	2017	8	0.35
Ministry of Mines and Energy	1992	2016	6	0.25
Ministry of Transport	1992	2016	5	0.21
Ministry of Cities	2003	2016	2	0.15
Secretariat for Micro and Small Enterprises	2013	2013	0	0.00
Secretariat of Fisheries	2009	2009	0	0.00
Secretariat of Civil Aviation	2011	2011	0	0.00
Secretariat of Communication	2008	2008	0	0.00

Source: Procedural Structure Alteration Decrees.
Authors' elaboration.

Table 2 indicates a dynamism in organizational structures, especially in the older ministries, such as the Ministries of Planning, Finance, and Social Security, which presented, on average and respectively, 1.29, 0.96, and 0.95 changes in their structures per year for the reference period. We can also observe that, due to the constant environmental changes, organizational flexibility is a desirable attribute when characterized as a result of the adaptation process to the demands of the external environment to provide the organization with a greater capacity to meet them (Tachizawa and Scaico, 2006).

In most cases, the change observed in this study meant growth. For instance, in 1999, the Ministry of Planning had six core unities¹¹ and seventeen departments linked to them, and in 2015, it grew to 8 offices and 26 departments. Therefore, during this period, it seems to have been the general behavior of most of the ministerial agencies. The special secretariats of the Presidency of the Republic, in turn, derive from the first FHC government and expanded more notably as of the first Lula government. After a while, they achieved Ministry status. For this work, we classify the secretariats as having ministry status in three categories: secretariats for direct support to the presidency, secretariats related to social demands, and secretariats related to infrastructure and the fishing industry. The first group is the Secretariat of Institutional Relations, the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, and the Secretariat of Communication. In the second group are: the General Secretariat, the Secretariat for Human Rights, the Secretariat of Policies for Women, and the Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality. The third includes the Secretariat of Ports, the Secretariat of Civil Aviation, and the Secretariat of Fisheries.

Examples include the creation of the Secretariat for Human Rights, the Secretariat of Policies for Women, and the Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality. In the 1990s, policies for those audiences were connected to the Secretariat of Citizenship Rights inside the Ministry of Justice,

11. The core units (*secretarias finalísticas*) are referenced herein as the units responsible for conducting public policies with different competencies from the advisory and support units (the ones who execute the support activities for the core ones).

which had two departments: the Department of Human Rights and the Department of Children and Adolescents (Decree No. 1,796 of January 24, 1996).¹²

In 1998, the Secretariat was transformed into the Secretariat for Human Rights (Decree No. 2,802 of October 13, 1998). Its responsibility was “to promote and fight for the rights of citizens, children, adolescents, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, black persons and other minorities” (Brasil, 1998, article 8º, section I, our translation). During Lula’s government, this secretariat was connected to the Presidency. The dissolution of competencies provoked an organizational fragmentation, from which specific secretariats were created for each audience: Secretariat of Human Rights, Secretariat of Policies for Women, and Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality.

Therefore, if we look at this rise of status inside the organizational structure as an indication of the subject gaining priority in the government’s agenda, on the one hand, one can say that the movement to prioritize social agendas began during FHC’s first term. However, it was significantly expanded during Lula’s first government. On the other hand, looking at the negotiation capital under the government’s coalition, creating new positions with minister status was a much more used strategy after Lula’s first government and during the Dilma’s.

4 HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION OVER THE PERIOD

During the analyzed period, the governmental structure transformations show a strong horizontal differentiation,¹³ both by the differentiation of competencies exposed by the growth in the number of ministries – as seen previously showed – and by the differentiation within the ministries made explicit by the increase in the number of secretariats and their respective departments. Aiming at illustrating the change history, figure 1 shows the evolution of the number of departments related to special departments,¹⁴ of several ministries for the period assessed.¹⁵

We can verify that the number of departments in the ministries analyzed rose from 81 to 247 in 2015. There was continuous growth during the period; however, the great leap was between 2003 and 2006, as shown in figure 1.


12. Available at: <<https://goo.gl/uNhHvM>>. Accessed on: Aug. 18, 2017.

13. Organizational structures are essentially characterized by design defined by the hierarchy and the division of labor, that is, by the organization’s vertical and horizontal differentiation (Hall, 1996).

14. In general, the evidence shows that the hierarchical structure of ministries can be made up of up to seven hierarchical levels below the minister. At the first level, the secretariats are comprised of departments at its immediate lower level.

15. The survey on internal changes in ministries includes the ones that existed in 1994, although extinct later, and those created as of the same year. Were excluded from this survey – in addition to the secretariats with ministry status: the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministries of the Army, Navy, and Airforce, due to the limited comparability after their discontinuity as of 1994, or the lack of a ministry status at the start period, or for having different designation, or, even, for including alteration decrees without mentioning the department level.

FIGURE 1
Evolution of the number of departments connected to the federal government's special secretariats (1995-2015)



Source: Procedural Structure Alteration Decrees.
Authors' elaboration.

The research data also indicate that the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Mines and Energy presented more changes for the period.

In the cases of the Health Education Ministries, evidence indicates that the expansion reflects some inflection in the government's agenda in favor of social issues. Similarly, the case of the Ministry of Mines and Energy points to progress in infrastructure issues, especially when there was the risk of a crisis in the availability of electricity.

The Ministry of Social Development, responsible for essential policies on the social agenda, remained practically stable between 2010 and 2016. On the other hand, one can observe that the expansion of the Ministry of Planning was more significant than those of the Ministries of Health and Education. In other words, the relevance of social issues to the government's agenda loses importance for a sole explanation of the expansion process verified.

Note that when the special secretariats were created and elevated to the status of ministry (more evident in 2003), the Ministry of Justice had part of its role taken to form new secretariats. Nevertheless, it continued with its movement of substantial expansion through the horizontal differentiation of its departments. From a political point of view, it is worth observing that this type of expansion means an increase in the number of positions of free appointment and fulfillment of duty (positions of trust). It means more capital to be used in negotiations within the government coalition framework.

It is also worth highlighting the dissemination of collegiate bodies within the organizational structures. From 1994-2015, collegiate bodies increased from 30 to 78 in the 23 agencies under the scope.

These collegiate bodies can represent ways of opening the federal government to social participation in the tasks of control and advice or the formulation of the federal government's decisions

regarding courses of action when composed of representatives of civil society or as mechanisms of decentralization of power when consisting of representatives from the government itself.¹⁶

5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The initial findings of the research point out a continuous growth of the organizational structure within the Brazilian Federal Public Administration between the FHC's first government and the end of Dilma's term. This expansion is strongly characterized by a fragmentation resulting from the dissolution of attributions (functional specialization) – equivalent to a transformation marked by the creation of specialized agencies and the narrowing of areas of expertise.

As a starting point, the organizational structure's quantitative dimension and the verification of a substantial narrowing of areas of operation, in themselves, do not answer questions about the main issues of these transformations and their impacts on the organizational capacity of the Federal Public Administration in meeting the demands of society. Therefore, we need to look into and compare motivations, competencies, and conditions of action of the new structures created and those expanded to observe the adherence and functional and political relevance of those for each public policy case.

Nevertheless, the absence of an explicit policy for the organization of the Federal Public Administration throughout the analyzed period is striking; the research results suggest that there are still no criteria to guide such transformations.

On the other hand, the transformations' quantitative dimension herein reported and the identification of their areas of concentration throughout the structure point to particular organizational flexibility as a mechanism for responding to strains from the external environment, either as a response to social demands or as consequences of government negotiations, within coalitional presidentialism framework. This observation points to a dynamic organization comprising institutions capable of promoting adjustments within short periods.

In addition, overcoming the Wilsonian thought that public administration would be an apolitical field, the organizational structure's history of transformations reflects permanent strains between the political field and public action organization. Throughout the period, there is a significant multiplication of negotiation capital within the coalition through the expansion of structures, whose immediate result is the availability of positions of free appointment and fulfillment of duty. As a future research agenda, one should investigate how much of this expansion would be associated with our coalitional presidentialism and its growing party system fragmentation.

As a result of the strains in the relations between the Public Administration and society, the significant expansion of the number of collegiates in the structure of the Federal Public Administration reveals advances toward the formal opening of new spaces for participation or decentralization of the decision-making power. Over the last few years, the effectiveness and quality of participation and the conditions for exercising democracy in those spaces have been systematically studied, indicating heterogeneous contexts.

16. According to Salgado (2012, p. 125, our translation), and taking as reference the Decree-Law No. 200 of 1967, "the governance systems of the Direct Administration units are single. That is, the coordination and decision-making processes are carried out – at all hierarchical levels – through the individual action of command positions with due communication to subordinate managers".

In the dynamic context of increasing demands and complex interactions, we need to understand the limits and possibilities of our Public Administration organization. Therefore, in an urgent research agenda, it is recommended to investigate the state's capacity related to its internal dynamics in terms of attributions and distribution of resources in its structure. Types of influence generated by our political institutionalization when interacting with the Public Administration and how it engages with society are also essential topics to the research agenda.

In the future, it would also be worth studying how the flexibility of changes observed here affected the public apparatus's organizational capacity to meet society's growing and increasingly complex demands.

REFERENCES

BRASIL. Decreto nº 1.796, de 24 de janeiro de 1996. Aprova a estrutura regimental e o quadro demonstrativo dos cargos em comissão e funções gratificadas do Ministério da Justiça e dá outras providências. **Diário Oficial da União**, Brasília, 1996a.

_____. Presidência da República. Casa Civil. **Governos da República**. 3. ed. Brasília: Presidência da República, 1996b.

_____. Decreto nº 2.802, de 13 de outubro de 1998. Aprova a estrutura regimental e o quadro demonstrativo dos cargos em comissão e funções gratificadas do Ministério da Justiça, e dá outras providências. **Diário Oficial da União**, Brasília, 1998.

HALL, R. H. **Organizations**: structures, processes and outcomes. 6th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.

HOWLETT, M.; RAMESH, M.; PERL, A. **Política pública**: seus ciclos e subsistemas – uma abordagem integral. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2013.

SALGADO, V. A. B. **Manual de administração pública democrática**: conceitos e formas de organização. Campinas: Saberes, 2012.

TACHIZAWA, T.; SCAICO, O. **Organização flexível**: qualidade na gestão por processos. 2. ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2006.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK^{1,2}

Helder Ferreira³

Elaine Marcial⁴

Joana Alencar⁵

1 INTRODUCTION

In Brazil, public security policy is historically structured under the primary competence of the states and the Federal District, mainly through its civil and military police, as provided for in the Federal Constitution of 1988. The federal government, in addition to having police with specific competencies (Federal Police and Federal Highway Police), since the 1990s, has increased its participation in the field. In this regard, institutions such as the National Public Security Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública – Senasp) and the National Public Security Force were created, besides the National Penitentiary Fund (Fundo Penitenciário Nacional – Funpen) and the National Public Security Fund (Fundo Nacional de Segurança Pública – FNSP).

In order to contribute to the federal government's planning for public security, Ipea, in partnership with SAE/PR, began to prepare a prospective project. Prospective methods aim to organize information to better define action strategies based on the basic principle that the future is multiple and uncertain, and the human being is its leading agent of change (Marcial, 2011).

The purpose of the work developed is to guide the actions matured in the present based on carefully built perspectives. The project, entitled Public Security in Brazil: an Outlook, intends to provide the basis to prepare the programs for public security included in the 2016-2019 Multi-Year Plan.

This research note presents the methodology and preliminary results of this work.

2 METHODOLOGY

A crucial process in this work is the building of prospective scenarios. Scenarios are views or stories about the future or the set comprising the description, coherently, of a future situation and the routing of events that allow us to move from a present position to a future one (Godet, 1987 apud Marcial, 2011). The method used to carry out the project was the *synthesis model of scenario planning methods*. This model was constructed by Marcial (2011) from the scenario planning methods of Godet (1993), Porter (1992), Schwartz (1996), and Marcial and Grumbach (2008).

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art17>

2. Thanks to the other members of the project team of the Institute of Applied Economic Research (Ipea) (Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, Almir de Oliveira Junior, Andréia de Oliveira Macêdo, Claudio Dantas Monteiro, Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira, Helder Rogério Sant'ana Ferreira, Joana Luiza Oliveira Alencar, Tatiana Daré Araujo, Yacine Guellati) and the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República – SAE/PR) (Antonio Carlos Wosgrau and Vanessa Meireles Barreto Chervenski). Also, thanks to the managers and colleagues from Ipea, SAE of the Ministry of Justice (MJ) and Secretariat of Planning and Investment (SPI) of the Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (Ministério do Planejamento, Desenvolvimento e Gestão – MP), as well as other collaborators from the universities and institutions who supported and participated in this project. This article was originally published in Portuguese in *Boletim de Análise Político-Institucional* No. 7, Jan.-June 2015. Available at: <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5680/1/Viol%c3%aaancia%20e%20seguran%c3%a7a%20p%c3%bablica%20em%202023_cen%c3%a1rios%20explorat%c3%b3rios%20e%20planejamento%20prospectivo.pdf>.

3. Planning and research technician at the Department of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy (Diest) of Ipea; and coordinator of the project Public Security in Brazil: an Outlook.

4. Ph.D. in information sciences; technical advisor at SAE/PR; and methodological coordinator of the project Public Security in Brazil: an Outlook.

5. Planning and research technician at Diest/Ipea.

The steps of the project are defined in the following subsections.

2.1 Main question and scenario planning system definition

The system defines the initial scope of scenario-building works (box 1). The main question was: by 2023, will Brazil have managed to reduce violent crime and increase the population's sense of security compared to 2013? To answer this question, we held workshops with experts to determine the crucial aspects – listed in box 1 – that needed to be addressed.

BOX 1

Scenario planning system resume

Object: public security
 Time frame: 2014-2023
 Objective: provide the means to develop programs in the field of public security of the 2016-2019 Multi-Year Plan in public security
 Place: Brazil
 Purpose: reduce violence
 Intended recipient: MJ and MP
 Term: January 2014-June 2015
 Subject's main aspects: criminal justice system, public security policies, macro and micro-determinants of violence, sense of security, drug policy, organized crime and market, and public security

Authors' elaboration.

2.2 Retrospective study of the present situation and identification of seeds of the future

Two stages, foreseen in the synthesis model, were brought together in this project: the retrospective and situation studies and the identification of seeds of the future. According to the methodology, for the retrospective study, one should retrieve the history of events until the present rescue, connecting it to the main question and the scenario planning system.

To carry out this analysis, we held seven workshops for each crucial aspect previously defined. Ipea-SAE/PR teams attended the workshops, as well as collaborators from Ipea, the MJ, the SPI/MP, and external experts (mainly researchers in public security). The workshops aimed to identify seeds of the future. Seeds of the future are facts or signs in the past and present that indicate future possibilities (Marcial, 2011). We worked with three types of seeds: consistent trends, uncertainties, and actors' strategies.

Consistent trends mean events whose orientation possibility is consolidated and visible to the point of admitting their permanence in the reference period. They are also defined as very probable actors' or variables' movements within the study perspective. Uncertainties are tiny, poorly perceived signals that can change behavior in the future altering reality.

They are crucial to the study's central question. Actors are change facilitators, people, or institutions capable of changing the course of events through their strategy (Marcial, 2011). Identifying actors includes understanding the strategic goals of each one of them, their primary actions and projects, strategic partnerships, challenges, and constraints (Godet, 1993; Schwartz, 1996).

3 SEEDS OF THE FUTURE FOR PUBLIC SECURITY IN 2023: MEGATRENDS, ACTORS, AND UNCERTAINTIES

As a result of the seven workshops, we have defined the megatrends, the key uncertainties⁶ and the main actors able to influence the main question. These seeds of the future are described hereunder.

3.1 Megatrends

The outcome analysis of the seven workshops, together with the retrospective and the current situation studies, provided nine “megatrends” described as follows.

3.1.1 Maintenance of the young Brazilian demographic profile, with high social inequality and easy access to firearms

Studies indicate that certain crimes are related to an age group and the male gender. By 2022, there should be no significant change in Brazil’s demographic profile, keeping the population’s proportion of young people (15 to 29 years old) high. The recent demographic projection indicates that young men will go from 13.4% of the population in 2010 to 12.0% in 2020 (Cerqueira and Moura, 2014). This slight variation is unlikely to reduce violent deaths significantly.

3.1.2 Increase in violent crimes inland

Several studies have pointed out the increase in violent crimes in the countryside. According to the 2014 Violence Map, while homicide rates in the capitals fell from 46.1 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2003 to 38.5 in 2012, in countryside cities (those that are not capitals or belong to a metropolitan region – MR), these rates increased, from 16.6 to 22.5 (Waiselfisz, 2014).

3.1.3 Maintenance of public security policies improvement

Brazil coexists with high levels of violent crime, a low sense of security, governance problems in public security, and considerable police violence. However, we expect that in the coming years, some movements towards improvement will continue, such as i) expansion of the federal and municipal governments’ roles in public security; ii) new institutional arrangements; iii) enforcement of new forms of policing; iv) initiatives for more effective punishment; v) information systems innovations; vi) police training innovations; and vii) integration between public security policies and other areas of public policy and institutions.

3.1.4 Growth of legal and illegal markets exploited by criminal organizations and strengthening of criminal groups in Brazil

According to estimates by the Brazilian Institute for Ethics in Competition (Etco), the underground economy in Brazil corresponded, in December 2012, to BRL 730 billion or 16.6% of GDP, including legal and illegal activities – sale or exchange of stolen goods and products, drug sales, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, fraud, theft, theft for own use etc. (Ibre, FGV and Etco, 2013). According to the same study, we can observe that this economy lost a share in the gross domestic product (GDP) (21% in 2003) but grew in transactions (BRL 663 billion in 2002).

6. We call key uncertainties those with more significant uncertainty but also greater motricity and less dependence.

3.1.5 Increase in the circulation of illicit drugs with the maintenance of policy of repression and supply restriction

In recent years, the circulation of illicit drugs in Brazil has increased. In a 2005 study by the Brazilian Center of Information on Psychotropic Drugs (Centro Brasileiro de Informações sobre Drogas Psicotrópicas – Cebrid), conducted in 108 cities with more than 100 thousand inhabitants, 5.2% of respondents admitted that they were sought by someone to sell them drugs. In the previous 2001 study, this rate was 4.0%.

3.1.6 Maintenance of high levels of victimization

Some crime levels have remained stable during the last few years. Homicides are estimated to have kept their levels at approximately 60 thousand (per year), more precisely between 2001 and 2010; 57,001 in 2001, the lowest of 56,418 in 2006, the top of 62,375 in 2009, and 60,015 in 2010 (Cerqueira and Moura, 2014). There are several factors, despite some advances in public security policy, that can contribute to the maintenance of high homicide rates, such as the maintenance of the young Brazilian's demographic profile, with high levels of social inequality and easy access to firearms; the intensification of the geographical redistribution of high rates of violent crimes; the growth of illegal crime markets and the strengthening of criminal organizations and groups in Brazil; and the increase in consumption and circulation of illicit drugs and maintenance of the supply restriction policy of repression.

3.1.7 Preservation of more severe sentences with an increase in prison population and expansion of electronic monitoring

The trend for more severe sentences should be kept in the coming years. In a recent survey by the Confederação Nacional do Transporte (CNT) and the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA), 37.6% of respondents chose to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16 years, and 9.9% preferred increasing sentences as the primary measure to contain violence (CNT and MDA, 2014). Among operators of the Criminal Justice System, congresspersons, and secretaries of public safety, there is also significant support for more severe sentences.

3.1.8 Maintenance of wide dissemination of criminal events, the feeling of insecurity, and considerable repercussion of some crimes in the media

Crime is central in television and radio programming, newspapers, and online media. In addition to the news broadcast on newscasts, there are programs mainly concentrated on this topic, such as Cidade Alerta, Polícia 24 Horas, and Brasil Urgente. The high audience level is not new, and it is reasonable to expect that there will be wide dissemination of criminal events, a vast audience of programs reporting cases of violence, and a considerable repercussion of some severe crimes in the media with an impact on the strong feeling of insecurity.

3.1.9 Increase in the privatization of security and broader dissemination of technologies

One estimates that the earnings of the private security sector went from BRL 7 billion in 2002 to BRL 43.5 billion in 2013 and is expected to reach BRL 50 billion by 2015. Moreover, regular companies grew from 1,386 in 2002 to 2,392 in 2013 (Fenavist, 2014). The reasons pointed out for the growth are increasing demand for services in cities due to the development of urbanization and the

purchasing power of the population, increase in urban violence and cargo theft and kidnappings, and replacement of organic security (companies with their own security structure) by hiring private security companies (Fenavist, 2013). Other factors can be increased insecurity and lack of trust in the police, which have already been addressed in the text. This expansion, coupled with public procurement, has led to more significant innovation and diffusion of technologies for security. For example, the use of security cameras has increased. For instance, the government of the Federal District intended to have, by the end of 2014, 835 cameras installed (Copa..., 2014).

3.2 Key uncertainties

The key uncertainties identified after concluding the workshops and subsequent studies are described next.

- Will an increase in inclusive social development impact violent crime rates?
- Will there be greater capacity for municipal intervention in public safety?
- Will there be greater operational integration among the police branches?
- Will the police's relationship with society improve in the coming years?
- Will there be a significant increase in the effectiveness of criminal investigation?
- Will federal entities have greater operational integration in the fight against organized crime?
- Will there be an improvement in the results of social reintegration policies?
- Will there be an improvement in the results produced by social and educational measures?

3.3 Actors

The main actors selected, due to their dynamic relationship with the key uncertainties, are: governors, the minister of Justice, the president, the secretary of Senasp, congresspersons, directors of the Civil Police, chiefs of the Military Police, civil society organizations (militant in the field of the criminal justice system), the Judiciary.

We also verified the ability of those actors to influence each one of the key uncertainties. From the final list of leading actors, we identified their objectives, partnerships, and constraints for each key uncertainty.

4 SCENARIOS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Four scenarios were built, whose description was based on morphological analysis⁷ of the key uncertainties, used to describe the plot of each of them. To create the scenarios, the leading actor's role was highlighted, the trends were, in general, kept, and the behavior of the key uncertainties varied depending on the plot of each scenario. The fictional scenarios constructed are described next.

- 1) Endemic violence – violent crimes and feeling of insecurity are on the rise, and institutions responsible for public safety are not articulated.

7. According to Marcial (2011, p. 245-246, our translation), morphological analysis is the "decomposition of a variable into several elements, identifying the forms and values they can take within the study's timeframe".

- 2) Social prevention – violent crimes are reduced and the feeling of security increases and state and city governments work with local actors to prevent violence.
- 3) Qualified repression – violent crimes are reduced, and the sense of security increases; in addition, the police become active in their relations with the community.
- 4) More repressive – violent crime levels remain the same, and there is a worse feeling of security; police distance themselves from the community.

The scenarios were assessed by the Ipea-SAE/PR team and collaborators from the MJ and the SPI regarding their possibility of occurrence, the consistency of causal relationship, actors, and results. Based on the scenarios and analysis, the following stages of the research will be developed to consolidate proposals and strategies for public security policies.

REFERENCES

- CERQUEIRA, D.; MOURA, R. L. Demografia e homicídios no Brasil. In: CAMARANO, A. A. (Ed.). **Novo regime demográfico: uma nova relação entre população e desenvolvimento?** Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2014.
- CNT – CONFEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DO TRANSPORTE; MDA – MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO AGRÁRIO. **Pesquisa CNT/MDA: relatório síntese – rodada 118.** [s.l.]: CNT; MDA, abr. 2014. Retrieved Aug. 6, 2014, from: <<http://goo.gl/tZNRdY>>.
- COPA deixa legado para brasilienses e turistas. **Agência Brasília**, 15 Jul. 2014. Retrieved Aug. 8, 2014, from: <<https://www.agenciabrasilia.df.gov.br/2014/07/15/copa-deixa-legado-para-brasilienses-e-turistas/>>.
- FENAVIST – FEDERAÇÃO NACIONAL DAS EMPRESAS DE SEGURANÇA E TRANSPORTE DE VALORES. **III Esseg: estudo do setor da segurança privada.** Brasília: Fenavist, 2013. Retrieved Aug. 8, 2014, from: <<http://goo.gl/2HXBGM>>.
- _____. **IV Esseg: estudo do setor da segurança privada.** Brasília: Fenavist, 2014. Retrieved Aug. 8, 2014, from: <<http://goo.gl/FMG4e5>>.
- GODET, M. **Manual de prospectiva estratégica: da antecipação à acção.** Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1993.
- GODET, M.; DURANCE, P. **A prospectiva estratégica: para as empresas e os territórios.** Brasília: Unesco, 2011.
- IBRE – INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE ECONOMIA; FGV – FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS; ETCO – INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE ÉTICA CONCORRENCIAL. **Índice sobre economia subterrânea.** [s.l.]: June 2013. Retrieved Aug. 4, 2014, from: <<http://goo.gl/otvLuN>>.
- MARCIAL, E. C. **Análise estratégica: estudos de futuro no contexto da inteligência competitiva.** Brasília: Thesaurus, 2011.
- MARCIAL, E. C.; GRUMBACH, R. J. **Cenários prospectivos: como construir um futuro melhor.** 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2008.

PORTER, M. E. **Vantagem competitiva**: criando e sustentando um desempenho superior. 7. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992.

SCHWARTZ, P. **The art of the long view**: planning for the future in an uncertain world. New York: Doubleday, 1996.

WAISELFISZ, J. J. **Os jovens no Brasil**: mapa da violência 2014. Brasília: Flacso, 2014.

AFTERWORD – PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK¹

Helder Ferreira²

Elaine Marcial³

Joana Alencar⁴

This work was finished in 2014, with the book *Violência e Segurança Pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*⁵ published the following year, describing the methodology used and its results. Many relevant events have happened since, including:

- economic recessions in Brazil in 2015, 2016 and 2020; impeachment of the president of the Republic in 2016;
- implementation of a expenditure ceiling for the federal government (Constitutional Amendment No. 95/2016);
- pandemic of covid-19 with a strong impact in 2020 and 2021;
- approval of a law on the Unified System of Public Security (Sistema Único de Segurança Pública – Susp) (Law No. 13,675/2018);
- growth of militias;
- clashes between factions outside Rio de Janeiro;
- growth in the homicide rate, until 2017, and then fall;⁶
- easing of gun control policy;
- more countries decriminalizing the use of marijuana and reproduction of the drug supply reduction policy in Brazil;
- tightening of penal legislation (for example, Law No. 13,964/2019);
- growth of deaths by police intervention and a drop in the murders of on-duty and off-duty police officers;⁷
- growth in the number of police candidacies for political offices;⁸
- growth in support for institutional disruption in the country;
- technological innovations in security public (such as body cameras for Military Police);

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art18>

2. Planning and research technician at Directorate of State Studies and Policies, Institutions and Democracy of the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Diest/Ipea); and coordinator of the project Public Security in Brazil: an Outlook.

3. Ph.D. in information sciences; technical advisor at Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República (SAE/PR); and methodological coordinator of the project Public Security in Brazil: an Outlook.

4. Planning and research technician at Diest/Ipea.

5. Ferreira, H. R. S.; Marcial, E. C. *Violência e segurança pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2015. Available at: <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5680/1/Viol%20e%20seguran%20a7a%20p%20bablica%20em%202023_cen%20a1rios%20explorat%20b3rios%20e%20planejamento%20prospectivo.pdf>.

6. Available at: <<https://www.ipea.gov.br/atlasviolencia/arquivos/artigos/1375-atlasdaviolencia2021completo.pdf>>.

7. Available at: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/anuario-2022.pdf?v=5>>.

8. Available at: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/analise-candidaturas-2022.pdf>>.

- political polarization in the country; and
- social networks consolidating themselves as an arena of political dispute and a means of disseminating fake news.

This indicates the need for a new study. This, however, will not be done here. We will take advantage of this afterword to present the final results of the work published in the book *Violência e Segurança Pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*, whose content will hereby be summarized, with changes.

Based on the analysis of the four constructed scenarios, the elements that make up the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Swot) matrix were initially identified. A set of opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses was extracted from the four scenarios and, then, as a result of the intersection of these external and internal forces, strategic objectives were proposed. These results can be seen in the annex.

The intersection of strengths and weaknesses with threats and opportunities resulted in twelve strategic objectives, presented below.

- 1) Develop a national public security plan with a clear definition of the attributions of the Union, states and municipalities, strengthening the paradigm of violence prevention.
- 2) Develop a national homicide prevention program focused on municipalities with the highest rates of violent crime, ensuring a continuous and sufficient flow of resources.
- 3) Improve drug policy, including actions to reduce demand.
- 4) Improve communication with society, with the aim of disseminating results, providing qualified information about the Ministry of Justice's (MJ) operating paradigms (prevention and qualified repression) and promoting society's participation.
- 5) Qualify states and municipalities for partnerships and management in the area of public security.
- 6) Integrate actions with other ministries and with other federated entities (programs that cover the social area, especially in relation to young people in situations of socioeconomic vulnerability).
- 7) Institutionalize more effective and continuous sources of funding and improve transfer instruments (fund to fund, term of commitment etc.).
- 8) Strengthen investments in intelligence and expertise, using new technologies, to improve problem-solving capacity.
- 9) Consolidate information systems, with the production and monitoring of indicators, as a way to guide the elaboration of policies, improve management, and produce diagnoses.
- 10) Improve the prevention, control and enforcement of firearms and ammunition.
- 11) Encourage the application of penal alternatives to imprisonment.
- 12) Restructure the prison system.

The proposed results reinforce how foresight strengthens the strategic planning process and how this work of construction of exploratory scenarios and other inputs can be appropriated within the planning of the MJ. The use of the scenario construction methodology as a tool to support planning has increased the participation of specialists external to the organization, mostly researchers from Brazilian universities, who, through brainstorming sessions, had the opportunity to debate and build visions

of the future, in partnership with public servants in the area of security and planning. This process of collective construction of knowledge has several advantages, such as the elimination of blind spots; the appropriation of new knowledge and new perspectives regarding a single phenomenon; and the generation of organizational learning through the appropriation of the generated knowledge; in addition to the exchange of knowledge between researchers and policy practitioners. It also creates images of the future that contribute, directly or indirectly, to the improvement of the decision-making process and facilitates the prioritization of investments, as it highlights the variables and the driving actors, which means those with the greatest capacity to influence and modify the entire system. Based on the key uncertainties for the system, decision makers can better focus their actions. An initial investment in these variables can reduce execution time and costs to achieve strategic objectives, due to the force of contamination they have on the entire system.

As for the suggestions for improving the policy, the results, in the first place, reinforce the urgency of advancing in the public security policy, in view of the risks of the situation worsening even more, whether towards a state of “endemic violence”, or for a police state. In this sense, wrong decisions can contribute to an undesirable future.

The option for a more repressive, punitive and incarcerative policy with tougher criminal legislation, criminalization of social groups (such as repression of the work of *flanelinhas* and *camelôs*, for example) and greater use of prison, can reduce our freedom and increase exclusion without reducing crime rates. This perspective has already been tried numerous times in the recent history of the country, without any good results being achieved. On the contrary, repression aimed at the most vulnerable population groups creates a generalized feeling of injustice, which ends up tearing social ties and separating the police from the communities, making the necessary work of co-production of public security unfeasible. Mass incarceration, in turn, facilitates the recruitment of young people into the organized crime business, in addition to allowing them to learn criminal technologies, the result of which returns to the streets.

Second, it is noted that even the most optimistic scenarios indicate that certain trends will hardly be reversed until 2023, such as: i) high social inequality; ii) easy access to firearms; iii) the growth of crime in the interior of the country; iv) low trust in the police; v) governance problems in public security; vi) the high number of police killings; vii) the growth of the activities of criminal organizations; viii) the domination of territories by criminal organizations; ix) the involvement of public agents with organized crime; x) the increase in the circulation of illicit drugs; xi) the high rates of victimization for violent crimes; xii) penal hardening; xiii) the increase in the prison population; xiv) the lack of policy for ex-convicts; xv) the deficit of vacancies in the prison system; and xvi) the high feeling of insecurity. Changing these trends, when possible, depends on a coordinated action by the main actors, which needs to be created and can be led by the MJ.

Third, it is necessary to advance in governance, and in this context, four points stand out. The first is related to public security policy, which needs to better coordinate, integrate and focus prevention and repression measures. This may involve structuring the Unified System of Public Security. In this sense, it would be up to the Union to coordinate this policy, stimulating innovation and reform of police and penal policies, allocating more resources, consolidating a national information system and drawing up innovative national strategies to tackle problems relating to illegal markets (stolen products, drugs, weapons etc.). The states would lead the integration of the police, with unified

training courses, establishment of integrated teams, equal pay etc. In the future, if the police structure happens to be deconstitutionalized, the unification of the police forces or the adoption of complete police cycle could be experimented with in states that so wish. Municipalities would assume the management of local actions for social prevention of violence, with a municipal prevention plan that could include the performance of Social Assistance Reference Centers (Centro de Referência da Assistência Social – Cras), violence prevention programs in schools, urban interventions, coordination with organizations non-governmental organizations (NGOs), guardianship councils and community leaders, and prioritization of the most violent areas, with a focus on youth.

The second point involves the establishment of pacts between bodies of the three Powers to coordinate actions, currently carried out in isolation in the criminal justice system, such as the control of the police, conducted by internal affairs offices and ombudsmen, but which lacks a better performance of the Public Ministry. A pact could also be built in relation to penal execution to address prison overcrowding and the lack of policies for ex-prisoners.

The third point represents the need for better structuring of the bodies that implement the public security policy, such as the National Public Security Secretariat (Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública – Senasp) and the police ombudsmen. In this sense, it is necessary to act on the weak point mentioned in the article (see annex), insufficiency of human resources, of specialized qualification and lack of management by competences.

Still in the field of governance, it is important to highlight the need to improve the ways of involving society in the management of politics, either by strengthening the councils, or by building a ten-year public security plan with the participation of society, as is done in the area of education.

Fourth, it is necessary to advance in planning, with the elaboration of a national plan for public security and a program for the prevention of homicides, as reinforced by the strategic objectives. A plan would make it easier for actors to coordinate themselves to achieve goals, help to define priorities and avoid duplication of actions and, with a monitoring system, would allow for course correction and follow-up by society. The homicide prevention program, as being developed by the MJ, would focus on the most serious Brazilian security problem.

Finally, the results pointed to other actions, listed below.

- 1) Invest in reducing social vulnerabilities, especially in the most violent areas.
- 2) Redirect drug policy towards demand reduction, given that so far the focus on containing supply has not been able to reduce consumption and has deleterious effects on public security, such as corruption, police violence, conflicts within and between gangs, execution of users with debts, high number of arrests of small traffickers.
- 3) Strengthen firearms control.
- 4) Foster the application of penal alternatives and the reform of the penitentiary system. Today, electronic monitoring has opened up the possibility of initiating a debate with society about convicts monitored outside prisons and detention centers, which opens up the real possibility of prison ruled out as the main penalty. However, it is necessary not to fall into a vigilantism that subjects those incarcerated for crimes of lesser offensive potential to the stigma of monitoring. In addition, it is necessary to create conditions, for example, with education, citizenship and professional training projects, so that inmates and sanctioned persons break with a trajectory associated with criminality.

- 5) Improve the financing of public security, which involves valuing professionals in the area, as well as guaranteeing resources for prevention actions.
- 6) Invest in investigative police, expertise and police intelligence to ensure, as is already done in many cases, the collection of evidence that guarantees the accountability of those involved and the interruption of the work of recurring offenders.

In conclusion, we hope that this work will contribute to the construction of a democratic, guaranteed and effective public security policy, without which we will keep the high rates of violent crimes and a low sense of security. We also hope that, given the contributions of this methodology and the results achieved, similar prospective studies would be performed, including on other topics related to public policies. Therefore, although the scenarios are not an end in themselves, these initiatives would contribute to the creation of a culture of long-term planning in the country and in the Brazilian State. They would consolidate the relevance of these prospective studies as a management tool, supporting both the decision-making process and planning, and thus contributing to the construction of the desired future.

ANNEX

TABLE A.1
Swot matrix

Forces from the external environment	
Opportunities	
1	Aging, with a reduction in the proportion of young men.
2	Improvements and inclusive social development, with greater access to citizenship.
3	Greater federal and municipal action and increased financial resources leveraged by crises and social demands.
4	Contribution of technological advances to public and private security.
5	Reforms in criminal legislation, criminal enforcement and the criminal justice system, aimed at increasing the application of criminal alternatives and social reintegration.
6	Consensus that public security has two parts: social prevention and qualified repression.
7	Demand from state and municipal governments and society for expanding the role of the federal government in public security.
8	Improvement of public security management, with investment in the production of diagnoses and indicators for monitoring.
9	Strengthening the role of criminal expertise and its structure and management.
10	Cooperation between private security companies and the police.
Threats	
1	Social inequality.
2	Increase in crime, expansion of the illicit drug market and strengthening of criminal organizations, including in the countryside.
3	Easy access and lack of control over the movement of firearms.
4	Lack of agreement on necessary institutional reforms.
5	Perception of public security policy and low trust in the police.
6	Crises in public security arising from the precariousness of security institutions and scarcity of financial resources.
7	Power of the media to guide the public security agenda.
8	Governance in public security institutions.
9	Lack of external control by the police.
10	Police state (criminalization of young people and the poor, lack of prioritization in social policies, distance between society and the police, lack of social reintegration policy, abandonment of criminal alternatives, police violence).
11	Overpopulation, loss of control of penal establishments for criminal organizations and ineffectiveness of social reintegration policies.
Forces from the internal environment	
Strong points	
1	Paradigm of prevention in the work of the MJ.
2	Capacity to induce public security policy, through technical support and training policy, strengthened through transfers to states and municipalities.
3	Position in the institutional network of public security.
4	Existence of the National Public Security Force.
5	Existence of a teaching, research and professional development department within Senasp.
6	Systems.
7	Channels with civil society.
8	Instruments for fighting organized crime.
9	Investment in the structuring of criminal expertise.
10	Promotion of penal alternatives to prison.

(Continues)

(Continuation)

Weak points	
1	Poor planning and management.
2	Many assignments that cause loss of focus.
3	Lack of medium and long-term financing mechanisms for priority programs.
4	Ineffectiveness, inadequacy and inefficiency of partnership instruments.
5	Failure to fully utilize their capacities to articulate and induce policies.
6	Lack of integration with other units of the Federation and public security bodies.
7	Lack of articulation with agencies in the social area.
8	Ineffective internal and societal communication.
9	Insufficiency of human resources and specialized qualifications and lack of management by competences.
10	Insufficient gun control policy.
11	Inability to oversee the private security sector.

Authors' elaboration.

Obs.: Swot – strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats; MJ – Ministry of Justice; Senasp – Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (National Public Security Secretariat).

POSFÁCIO – RESULTADOS PRELIMINARES DO PROJETO A SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA NO BRASIL: UMA VISÃO PROSPECTIVA¹

Helder Ferreira²

Elaine Marcial³

Joana Alencar⁴

O trabalho foi concluído em 2014 e no ano seguinte foi publicado o livro *Violência e Segurança Pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*,⁵ que descreve a metodologia utilizada e os resultados. Muitas coisas se passaram desde então, entre elas: recessões econômicas no Brasil em 2015, 2016 e 2020; *impeachment* da presidente da República em 2016; implementação de um teto de gastos para o governo federal (Emenda Constitucional nº 95/2016); pandemia de covid-19, com forte impacto em 2020 e 2021; aprovação da Lei nº 13.675/2018, sobre o Sistema Único de Segurança Pública (Susp); fortalecimento das milícias; confrontos entre facções fora do Rio de Janeiro; aumento da taxa de homicídios até 2017 e a partir de então, queda;⁶ flexibilização da política de controle de armas; mais países descriminalizando o uso da maconha e reprodução da política de redução de oferta de drogas no Brasil; endurecimento da legislação penal (por exemplo, a Lei nº 13.964/2019); aumento do número de mortes por intervenção policial e queda nos assassinatos de policiais em serviço e fora de serviço;⁷ crescimento do número de candidaturas de policiais a cargos políticos;⁸ crescimento do apoio à ruptura institucional no país; inovações tecnológicas na segurança pública (como as câmeras corporais para policiais militares); polarização política no país; e as redes sociais se consolidando como arena da disputa política e meio de divulgação de *fake news*. Tudo isso indica a necessidade de se fazer um novo estudo.

Aproveitamos este posfácio para apresentar os resultados finais do trabalho, publicados no livro *Violência e Segurança Pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*, cujo texto será trazido com alterações.

Inicialmente, com base na análise dos quatro cenários construídos, foi realizada a identificação dos elementos que compõem a matriz *Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities e Threats* (Swot) – acrônimo em inglês de forças, fraquezas, oportunidades e ameaças. Em seguida, fruto do cruzamento dessas forças externas e internas, foram propostos objetivos estratégicos. Os resultados podem ser verificados no apêndice.

1. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.38116/bapi33art19>

2. Técnico de planejamento e pesquisa na Diretoria de Estudos e Políticas do Estado, das Instituições e da Democracia do Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Diest/Ipea); e coordenador do projeto A Segurança Pública no Brasil: Uma Visão Prospectiva.

3. Doutora em ciência da informação; assessora técnica da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República (SAE/PR); e coordenadora de metodologia do projeto A Segurança Pública no Brasil: Uma Visão Prospectiva.

4. Técnica de planejamento e pesquisa na Diest/Ipea.

5. Ferreira, H. R. S.; Marcial, E. C. *Violência e segurança pública em 2023: cenários exploratórios e planejamento prospectivo*. Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2015. Disponível em: <https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/bitstream/11058/5680/1/Viol%c3%aancia%20e%20seguran%c3%a7a%20p%c3%bablica%20em%202023_cen%c3%a1rios%20explorat%c3%b3rios%20e%20planejamento%20prospectivo.pdf>.

6. Disponível em: <<https://www.ipea.gov.br/atlasviolencia/arquivos/artigos/5141-atlasdaviolencia2021completo.pdf>>.

7. Disponível em: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/anuario-2022.pdf?v=5>>.

8. Disponível em: <<https://forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/analise-candidaturas-2022.pdf>>.

O cruzamento dos pontos fortes e fracos com as ameaças e oportunidades resultou em doze objetivos estratégicos, os quais são apresentados a seguir.

- 1) Elaborar um plano nacional de segurança pública com a definição clara das atribuições da União, dos estados e municípios, fortalecendo o paradigma da prevenção à violência.
- 2) Elaborar um programa nacional de prevenção a homicídios focado nos municípios com maiores taxas de criminalidade violenta, garantindo fluxo contínuo e suficiente de recursos.
- 3) Aprimorar a política de drogas, inclusive com ações para a redução da demanda.
- 4) Aprimorar a comunicação com a sociedade, com o objetivo de divulgar resultados, fornecer informações qualificadas acerca dos paradigmas de atuação do Ministério da Justiça – prevenção e repressão qualificada – e promover a participação da sociedade.
- 5) Qualificar estados e municípios para a realização de parcerias e para a gestão na área de segurança pública.
- 6) Integrar ações com outros ministérios e com outros entes federados, em programas que abranjam a área social, especialmente em relação a jovens em situação de vulnerabilidade socioeconômica.
- 7) Institucionalizar fontes de financiamento mais efetivas e contínuas e aprimorar os instrumentos de repasse (fundo a fundo, termo de compromisso etc.).
- 8) Fortalecer investimentos em inteligência e perícia, com uso de novas tecnologias, para melhorar a capacidade resolutiva.
- 9) Consolidar sistemas de informação, com produção e monitoramento de indicadores, como forma de balizar a elaboração de políticas, melhorar a gestão e produzir diagnósticos.
- 10) Aperfeiçoar a prevenção, o controle e a fiscalização de armas de fogo e munições.
- 11) Fomentar a aplicação de alternativas penais à prisão.
- 12) Reestruturar o sistema prisional.

Os resultados propostos mostram como a prospectiva fortalece o processo de planejamento estratégico e como esse trabalho de construção de cenários exploratórios e demais insumos pode ser apropriado dentro do planejamento do Ministério da Justiça.

A utilização da metodologia de construção de cenários como instrumento de apoio ao planejamento ampliou a participação de especialistas externos à organização, em sua maioria pesquisadores das universidades brasileiras, que, por meio das sessões de *brainstorming*, tiveram a oportunidade de debater e construir visões de futuro em parceria com servidores públicos da área de segurança e de planejamento.

Esse processo de construção coletiva de conhecimento possui diversas vantagens, como a eliminação de pontos cegos, a apropriação de novos conhecimentos e de novos olhares a respeito de um único fenômeno, e a geração de aprendizado organizacional por meio da apropriação do conhecimento gerado, além do intercâmbio de conhecimento entre pesquisadores e implementadores da política. Também cria imagens de futuro que contribuem, direta ou indiretamente, para a melhoria do processo decisório e facilita a priorização de investimentos, pois evidencia as variáveis e os atores mais motrizes, ou seja, aqueles com maior capacidade de influenciar e modificar todo o sistema. A partir das incertezas-chave para o sistema, os tomadores de decisão podem focar melhor suas ações.

Um investimento inicial nessas variáveis pode, pela força de contaminação que possuem sobre todo o sistema, reduzir o tempo e os custos de execução para que os objetivos estratégicos sejam alcançados.

Quanto às sugestões para o aprimoramento da política, os resultados, em primeiro lugar, reforçam a urgência de se avançar na política de segurança pública, tendo em vista os riscos de a situação se agravar ainda mais, seja para um estado de “violência endêmica”, seja para um Estado policial. Nesse sentido, decisões equivocadas podem contribuir para um futuro indesejável.

A opção por uma política mais repressiva, punitivista e encarceradora, com endurecimento da legislação penal, criminalização de grupos sociais – como repressão ao trabalho de flanelinhas e camelôs, por exemplo – e maior utilização da prisão, pode diminuir a liberdade e aumentar a exclusão, sem reduzir as taxas de criminalidade. Essa perspectiva já foi experimentada inúmeras vezes na história recente do país, sem que nenhum bom resultado fosse alcançado. Pelo contrário, a repressão direcionada para as camadas populacionais mais vulneráveis cria um sentimento generalizado de injustiça, que acaba por esgarçar os vínculos sociais e apartar a polícia das comunidades, inviabilizando o necessário trabalho de coprodução da segurança pública. O encarceramento em massa, por sua vez, facilita o recrutamento do jovem no negócio do crime organizado, além de permitir um aprendizado das tecnologias criminosas, cujo resultado retorna às ruas.

Em segundo lugar, nota-se que mesmo os cenários mais otimistas apontam que certas tendências dificilmente poderão ser revertidas até 2023, tais como: a desigualdade social elevada; o fácil acesso a armas de fogo; o crescimento da criminalidade no interior do país; a baixa confiança na polícia; os problemas de governança na segurança pública; o alto número de mortes pela polícia; o crescimento da atuação de organizações criminosas; o domínio de territórios por organizações criminosas; o envolvimento de agentes públicos com o crime organizado; o aumento da circulação de drogas ilícitas; as altas taxas de vitimização por crimes violentos; o endurecimento penal; o aumento da população carcerária; a falta de política para os ex-apenados; o déficit de vagas no sistema prisional; e a alta sensação de insegurança. Mudar essas tendências, quando possível, depende de uma atuação coordenada dos principais atores, que precisa ser construída e pode ser liderada pelo Ministério da Justiça.

Em terceiro lugar, é preciso avançar na governança e, nesse contexto, destacam-se quatro pontos. O primeiro está relacionado à política de segurança pública, que precisa coordenar, integrar e focar melhor as medidas de prevenção e repressão. Isso pode passar pela estruturação do Susp. Nesse sentido, caberia à União coordenar tal política, estimulando a inovação e a reforma das polícias e das políticas penais, aportando mais recursos, consolidando um sistema nacional de informações e elaborando estratégias nacionais inovadoras para enfrentar os problemas relativos aos mercados ilegais (produtos roubados, drogas, armas etc.). Os estados conduziram a integração das polícias, com cursos de formação unificados, estabelecimento de equipes integralizadas, equiparação de salários, entre outras medidas. No futuro, em se desconstituindo a estrutura policial, poderiam ser experimentados, nos estados que assim o desejassem, a unificação das polícias ou o ciclo completo de polícia. Os municípios assumiriam a gestão de ações locais de prevenção social à violência, com um plano municipal que poderia incluir a atuação dos centros de referência de assistência social (Cras); programas de prevenção à violência nas escolas; intervenções urbanísticas; coordenação com organizações não governamentais (ONGs); conselhos tutelares e lideranças comunitárias; e priorização das áreas mais violentas, com foco na juventude.

O segundo ponto passa pelo estabelecimento de pactos entre órgãos dos três Poderes para coordenar ações que hoje são realizadas isoladamente no sistema de justiça criminal, como o controle das polícias, que é efetuado por corregedorias e ouvidorias, mas que ressoa de uma maior atuação do Ministério Público. Um pacto também poderia ser construído em relação à execução penal para enfrentar a superpopulação carcerária e a falta de políticas para os ex-apenados.

O terceiro ponto representa a necessidade de melhor estruturação dos órgãos que implementam a política de segurança pública, como a Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (Senasp) e as ouvidorias de polícia. Nesse sentido, é preciso atuar no ponto fraco mencionado anteriormente (ver apêndice), insuficiência de recursos humanos e de qualificação especializada e falta de gestão por competências.

O último ponto a ser destacado, ainda no campo da governança, refere-se à necessidade de se aperfeiçoar as formas de envolvimento da sociedade na gestão da política, seja pelo fortalecimento dos conselhos, seja pela construção de um plano decenal de segurança pública, com a participação da sociedade, tal como é feito na área de educação.

Em quarto lugar, é necessário avançar no planejamento, com a elaboração de um plano nacional de segurança pública e um programa de prevenção a homicídios, conforme é reforçado pelos objetivos estratégicos. Um plano facilitaria que os atores se coordenassem a fim de atingir as metas. Isso ajudaria a definir prioridades e evitar duplicidades de ações e, com um sistema de monitoramento, permitiria a correção de rumos e o acompanhamento pela sociedade. O programa de prevenção a homicídios, tal como está sendo elaborado pelo Ministério da Justiça, teria foco no mais grave problema de segurança brasileiro.

Por fim, os resultados apontaram outras ações, enumeradas a seguir.

- 1) Investir na redução das vulnerabilidades sociais, principalmente nas áreas mais violentas.
- 2) Redirecionar a política de droga para a redução da demanda, dado que até hoje o foco na contenção da oferta não conseguiu reduzir o consumo e tem efeitos deletérios sobre a segurança pública, como corrupção, violência policial, conflitos dentro e entre quadrilhas, execução de usuários com dívidas e alto número de prisões de pequenos traficantes.
- 3) Fortalecer o controle sobre armas de fogo.
- 4) Fomentar a aplicação de alternativas penais e a reforma do sistema penitenciário. Hoje, o monitoramento eletrônico possibilitou o início de um debate com a sociedade sobre vigiar condenados fora das prisões e unidades de internação, o que abre a real possibilidade de a prisão ser descartada como pena principal. No entanto, é preciso não cair num vigilantismo que submeta ao estigma do monitoramento os apenados por crimes de menor potencial ofensivo. Além disso, é necessário criar condições, por exemplo, com projetos de educação, cidadania e formação profissional, para que os apenados e sancionados rompam com uma trajetória associada à criminalidade.
- 5) Melhorar o financiamento da segurança pública, que passa pela valorização dos profissionais da área, bem como garantir recursos para as ações de prevenção.
- 6) Investir em polícia investigativa, perícia e inteligência policial para assegurar, como já é feito em muitos casos, o levantamento de provas que garantam a responsabilização dos envolvidos e a interrupção da atuação de infratores recorrentes.

Em conclusão, esperamos que este trabalho contribua para a construção de uma política pública de segurança democrática, garantista e efetiva, sem a qual continuaremos com altas taxas de criminalidade violenta e baixa sensação de segurança. Também esperamos que, dadas as contribuições dessa metodologia e dos resultados alcançados, estudos de futuro semelhantes a este, inclusive para outros temas ligados às políticas públicas, sejam realizados. Isso porque, apesar de os cenários não serem um fim em si mesmos, essas iniciativas contribuiriam para a criação no país e no Estado brasileiro de uma cultura de planejamento de longo prazo. Elas consolidariam a importância desses estudos de futuro como instrumento de gestão, que apoiam tanto o processo decisório quanto o planejamento, contribuindo assim para a construção do futuro desejado.

APÊNDICE

QUADRO A.1
Matriz Swot¹

Forças do ambiente externo	
Oportunidades	
1	Envelhecimento da população, com a redução da proporção de homens jovens.
2	Melhorias socioeconômicas e desenvolvimento social inclusivo, com maior acesso à cidadania.
3	Maior atuação federal e municipal e aumento de recursos financeiros potencializados pelas crises e demandas sociais.
4	Contribuição de avanços tecnológicos para a segurança pública e privada.
5	Reformas na legislação penal, de execução penal e no sistema de justiça criminal, visando ao aumento da aplicação de alternativas penais e à reintegração social.
6	Consenso de que a segurança pública tem duas partes: prevenção social e repressão qualificada.
7	Demanda dos governos estaduais, municipais e da sociedade pela ampliação da atuação do governo federal na segurança pública.
8	Aprimoramento da gestão em segurança pública, com investimento na produção de diagnósticos e indicadores para monitoramento.
9	Fortalecimento do papel da perícia criminal e da sua estrutura e gestão.
10	Cooperação entre as empresas de segurança privada e as polícias.
Ameaças	
1	Desigualdade social.
2	Aumento da criminalidade, expansão do mercado de drogas ilícitas e fortalecimento das organizações criminosas, inclusive no interior.
3	Fácil acesso e descontrole sobre a circulação de armas de fogo.
4	Inexistência de acordos sobre as reformas institucionais necessárias.
5	Percepção negativa da política de segurança pública e baixa confiança na polícia.
6	Crises na segurança pública oriundas da precarização das instituições de segurança e escassez de recursos financeiros.
7	Poder da mídia em pautar a agenda de segurança pública.
8	Governança deficitária nas instituições de segurança pública.
9	Inexistência de controle externo das polícias.
10	Estado policial: criminalização de jovens e pobres, falta de priorização em políticas sociais, afastamento entre sociedade e polícia, inexistência de política de reintegração social, abandono das alternativas penais, violência policial.
11	Superpopulação carcerária, perda de controle de estabelecimentos penais para organizações criminosas e inefetividade das políticas de reintegração social.
Forças do ambiente interno	
Pontos fortes	
1	Paradigma da prevenção na atuação do Ministério da Justiça.
2	Capacidade de indução na política de segurança pública, por meio de aporte técnico e política de capacitação, fortalecida por meio de transferências para estados e municípios.
3	Posição privilegiada na rede institucional da segurança pública.
4	Existência da Força Nacional de Segurança Pública.
5	Existência de um departamento de ensino, pesquisa e valorização profissional dentro da Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (Senasp).
6	Sistemas de informação modernos.
7	Canais de diálogo com a sociedade civil.
8	Instrumentos para o enfrentamento ao crime organizado.
9	Investimento na estruturação das perícias criminais.
10	Fomento a alternativas penais à prisão.

(Continua)

(Continuação)

Pontos fracos	
1	Planejamento e gestão deficiente.
2	Muitas atribuições que provocam perda de foco.
3	Falta de mecanismos de financiamento de médio e longo prazo para programas prioritários.
4	Ineficácia, inadequação e ineficiência dos instrumentos de parceria.
5	Não utilização plena de suas capacidades para articular e induzir políticas.
6	Deficiência na integração com outras unidades da Federação e órgãos de segurança pública.
7	Falta de articulação com pastas da área social.
8	Comunicação interna e com a sociedade ineficaz.
9	Insuficiência de recursos humanos e de qualificação especializada e falta de gestão por competências.
10	Política insuficiente de controle do uso de arma.
11	Incapacidade de fiscalizar o setor de segurança privada.

Elaboração dos autores.

Nota: ¹ Swot – acrônimo em inglês de forças (strengths), fraquezas (weaknesses), oportunidades (opportunities) e ameaças (threats).

Ipea – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada

EDITORIAL

Coordenação

Aeromilson Trajano de Mesquita

Assistentes da Coordenação

Rafael Augusto Ferreira Cardoso

Samuel Elías de Souza

Supervisão

Aline Cristine Torres da Silva Martins

Revisão

Bruna Oliveira Ranquine da Rocha

Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves de Melo

Elaine Oliveira Couto

Lis Silva Hall

Luciana Bastos Dias

Rebeca Raimundo Cardoso dos Santos

Vivian Barros Volotão Santos

Débora Mello Lopes (estagiária)

Maria Eduarda Mendes Laguardia (estagiária)

Editoração

Aline Cristine Torres da Silva Martins

Mayana Mendes de Mattos

Mayara Barros da Mota

The manuscripts in languages other than Portuguese published herein have not been proofread.

Missão do Ipea

Aprimorar as políticas públicas essenciais ao desenvolvimento brasileiro por meio da produção e disseminação de conhecimentos e da assessoria ao Estado nas suas decisões estratégicas.

10TH ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL ISSUE

PRESENTATION: 10TH ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL ISSUE

Daniel Pitangueira de Avelino
Felix Garcia Lopez
Natália Massaco Koga

POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES

Luís Felipe Zilli

AFTERWORD – POLICE KILLINGS AND VICTIMIZATION: GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHENOMENON IN THREE BRAZILIAN STATES

Luís Felipe Zilli

POSFÁCIO – LETALIDADE E VITIMIZAÇÃO POLICIAL: CARACTERÍSTICAS GERAIS DO FENÔMENO EM TRÊS ESTADOS BRASILEIROS

Luís Felipe Zilli

PREVENTING VIOLENT SOCIAL CONFLICT DURING AND AFTER THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC: GUARANTEEING INCOME, FOCUSING ON MENTAL HEALTH, AND COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY

Rodrigo Fracalossi de Moraes

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY: INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FOR FEDERAL PUBLIC PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION IN BRAZIL

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa

MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT DRUG POLICY FORMULATION

Débora Medeiros
Luís Fernando Tófoli

THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL

Almir de Oliveira Junior

AFTERWORD – THE RELEVANCE OF POLICE INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS IMPROVEMENT IN BRAZIL

Almir de Oliveira Junior

POSFÁCIO – A IMPORTÂNCIA DAS ATIVIDADES DE INVESTIGAÇÃO E INTELIGÊNCIA POLICIAL PARA O SISTEMA DE JUSTIÇA CRIMINAL E SEU APERFEIÇOAMENTO NO BRASIL

Almir de Oliveira Junior

FROM #VIDASNASFAVELASIMPORTAM TO #NÓSPORNÓS: PERIPHERAL YOUTH AT THE CENTER OF THE DEBATE ON DRUG POLICY

Ana Clara Telles
Luna Arouca
Raull Santiago

THE DEBATE ON THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES PERFORMANCE IN THE COUNTRY: MAIN ARGUMENTS

Paulo Kliass

PUBLIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

Almir de Oliveira Junior
Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima

AFTERWORD – PUBLIC SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

Almir de Oliveira Junior
Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima

POSFÁCIO – SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA E RACISMO INSTITUCIONAL

Almir de Oliveira Junior
Verônica Couto de Araújo Lima

RECENT HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa
João Cláudio Pompeu

PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK

Helder Ferreira
Elaine Marcial
Joana Alencar

AFTERWORD – PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE PROJECT PUBLIC SECURITY IN BRAZIL: AN OUTLOOK

Helder Ferreira
Elaine Marcial
Joana Alencar

POSFÁCIO – RESULTADOS PRELIMINARES DO PROJETO A SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA NO BRASIL: UMA VISÃO PROSPECTIVA

Helder Ferreira
Elaine Marcial
Joana Alencar

